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ABSTRACT
This thesis consists of three essays in applied microeconomics.
In Chapter 1, I estimate the effect that wealth and power have on criminal justice outcomes by exploit-
ing the random matching of drivers to pedestrians in vehicle-pedestrian crashes. If justice is impartial,
we should observe the same share of rich offenders both for poor and rich victims, conditional on loca-
tion and time. Rich victims act as a control group to estimate the proportion of missing rich offenders
whose victims are less powerful. Using data from Russia, I find that its justice system is not impartial
and the disparity in outcomes is even more obvious for graver crashes.
Chapter 2 studies how race and gender affect the probability of receiving help in the United States.
Refining the approach of Chapter 1, we estimate whether drivers who hit a pedestrian decide to stay
or flee depending on the race or gender of their victim. We match crashes that happened under similar
circumstances and in proximity to each other in the U.S. We find that drivers generally do not discrimi-
nate pedestrians by gender, but do by race. Drivers stay less often for blacks than for whites, especially
in the white-majority neighborhoods.
Chapter 3 studies how the power imbalance between victims and defendants affects negotiations in
Victim-Defendant settlements in criminal justice. We develop a perfect-information game where the
victim and the defendant must exert costly effort for the case to reach prosecution, but they can settle
before the contest. Improving the defendant’s bargaining position reduces the settlement amount, yet
even affordable settlements can fail to happen. Using the data on criminal traffic offenses in Russia, we
structurally estimate the model and recover individual preferences and fighting abilities. We find that
the relation between the defendant’s wealth and the expected settlement offer is inversely U-shaped.
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1
MISS ING R ICH OFFENDERS : TRAFF IC ACC IDEN TS AND THE
IMPART IAL I T Y OF JUST ICE
An impartial legal system is an indicator of good institutions. In particular, the legal system should be
impartial to the influence of personal power, whatever its provenance: wealth, political authority, or
social connections.1 Measuring impartiality empirically, however, is a challenging task. There are two
main reasons for this. First, powerful offendersmay evade justice early in the legal process, and thusmay
not appear in any records. Second, their crimes may be incomparable in nature to the crimes committed
by the less powerful. In this paper, I propose a simple methodology to address these challenges. I test
this methodology by applying it to Russian data on criminal traffic offenses.
My identification strategy relies on the random matching of drivers with pedestrians in traffic acci-
dents in a given location and time. Since drivers typically do not choose whom to hit, the share of rich
– and hence powerful – offenders should be the same across all types of victims, rich or poor. It should
also remain the same among the cases chosen for prosecution, if the justice system is impartial. Under
impartial justice, different offenders are more or less likely to be prosecuted – for example because of
different degrees of culpability – but the identity of the victim must be irrelevant for the decision to
prosecute, resulting in identical profiles of prosecuted offenders across all victims.2
Specifically, if rich offenders are de facto more likely to evade justice, rich victims should also be
more successful in resisting such evasion (Hagan 1982). In this case, I expect the share of rich offenders
among the prosecuted cases to be lower for poor victims than for rich ones. Rich victims can thus act
as a control group to quantify the extent of missing rich offenders for poorer victims. In other words, I
estimate how many cases involving rich offenders and poor victims need to be added to the sample so
that rich offenders are balanced across all types of victims.3
1 See Glaeser, Scheinkman, and Shleifer (2003) for a discussion on how a legal system subverted by the powerful can lead to
weaker property rights protection and the propagation of economic inequality. For a discussion on the link between the quality
of institutions and economic development, see for example Acemoglu and Robinson (2013), Nunn and Puga (2012), Dell (2010),
Coatsworth (2008), and Glaeser et al. (2004).
2 The identification strategy is similar in spirit to Levitt and Porter (2001) who exploit the random matching of drivers in two-car
crashes to estimate the risks posed by drunk drivers. If sober and drunk drivers are equally likely to result in a fatal car crash,
then they should be “equally mixed” in the sample of fatal crashes. The distributional asymmetries allow them to recover how
deadly drunk drivers are.
3 The identification strategy is related to the literature on “missing” girls in China (Shi and Kennedy 2016; Johansson and Nygren
1991, e.g.), which uses the observed distortions in sex ratios among the newborn children to reveal the number of girls that have
been either aborted, killed in infancy, or underreported as a result of the one-child policy and the social preference for boys.
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I apply the method on police data from Russia, which ranks low in the effectiveness and the impar-
tiality of its criminal justice system, according to The World Justice Project (2014).4 In Russia, a traffic
offense is criminal if it has resulted in a grave (usually life-threatening) injury. The data represents all
prosecuted cases for criminal traffic offenses for 2013–2014. I restrict the sample to offenders of working
age who have hit one working-age pedestrian, in total 6, 600 cases from 1, 200 police departments with
the median of 2 observations per police department.
I proxy the level of resources that give power by employment status. I classify individuals in three
groups. Low-resource individuals are those with no permanent employment; high-resource individuals
are entrepreneurs, white-collar executives, and government officials. All remaining individuals are in
the middle group. As an alternative proxy for resources, I also use the offenders’ education level and
impute the prices for their cars based on their resale value. I observe the hour and date of the accident,
which allows to account for intra-day variation in the population of offenders and victims. I proxy the
location of an accident by the police department identifier, since police departments only investigate
offenses that happened on their territory.
I find two key results that raise doubts about the impartiality of justice in Russia. First, rich offenders
are prosecuted less often. Comparing the profiles of offenders when victims are poor relative to when
victims are rich, there are about 50% fewer top-group offenders and 40% fewer middle-group ones than
there should be, after accounting for police department and hour fixed effects. I infer that these missing
rich offenders have avoided prosecution at some earlier stage. Because of the inherent gravity of the
accidents in my sample, I can rule out that offenders compensate the victims on the spot to avoid police
investigation. Actually, the imbalance is even more evident for the cases involving the victim’s death.
The results are robust to using alternative proxies for resources, or to different regional breakdowns.
Second, I find that rich offenders are less likely to be punished in court. Among the prosecuted cases,
I see that rich offenders are incarcerated less often when their victims are less powerful. This imbalance
might be ascribed to settlements between parties, as allowed in the Russian justice system for unin-
tentional crimes (albeit with the approval of a judge). Indeed, when I estimate the combined share of
offenders who have either settled or been imprisoned, I find that this share is the same across all victims.
Taken at face value, this would misleadingly suggest that the court system is impartial. However, since
rich offenders are already less likely to be prosecuted in the first place, at the time of the accident the
probability of punishment actually does vary by type of victim: the middle-group offenders settle or
are imprisoned in 25% of cases when the victim is low-group versus 40-50% for middle- or top-group
4 See Paneyakh (2014) and Sklyaruk and Skougarevsky (2015) for the discussion on how Russian prosecutors, facing wrong incen-
tives to maximize their conviction statistics, may be more willing to prosecute low-resource offenders exploiting their low level
of resistance.
missing rich offenders: traffic accidents and the impartiality of justice 3
victims. Top-group offenders settle or are imprisoned in 8% of cases when the victim is less resourceful
versus roughly around 50% when the victim is also in the top group.
I acknowledge that the geographic area supervised by police departments may not be fine-grained
enough to eliminate all the spatial correlation. To check the quality of the controls, I run placebo tests
using other spatially correlated characteristics of offenders and victims (e.g., foreign citizenship) which
show that police-level fixed effects successfully eliminate spatial correlation for them. Also, results at
large are robust to elimination of the biggest – by the number of observations – police departments
from the sample. I also argue that the stronger evidence of missing rich offenders for more severe cases
cannot be explained by an omitted spatial segregation and is suggestive of other channels. While all of
the above does not rule out the residual presence of spatial correlation, it increases my confidence in
attributing the imbalanced distribution of offenders to the lack of impartiality in the justice system.
Methodologically this paper contributes to available empirical tests of unjustified biases in police and
court decisions (e.g., Alesina and La Ferrara 2014; Knowles, Persico, and Todd 2001; Shayo and Zuss-
man 2011).5 Glaeser and Sacerdote (2003) use traffic offenses for their exogenous pairing of offenders
with victims to test for gender and racial biases in criminal sentencing, but they do not address the
non-random selection of cases into court. My approach allows to estimate the disparities at earlier (un-
observed) stages of criminal justice, which is an important challenge in the literature on sentencing
disparities (Zatz and Hagan 1985; Ulmer 2012).6 Since the distribution of offenders should be indepen-
dent from the distribution of victims also in terms of attributes other thanwealth, one can apply the same
identification method to study racial, gender, and ethnic biases at different stages of criminal justice.7
This study is closely related to the literature on justice disparities for different socio-economic status
of offenders and in particular to the study by Volkov (2016).8 Basing his study on court data for violent
crimes, theft, drugs, and fraud, Volkov (2016) finds that judges in Russia tend to incarcerate the college-
educated less often and the unemployed more often. At the same time, the author observes that judges
incarcerate entrepreneurs and top managers more often, which he attributes to the judges’ bias against
people in “the position of trust and authority”. I find the opposite and I believe that the difference be-
5 Alesina and La Ferrara (2014) and Shayo and Zussman (2011) also exploit the identity of the victim in finding judicial bias. Alesina
and La Ferrara (2014) test racial bias by comparing the rates with which appellate courts reverse capital sentences for white
victims versus minority victims in the United States. Shayo and Zussman 2011 exploit a random assignment of judges to study
in-group bias through the variation in judges’ and plaintiffs’ ethnicities.
6 In general, empirical papers analyzing court data usually develop a theoretic model, specific to the setting, and use it to predict
the characteristics of cases that reach the sentencing stage and, thus, the direction of the bias (see for example, Ichino, Polo, and
Rettore 2003).
7 For example, for Russia I find that females tend to be prosecuted slightly more often when their victims are females as well,
revealing a pro-female bias in prosecution. However, the difference in prosecution rates does not translate into ex-ante disparities
in incarceration or settlement rates.
8 See D’Alessio and Stolzenberg 1993, for a general overview of the literature. Other studies that investigate the effect of resources
on justice include the literature on corporate advantage (e.g., Yoav 1999; Bacher et al. 2005) and on the effect of private versus
public defense counseling (e.g., Champion 1989; Rattner, Turjeman, and Fishman 2008; Hartley, Miller, and Spohn 2010).
4 missing rich offenders: traffic accidents and the impartiality of justice
tween our results is driven by missing offenders and a selection bias. In particular, crimes committed
by entrepreneurs and top managers may be qualitatively different from the same-category crimes com-
mitted by lower-status offenders, which is a general concern in the literature. Rather than comparing
judicial outcomes for rich to poor offenders directly, traffic offenses allow us to measure the disparity
throughout the justice system via the random variation of victims’ resources.
This paper is also related to the normative studies of whether wealthy offenders should be allowed
to “buy” justice, which usually omit the role of the victim, assuming that the interaction is between the
offender and the prosecutor (e.g., Garoupa and Gravelle 2003).9 My results show that the interaction
can be between the offender and the victim, which may have policy-relevant implications.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.1 presents the identification strategy. Sec-
tion 1.2 provides institutional framework and summarizes the data. Section 1.3 presents results for pros-
ecution and for incarceration and settlement rates, and discusses possible mechanisms behind missing
rich offenders. The last section concludes.
1.1 identification strategy
This section provides definitions and describes the identification strategy used in the paper. I first present
the simplest case, in which resources are binary, and then I explain how it adapts to more resource levels.
The general case with continuous resources is presented in Appendix 1.A.
1.1.1 Binary resources
In a given location and time 𝑔, an offending driver (O) hits a random pedestrian, called the victim (V).
Offenders and victims are endowed with resources that give power, denoted as 𝑟𝑜 and 𝑟𝑣 respectively.
The level of resources can be low (𝐿), or high (𝐻 ): 𝑟𝑜 , 𝑟𝑣 ∈ {𝐿, 𝐻}. In location 𝑔, the probability that
the offender is rich is denoted as Pr(𝑟𝑜 = 𝐻), while Pr(𝑟𝑣 = 𝐻) denotes the probability that the victim
is rich. There are four possible combinations of offender-victim resources, 𝑟𝑜 × 𝑟𝑣 ∈ {𝐿𝐿, 𝐿𝐻 , 𝐻𝐿, 𝐻𝐻}.
Since drivers are randomly matched to victims, the distributions of their resources are independent.
Hence, the joint probability function is the multiplication of the marginal distributions:
Pr(𝑟𝑜 , 𝑟𝑣) = Pr(𝑟𝑜) Pr(𝑟𝑣) for 𝑟𝑜 , 𝑟𝑣 ∈ {𝐿, 𝐻} (1)
9 See also Lott Jr (1987), Arlen (1992), Kobayashi and Lott (1996), and Clark (1997)
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Because of independence, the share of 𝐻 offenders is the same for 𝐻 or 𝐿 victims in the population of
accidents and equal to the unconditional share of the 𝐻 -type among offenders:10
Pr(𝑟𝑜 = 𝐻 ∣ 𝑟𝑣 = 𝐿) = Pr(𝑟𝑜 = 𝐻 ∣ 𝑟𝑣 = 𝐻) = Pr(𝑟𝑜 = 𝐻) (2)
After the accident, the legal system decides whether to prosecute (or, more generally, punish) the
offender, 𝑃 = 1, or not, 𝑃 = 0.11 Only prosecuted cases are observed. The probability of prosecution,
Pr(𝑃 = 1 ∣ 𝑟𝑜 , 𝑟𝑣), is denoted as 𝜋(𝑟𝑜 , 𝑟𝑣), which is a function of the victim’s and offender’s resources. I
denote the relative prosecution rates for 𝐻 versus 𝐿 offenders for a given 𝑟𝑣 as:
𝜌𝐻𝐿 (𝑟𝑣) ≡
𝜋(𝑟𝑜 = 𝐻, 𝑟𝑣)
𝜋(𝑟𝑜 = 𝐿, 𝑟𝑣)
(3)
For example, 𝜌𝐻𝐿 (𝑟𝑣 = 𝐿) = 2/3 means that for every three poor offenders the system prosecutes two
rich offenders, given the victim is poor.The value of 𝜌𝐻𝐿 (𝑟𝑣 = 𝐿) does not have a normative interpretation,
because 𝐻 offenders may differ from 𝐿 offenders in their culpability or the propensity to run away.
However, there is no reasonwhy the relative prosecution rate should differ across victims in an impartial
legal system.
Definition 1. A justice system is impartial if the relative prosecution rate does not depend on the resources
of the victim:
𝜌𝐻𝐿 (𝑟𝑣 = 𝐿) = 𝜌𝐻𝐿 (𝑟𝑣 = 𝐻)
Let 𝛿𝐻 (𝑟𝑣) denote the expected share of 𝐻 offenders among the prosecuted cases conditional on the
victim’s resource level. I can express it as a function of 𝜌𝐻𝐿 (𝑟𝑣) and Pr(𝑟𝑜 = 𝐻):12
𝛿𝐻 (𝑟𝑣) ≡ 𝑃𝑟(𝑟𝑜 = 𝐻 |𝑟𝑣 , 𝑃 = 1) =
𝜌𝐻𝐿 (𝑟𝑣)
𝜌𝐻𝐿 (𝑟𝑣) + 1−Pr(𝑟𝑜=𝐻)Pr(𝑟𝑜=𝐻)
(4)
Then, the odds ratio of observing an 𝐻 offender given the victims are 𝐿-type as opposed to 𝐻 -type
captures the ratio of the relative prosecution rates:
𝛿𝐻 (𝑟𝑣 = 𝐿)/ (1 − 𝛿𝐻 (𝑟𝑣 = 𝐿))
𝛿𝐻 (𝑟𝑣 = 𝐻)/ (1 − 𝛿𝐻 (𝑟𝑣 = 𝐻))
= 𝜌
𝐻𝐿 (𝑟𝑣 = 𝐿)
𝜌𝐻𝐿 (𝑟𝑣 = 𝐻)
(5)
10 Proof: Pr(𝑟𝑜 = 𝐻 ∣ 𝑟𝑣 ) = Pr(𝑟𝑜=𝐻,𝑟𝑣 )Pr(𝑟𝑜=𝐻,𝑟𝑣 )+Pr(𝑟𝑜=𝐿,𝑟𝑣 ) =
Pr(𝑟𝑜=𝐻) Pr(𝑟𝑣 )
Pr(𝑟𝑜=𝐻) Pr(𝑟𝑣 )+Pr(𝑟𝑜=𝐿) Pr(𝑟𝑣 )
= Pr(𝑟𝑜 = 𝐻)
11 Other types of punishment may include the decision to report, indict, incarcerate, etc.
12 Proof: Use Bayes’ rule and Equations (1), (2), and (3)
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Proposition 1. The justice system is impartial if and only if the odds ratio of observing a rich offender
between poor and rich victims is equal to one:
𝜌𝐻𝐿 (𝑟𝑣 = 𝐿) = 𝜌𝐻𝐿 (𝑟𝑣 = 𝐻) ⟺
𝛿𝐻 (𝑟𝑣 = 𝐿)/ (1 − 𝛿𝐻 (𝑟𝑣 = 𝐿))
𝛿𝐻 (𝑟𝑣 = 𝐻)/ (1 − 𝛿𝐻 (𝑟𝑣 = 𝐻))
= 1 (6)
which is equivalent to observing the same share of rich offenders for poor and rich victims:13
𝜌𝐻𝐿 (𝑟𝑣 = 𝐿) = 𝜌𝐻𝐿 (𝑟𝑣 = 𝐻) ⟺ 𝛿𝐻 (𝑟𝑣 = 𝐿) = 𝛿𝐻 (𝑟𝑣 = 𝐻) (7)
Otherwise, if justice is not impartial, I expect 𝐻 offenders to be prosecuted less frequently when their
victims are 𝐿, rather than 𝐻 , i.e. 𝜌𝐻𝐿 (𝑟𝑣 = 𝐿) < 𝜌𝐻𝐿 (𝑟𝑣 = 𝐻). Hence, I expect lower odds of observing a
rich offender for the less powerful victims:
𝜌𝐻𝐿 (𝑟𝑣 = 𝐿) < 𝜌𝐻𝐿 (𝑟𝑣 = 𝐻) ⟺ 𝛿𝐻 (𝑟𝑣 = 𝐿) < 𝛿𝐻 (𝑟𝑣 = 𝐻)
⟺ 𝛿
𝐻 (𝑟𝑣 = 𝐿)/ (1 − 𝛿𝐻 (𝑟𝑣 = 𝐿))
𝛿𝐻 (𝑟𝑣 = 𝐻)/ (1 − 𝛿𝐻 (𝑟𝑣 = 𝐻))
< 1
1.1.2 Empirical approach when resources are binary
Using the prosecuted traffic offenses in location 𝑔, I can fit the following population regression function:
1{𝑟𝑜 = 𝐻}𝑐 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1{𝑟𝑣 = 𝐻}𝑐 + 𝑢𝑐 (8)
where 1{𝑟𝑜 = 𝐻}𝑐 and 1{𝑟𝑣 = 𝐻}𝑐 are the indicator functions for the rich offender and the rich victim,
respectively; 𝑐 is the case identifier, and 𝑢 is the error term. The regression parameters 𝛼 and 𝛽 help
capturing the following parameters of interest:
𝛼 = 𝛿𝐻 (𝑟𝑣 = 𝐿) (9)
𝛽 = 𝛿𝐻 (𝑟𝑣 = 𝐻) − 𝛿𝐻 (𝑟𝑣 = 𝐿) (10)
13 Proof. Condition (6) follows from Equation (5). Condition (7) is the result of
𝛿𝐻 (𝑟𝑣 = 𝐿)/ (1 − 𝛿𝐻 (𝑟𝑣 = 𝐿))
𝛿𝐻 (𝑟𝑣 = 𝐻)/ (1 − 𝛿𝐻 (𝑟𝑣 = 𝐻))
= 1 ⟺ 𝛿𝐻 (𝑟𝑣 = 𝐿) = 𝛿𝐻 (𝑟𝑣 = 𝐻)
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𝛼/(1 − 𝛼)
(𝛼 + 𝛽)/(1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽) =
𝜌𝐻𝐿 (𝑟𝑣 = 𝐿)
𝜌𝐻𝐿 (𝑟𝑣 = 𝐻)
(11)
Using Proposition 1, I can test the impartiality by testing the following hypothesis:
𝐻0 ∶ 𝛽 = 0 (12)
If 𝛽 = 0, then the odds ratio 𝛼/(1−𝛼)(𝛼+𝛽)/(1−𝛼−𝛽) = 1.
Because of Equation (11), the odds ratio has a direct interpretation. The lower its value, the greater is
the share of missing 𝐻 offenders. For example, 𝜌
𝐻𝐿 (𝑟𝑣=𝐿)
𝜌𝐻𝐿 (𝑟𝑣=𝐻)
= 0.75 means that only three out of four cases
involving rich offenders and poor victims have been prosecuted relative to the number observed for rich
victims – i.e., one quarter of cases involving rich offenders and poor victims is missing.
The identification strategy is robust to allowing risky behavior of pedestrians and drivers to correlate
with the level of their resources. Risk-taking behavior changes the marginal distribution of types for of-
fenders and victims, but the two distributions remain independent, as long as risky behaviour of drivers
does not depend on which pedestrians are around, and vice versa. Potential problems arise if the system
prosecutes only those cases where the offender was relatively more culpable than the victim, leading
to a violation of the independence assumption. I test this hypothetical prosecution rule for Russia in
Appendix 1.E.1 and do not find reasons for such concerns.
1.1.3 Three or more levels of resources
When there are more than two levels of resources, the procedure can always be reduced to the binary
case, by picking just two levels of 𝑟𝑜 and two levels of 𝑟𝑣 at a time and finding the corresponding odds
ratio. Alternatively, several adjacent levels can be combined into one.
I denote the observed share of 𝑖-type offenders conditional on the victim’s resource level in the sample
restricted for 𝑖-type and 𝑗-type offenders only as:
𝛿 𝑖𝑗(𝑟𝑣) ≡ 𝑃𝑟(𝑟𝑜 = 𝑖|𝑟𝑜 ∈ {𝑖, 𝑗}, 𝑟𝑣 ; 𝑃 = 1)
Then, equation (5) can be restated as:
𝛿 𝑖𝑗(𝑟𝑣 = 𝑘)/ (1 − 𝛿 𝑖𝑗(𝑟𝑣 = 𝑘))
𝛿 𝑖𝑗(𝑟𝑣 = 𝑙)/ (1 − 𝛿 𝑖𝑗(𝑟𝑣 = 𝑙))
= 𝜌
𝑖𝑗(𝑟𝑣 = 𝑘)
𝜌𝑖𝑗(𝑟𝑣 = 𝑙)
(13)
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For example, when there are three levels of resources – 𝐿 for low, 𝑀 for middle, and 𝐻 for high,
𝐿 < 𝑀 < 𝐻 – it gives nine possible combinations of offender-victim resources and nine odds ratios to
estimate: 𝜌
𝑖𝑗 (𝑟𝑣=𝑘)
𝜌𝑖𝑗 (𝑟𝑣=𝑙)
, such that 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘, 𝑙 ∈ {𝐿,𝑀, 𝐻}, 𝑖 > 𝑗, 𝑘 < 𝑙. When 𝑖 = 𝑙 and 𝑗 = 𝑘, I call such odds
ratios symmetric, otherwise, the odds ratios are asymmetric. For example, an asymmetric odds ratio
that captures 𝜌
𝐻𝐿 (𝑟𝑣=𝐿)
𝜌𝐻𝐿 (𝑟𝑣=𝑀)
tells us the share of non-missing 𝐻 offenders for 𝐿 victims using𝑀 victims (and
𝐿 offenders) as the control group.
1.2 institutional setup and data
This section introduces the institutional setup of Russia and summarizes the information about the data.
1.2.1 Criminal traffic offenses and punishment
Russia has a civil law legal system. The Criminal Code of Russia classifies bodily injuries into “light”,
“average”, and “severe”, where severe injuries are usually life-threatening or leading to disability. A
traffic offense is considered to be criminal if the driver has caused someone else a “severe” injury.
The Code distinguishes criminal traffic offenses based on the number of fatalities it has caused: for
the cases involving only one pedestrian, there are either no death or one death. The Code further differ-
entiates between sober and intoxicated offenders, giving a total of four different offense groups, each of
which is potentially punishable by incarceration. The maximum prison sentence varies with the offense
type: it starts at two years for no death + sober and rises up to seven years for one death + intoxicated.
The no death + sober offense type also allows for milder forms of punishments including the “limitation
of freedom”, which imposes some restrictions on movement at night, on leaving the municipality and
requires regular check-ups with the authorities, among other things.
The criminal court usually revokes the driver’s license and decides on the amount of compensation
of damages for pain and suffering the defendant has to pay to the victim. The compensation of the
medical expenses and property damage almost always involves the insurance company of the offender
in a separate civil case, which depends on the results of the criminal.
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1.2.2 Legal process
The timeline of events in the legal process for a criminal offense can be split into three parts: (1) the
police investigation and the decision of the prosecutor; (2) decision to settle, and (3) the court trial.
When a traffic accident happens, the local road police arrives at the scene. If someone is severely
injured, an investigator from the local police department joins the investigation. She registers the case as
a criminal offense after collecting themedical reports about severe injuries. At this stage, the information
about the circumstances of the criminal case and the information on the victim enters the police records.
Based on the evidence collected by the investigator, the prosecutor decides whether to prosecute the
suspected offender, if there is one. If the suspect is prosecuted, the information about him enters the
police records.
After the decision to prosecute, defendants may settle with the victims. A settlement between the
offender and the victim involves the following steps: (1) the defendant compensates the the victim or
the close family members for the damages for pain and suffering; (2) the victim forgives the offender
and officially asks the criminal charges to be dropped; (3) subject to the approval of the judge (or earlier
with the permission of the prosecutor) the offender (a) gets no criminal conviction, since his guilt is not
ruled by court, (b) keeps his driver’s license, and (c) may settle again in future even for the same offense.
The information about the settlement, nevertheless, enters the police database.
If no settlement is reached, the case is forwarded to court and the judge decides whether the defendant
is guilty or not. A prominent feature of the Russian criminal system is that acquittals in court are very
rare, less than 1% out of total traffic offenses in court.Thus, the court is de facto the sentencing stage of the
criminal justice (Volkov 2016; Shklyaruk 2014; Trochev 2014). In practice, incarcerations are rare for no
death + sober offenses, but quite common for the rest. Table 1 summarizes the statistics of outcomes for
all criminal traffic offenses tried in Russian courts in 2009–2013 by the offense groups. The table shows
that the probability of settlements (imprisonment) drop (increase) with the severity of the offense.
1.2.3 Data
The data comes from the Russian centralized police-database for 2013–2014.14 Each investigation is
recorded by different personnel in police and prosecutor offices through different statistical forms.
14 The access is provided by the Institute for the Rule of Law at the European University at Saint Petersburg. The Institute has
cleaned and transformed the raw administrative data into a Stata database with the support of Russian Science Foundation grant
17-18-01618.
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Table 1: The classification of traffic offenses
The Criminal Code classification Summary statistics⋆
# Fatalities Offender’s Max
state prison Settled Probation Incarceration
(yrs) (%) (%) (%) (avg. yrs)
1 No death Sober 2 43 30 3 1.4
2 No death Intoxicated 3 22 50 26 1.9
3 One death Sober 3 23 44 31 2.3
4 One death Intoxicated 7 5 23 70 3.1
⋆Source: Official database of court data; averaged over 2009–2013;
The first set of forms represents the entirety of the criminal cases that have been registered by the
police. The data includes a short description of each case provided by the investigators for their own
easy reference. Hence, the style and the amount of detail contained in the description vary across police
departments. I identify the cases that involve pedestrians by using an automated regular expressions
parser I developed for this project. The parser captures the patterns of texts associated with pedestrians
in the description: either a direct use of the word ‘pedestrian’ with its derivatives or patterns like ‘hit
[the name of the victim] who was crossing the street’. The search has identified 21, 300 such cases out
of more than 70, 000 criminal traffic offenses, 96% of which involve a single victim.
The information on the hour of the accident is available in 80% of cases and the presence of this
information is not correlated with any particular combination of offender-victim resources (see Table 15
in Appendix 1.E.2). I interact the hour of the accident with the day of the week, differentiating between
the weekdays, Saturdays, and Sundays. Since accidents are rarer during weekends and nights, I recode
some hours into bigger groups. For weekdays, I group the accidents after midnight and before 5 am. For
weekends, I divide the hours into four groups: 1 am to 7 am, 8 am to noon, 1 pm to 5 pm, and 6 pm to
midnight. For example, all accidents that happened at 2 pm on Monday are in the same group as other
2 pm accidents from other weekdays, but not together with 2 pm accidents from Saturday or Sunday.
Among the pedestrian victims, 38% died in the accident, 50% are females, 9% are minors, 22% are
retired, 40% have no permanent employment, 20% are blue-collar workers, 2% are white-collar workers,
less than 1% each are government officials and businessmen. The police has failed to find the offender in
25% of cases, which includes the official reports about the failure and cases with the missing information
on the suspect. In 6% of cases the initial charges have been dropped. The remaining 69% have been
prosecuted.
The second type of forms provide information on defendants. I have merged these forms with the
previous using the case identifiers, the police department number and the year of the registration of
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the case. For cases involving one pedestrian victim, it amounts to 14, 100 prosecuted offenders, who are
90% males, 5% retirees, 34% with no permanent employment, 45% blue-collar workers, 5% white-collar
workers (out of which 1% are executives), 3% businessmen, and 1% government officials. About 16% of
offenders have a criminal record. Among offenders, 16% settled, 12% were punished by the limitation
of freedom, 10% received a suspended prison term, and 12% were incarcerated. In another 21% of cases,
the offender was found guilty, but not punished thanks to the amnesty for no deaths + sober offenses in
one of the years. In 25% of cases, the records state that the case is before the court but does not specify
the outcome.
As the primary proxy for resources, I use the employment status (or simply the status), denoted as
𝑠𝑜 for offenders and 𝑠𝑣 for victims, where 𝑠𝑜 , 𝑠𝑣 ∈ {𝐿,𝑀, 𝐻}. I exclude cases that involve children, stu-
dents, and retirees. The 𝐿 type, which includes individuals that do not have permanent employment,
represents 56% of victims and 37% of offenders. The 𝐻 type, which includes white-collar top-managers,
entrepreneurs, and government officials, including law enforcement officials, accounts for 2% of victims
and 7% of offenders. The officials are considered to have greater knowledge about the judicial system
and be better connected to the decision-makers on their case, even if they are not wealthier than the
white-collar workers. The 𝑀 type, mostly blue-collar workers, constitute 42% of victims and 57% of
offenders.
In total, there are 8, 100 cases, but only 6, 600 cases has the information on the hour of the accident.
Table 2 shows the distribution of cases across offender-victim status groups. The 𝐻 type is the least
populous, with just 16 observations for 𝐻 -type offenders and 𝐻 -type victims. The mass of observations
is for 𝐿 and 𝑀 types.
Table 2: Number of observations in each group
Victim
L M H
Off
en
de
r L 1, 748 695 49
M 1, 829 1, 821 83
H 192 176 16
Additional proxies for offenders’ resources are based on their education and the imputed car prices.
I classify offenders into three groups based on educational achievement, 𝑒𝑜 ∈ {𝑠𝑐ℎ, 𝑣𝑜𝑐, 𝑐𝑜𝑙}. The lowest
level includes school graduates with no further education (10% of offenders). The middle level includes
vocational training or other types of degrees that do not constitute a college degree (70% of offenders).
College graduates, the highest level, represent 20% of offenders.
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Information on cars driven by offenders comes from the case description. Usually, the text mentions
the car driven by the offender before any other participant. For those first-mentioned cars I impute the
estimated value using the online advertisements of secondary car sales on auto.ru retrieved in October
2014. Car prices are available for 4, 400 offenders. I impute the prices based on the mean observed for a
certain car brand and model in the advertisements. Additionally, there are 700 truck, bus, and motorbike
drivers, for whom the prices are not available. I allocate offenders into three groups based on the cars
they drive, denoted 𝑐𝑜 ∈ {inf, nor, lux}. The lowest, inferior, group includes trucks, buses, motorbikes,
and cars with the imputed price below 250, 000 RUB (about 4, 500 USD at the time of writing), which
represents 59% of offenders. The middle group includes normal cars: those with the imputed price above
250, 000 but below 500, 000 RUB (25% of offenders). The top group includes all other cars, which I refer
to as luxury cars (16% of offenders).
Table 3 summarizes the statistics for the 8, 100 cases by the employment status of victims and offend-
ers. It shows averages of the variables for each status and the two normalized differences for 𝑀 versus
𝐿, and 𝐻 versus 𝑀 . The normalized difference is calculated as the difference in averages divided by the
square root of the average of the standard deviations.15 This measure is more relevant in assessing im-
balances across groups than the t-statistic, and the normalized difference greater than 0.25 indicates an
imbalance (Imbens and Wooldridge 2009).
I observe more deaths among 𝐿 victims than for higher-status victims.The higher-status offenders are
more likely to be college graduates and tend to drive more expensive cars, although the mean difference
between 𝐿 and 𝑀 offenders is not as pronounced as that between 𝑀 and 𝐻 . 𝐿 offenders are also on
average younger than the rest and tend to come from areas with a lower load of traffic offenses per
police department, possibly linked to rural areas.
The statuses of victims and offenders are correlated. 𝐻 victims are more likely to be hit by expensive
cars and college-educated offenders. Nevertheless, offenders and victims across all status levels do not
differ in the general characteristics of the accidents: time, day, month, and location within or outside
the city (as captured by regular expressions from the case descriptions).
Figure 1 shows the density of police departments by number of observations. Among 6, 600 cases that
have full information, the average number of observations per police department is 5.45 and the median
is 2. There are six departments with more than 100 observations each, with a single one having 269
cases. It could be that some departments oversee a territory too large to be used as the location control.
In Section 1.E.5, I show that the main results are mostly robust to the gradual removal of the largest
15 𝑛𝑑 = ( ̄𝑋𝑗 − ̄𝑋𝑘) /√
𝑆2𝑗 +𝑆2𝑘
2 where ̄𝑋𝑖 is the mean and 𝑆𝑖 is the standard deviation of a variable 𝑋 for group 𝑖.
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics for 8, 100 prosecuted cases by the employment status of victims or offenders
By Victim type: By Offender type:
𝐿 𝑀 𝐻 𝑀-𝐿 𝐻 -𝑀 𝐿 𝑀 𝐻 𝑀-𝐿 𝐻 -𝑀
?̂? ?̂? ?̂? nd nd ?̂? ?̂? ?̂? nd nd
Victim info:
𝑠𝑣 ∈ {𝑀, 𝐻} 0.30 0.52 0.51 0.44 -0.02
𝑠𝑣 = 𝐻 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.18
died 0.37 0.27 0.24 -0.22 -0.06 0.30 0.33 0.37 0.05 0.09
female 0.38 0.43 0.30 0.10 -0.27 0.38 0.41 0.41 0.07 -0.01
intoxicated 0.06 0.04 0.01 -0.08 -0.18 0.05 0.04 0.06 -0.04 0.06
Offender info:
𝑠𝑜 ∈ {𝑀, 𝐻} 0.53 0.74 0.67 0.44 -0.14
𝑠𝑜 = 𝐻 0.05 0.06 0.14 0.06 0.25
college 0.21 0.20 0.29 -0.02 0.21 0.14 0.22 0.46 0.22 0.51
female 0.09 0.08 0.11 -0.02 0.08 0.07 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.04
age:
<24 0.23 0.21 0.19 -0.05 -0.06 0.26 0.21 0.05 -0.11 -0.48
>40 0.31 0.34 0.35 0.07 0.02 0.26 0.36 0.37 0.22 0.03
intoxicated 0.13 0.12 0.17 -0.02 0.12 0.15 0.12 0.11 -0.12 -0.03
crime history 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.03 -0.00 0.20 0.14 0.13 -0.17 -0.02
car info present 0.60 0.55 0.59 -0.10 0.07 0.59 0.57 0.50 -0.03 -0.16
car price present 0.50 0.47 0.52 -0.06 0.09 0.51 0.49 0.42 -0.04 -0.13
imputed price 0.30 0.28 0.38 -0.06 0.38 0.27 0.30 0.41 0.12 0.43
Accident:
hour info present 0.82 0.80 0.81 -0.04 0.02 0.80 0.82 0.85 0.04 0.08
hour (14 = 2 pm) 14.68 14.04 14.79 -0.10 0.12 14.76 14.21 14.41 -0.09 0.03
day (3 = Wed) 3.01 3.11 3.08 0.05 -0.01 2.95 3.10 3.23 0.07 0.07
month (7 = Jul) 7.37 7.52 7.41 0.04 -0.03 7.32 7.50 7.56 0.06 0.02
outside of city1 0.17 0.14 0.15 -0.09 0.02 0.17 0.15 0.17 -0.06 0.07
in city (streets)1 0.40 0.46 0.50 0.13 0.08 0.43 0.43 0.38 0.01 -0.10
# cases/police2 207 237 189 0.07 -0.11 155 262 220 0.26 -0.09
Outcomes:
settlement 0.18 0.17 0.14 -0.03 -0.08 0.14 0.19 0.24 0.13 0.12
reached court 0.61 0.57 0.60 -0.08 0.06 0.60 0.59 0.58 -0.03 -0.01
out of which:
lim. freedom 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.07 -0.08 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.02 -0.08
real incarcer.n 0.12 0.11 0.18 -0.04 0.20 0.14 0.10 0.11 -0.10 0.01
?̂?: mean; nd: normalized difference;
1 if location is mentioned in the case description;
2 number of all criminal traffic offenses registered per police department in 2013-2014.
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police departments from the sample. Figure 2 in Appendix 1.B provides information on the distribution
of the sample for each combination of offender-victim employment statuses across police departments’
sample sizes.
Figure 1: The distribution of police departments by sample size
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1.3 empirical results
This section presents the empirical setup and results.
1.3.1 Setup
I modify regression (8) to account for the unobserved variation in the marginal distributions of offenders
and victims across locations and time by including indicators for police departments, 𝑝𝑐 ; hour&day, 𝑡𝑐 ;
month, 𝑚𝑐 ; and year, 𝑦𝑐 , as:
1{𝑟𝑜 = 𝑖 𝑣𝑠. 𝑗}𝑐 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑀1{𝑟𝑣 = 𝑀}𝑐 + 𝛽𝐻1{𝑟𝑣 = 𝐻}𝑐
+ 𝛾𝑝𝑐 + 𝜏𝑡 𝑡𝑐 + 𝜏𝑚𝑚𝑐 + 𝜏𝑦𝑦𝑐 + 𝑢𝑐
𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ {𝐿,𝑀, 𝐻}
(14)
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where the dependent variable 1{𝑟𝑜 = 𝑖 𝑣𝑠. 𝑗}𝑐 equals one if the offender in case 𝑐 has status 𝑖, and zero,
if it is 𝑗, so the sample is restricted just for two types of offenders, 𝑖 and 𝑗. The regression estimates
two slopes: 𝛽𝑀 for 𝑀-type victims and 𝛽𝐻 for 𝐻 -type victims. I use the linear regression specification
because it provides consistent estimates for the population parameters even when the number of fixed
effects is large, while logit or probit models are inconsistent (Greene 2002; Angrist and Pischke 2008).
In total, I estimate the regression separately on three samples of offenders: 𝑀 vs. 𝐿, 𝐻 vs. 𝐿, and 𝐻 vs.
𝑀 .
Note that:
𝛼 = 𝛿 𝑖𝑗(𝑟𝑣 = 𝐿)
𝛼 + 𝛽𝑀 = 𝛿 𝑖𝑗(𝑟𝑣 = 𝑀)
𝛼 + 𝛽𝐻 = 𝛿 𝑖𝑗(𝑟𝑣 = 𝐻)
which allows to estimate the relative prosecution rates as in Equation (13) for 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘, 𝑙 ∈ {𝐿,𝑀, 𝐻}, 𝑖 >
𝑗, 𝑘 < 𝑙.
Table 4: Regression results for prosecuted cases: with and without the fixed effects
Dependent variable:
1{𝑠𝑜 = 𝑀 𝑣𝑠. 𝐿} 1{𝑠𝑜 = 𝐻 𝑣𝑠. 𝐿} 1{𝑠𝑜 = 𝐻 𝑣𝑠. 𝑀}
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
̂𝛽𝑀 0.212 0.120 0.114 0.103 0.073 0.071 −0.007 0.012 0.014
(0.014) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.021) (0.020) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013)
̂𝛽𝐻 0.117 0.035 0.046 0.147 0.106 0.092 0.067 0.081 0.089
(0.050) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.085) (0.083) (0.038) (0.047) (0.046)
?̂? 0.511 0.550 0.553 0.099 0.109 0.110 0.095 0.085 0.084
N 6,224 6,224 6,224 2,875 2,875 2,875 4,117 4,117 4,117
p-values for H0:
̂𝛽𝑀 = 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.482 0.315 0.272̂𝛽𝐻 = 0 0.019 0.545 0.421 0.010 0.212 0.268 0.081 0.082 0.050̂𝛽𝑀 = ̂𝛽𝐻 = 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.131 0.182 0.120
Fixed effects:
Police department ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Hour×Day, month, yr ✔ ✔ ✔
* These are the results for the OLS regression of the status of the offender on the status of the victim as in
Equation (14). N is the number of observations.
** Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the police level.
*** 𝛼 is reconstructed at the means of covariates.
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1.3.2 Probability of prosecution
Table 4 presents the estimates for 𝛼 , 𝛽𝑀 and 𝛽𝐻 for all three samples using the employment status as
the proxy for resources, i.e., 𝑟𝑜 = 𝑠𝑜 and 𝑟𝑣 = 𝑠𝑣 . Column 1, 4, and 7 provide the OLS results without
the location and time fixed effects. Among the prosecuted cases, richer offenders are correlated with
richer victims. Location fixed effects reduces the magnitude of the correlation, as predicted; however,
not enough to eliminate all the correlation (See Columns 2, 5, and 8).The time fixed effects do not change
the results (Columns 3,6, and 9).
According to the individual and joint significance of 𝛽-parameters (the lower part of Table 4), I can
reject the null hypothesis that the prosecution is impartial. For the sample of𝑀 versus 𝐿 offenders and𝐻
versus 𝐿 offenders, 𝛽𝑀 is significantly greater than zero. For the sample of 𝐻 versus𝑀 offenders, it is 𝛽𝐻
that is greater than zero at 5% significance level. Across all samples, 𝛽𝐻 is estimated less precisely than
𝛽𝑀 due to the smaller sample of 𝐻 victims. As predicted, the signs of 𝛽𝑀 and 𝛽𝐻 are positive, implying
that rich victims are better able to prosecute rich offenders.
Table 5: Prosecuted cases: symmetric odds ratios†
Definitions of 𝐻 , 𝐿 Ratio est. se p-val H0: Ratio= 1 N
Poor=𝐿, Rich= 𝑀 𝜌
𝑀𝐿 (𝑠𝑣 = 𝐿)
𝜌𝑀𝐿 (𝑠𝑣 = 𝑀)
0.618 (0.046) 0.000 6,224
Poor=𝐿, Rich= 𝐻 𝜌
𝐻𝐿 (𝑠𝑣 = 𝐿)
𝜌𝐻𝐿 (𝑠𝑣 = 𝐻)
0.488 (0.257) 0.047 2,875
Poor=𝑀 , Rich=𝐻 𝜌
𝐻𝑀 (𝑠𝑣 = 𝑀)
𝜌𝐻𝑀 (𝑠𝑣 = 𝐻)
0.518 (0.163) 0.003 4,117
† Symmetric odds ratios use the same definitions of rich and poor for both victims and offenders
(see Section 1.1.3).
* Estimates of the odds ratios are based on equation (13) and the results in Table 4 with location
and time fixed effects. For example, the first row is calculated using the results in Column 3
of Table 4, as ?̂?/(1−?̂?)(?̂?+ ̂𝛽𝑀 )/(1−?̂?− ̂𝛽𝑀 ) . N is the number of observations.** Standard errors are estimated using Delta method.
Table 5 reports the odds ratios for symmetric groups of offenders and victims.16 It shows that the
justice system prosecutes only six out of ten𝑀-type offenders who hit an 𝐿-type victim in comparison to
all ten who hit an𝑀-type victim. In other words, four out of ten𝑀-type offenders are missing for 𝐿-type
victims. The test strongly rejects the null hypothesis that the justice system treats 𝐿 and 𝑀 individuals
impartially (i.e., that the odds ratio is equals one). Comparing 𝐿 to 𝐻 individuals, the odds ratio is lower
– only every second 𝐻 -type offender is not missing for 𝐿-type victims – but it is imprecise. Despite the
16 See the full table with the asymmetric groups in Appendix 1.C.
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imprecision, the test still rejects the impartiality under 5% significance level. Comparing𝑀 to 𝐻 groups,
every second 𝐻 -type offender is missing for 𝑀-type victims, and the impartiality is rejected. Overall,
the results show that a substantial number of offenders is missing when offenders are richer than their
victims.
If I use other proxies for offenders’ resources, I also find evidence that rich offenders are missing
disproportionately for poor victims. Specifically, I find that around a half of luxury-car drivers is missing
when victims are 𝐿-type. The estimates of the odds ratios for college-educated offenders are below the
impartiality level of onewhen compared to offenders with no college degree, but they are not significant.
At the same time, I find that offenders with the vocational training disappear disproportionately when
compared to the offenders who have only a school degree. See Appendix 1.D for more details.
1.3.3 Results by the severity of the offense
I perform the same analysis separately for the sample of cases with no death + sober offenses (less severe)
and for the sample with all other cases that include deaths or intoxicated offenders (more severe). The
results for both samples are in line with each other, see Column 1 and 2 of Table 6. However, the evidence
of missing 𝐻 -type offenders is much stronger for more severe cases. Every four out of five 𝐻 offenders
are missing when victim is 𝐿 or 𝑀 . The result is similar even if I restrict the sample only for cases in
which victims died (Column 3 of Table 6). For less severe cases, for which incarcerations are very rare,
the odds ratios are higher and imprecise, failing to reject the impartiality of justice there.
Table 6: The odds ratios by case severity: Prosecuted cases
Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3
Groups: Ratio No deaths+Sober Deaths or Drunk Deaths
Poor=𝐿, Rich=𝑀 𝜌𝑀𝐿 (𝑠𝑣 = 𝐿)
𝜌𝑀𝐿 (𝑠𝑣 = 𝑀)
0.581 0.628 0.519
(0.056) (0.105) (0.101)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Poor=𝐿, Rich=𝐻 𝜌𝐻𝐿 (𝑠𝑣 = 𝐿)
𝜌𝑀𝐿 (𝑠𝑣 = 𝐻)
0.600 0.211 0.308
(0.410) (0.161) (0.303)
[0.329] [0.000] [0.022]
Poor=𝑀 , Rich=𝐻 𝜌𝐻𝑀 (𝑠𝑣 = 𝑀)
𝜌𝑀𝐿 (𝑠𝑣 = 𝐻)
0.704 0.201 0.267
(0.288) (0.124) (0.225)
[0.303] [0.000] [0.001]
* The table reports the estimates of the odds ratios based on equation (13).
** Standard errors are in parentheses, estimated using Delta method.
*** p-values for testing H0: Odds ratio = 1 are in square brackets.
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1.3.4 Probability of incarceration
Next, I look at the probability of incarceration and how it differs with the status of the victim. The
probability of a settlement between the offender and the victim probably depends on the combination
of each party’s resources – i.e., richer offenders are more likely to settle with poorer victims. Instead, I
do not distinguish between incarcerations and settlements, which I jointly name as court punishment.
First, as is standard in the literature, I simply estimate the disparities in court punishment – disregarding
the earlier stages of the justice process. I also show how the figures change if I correct the estimates for
the missing rich offenders. Second, I use my identification strategy to directly estimate the share of rich
offenders missing from court punishment.
1.3.4.1 Conventional approach and the correction
First, I simply compare the differences in court punishment among the cases that have been selected
for prosecution. It is a usual approach in the literature on socio-economic status disparities. I restrict
the sample for the cases that have either intoxicated offenders or victim deaths, excluding second-time
offenders. I estimate the following linear probability model:
𝑦𝑐 = ∑
𝑗∈{𝐿,𝑀,𝐻}
∑
𝑘∈{𝐿,𝑀,𝐻}
𝛽𝑗,𝑘1{𝑠𝑣 = 𝑗}𝑐1{𝑠𝑜 = 𝑘}𝑐+
𝜁0,1𝑂intox𝑐 + 𝜁1,0𝑉 dead𝑖 + 𝜁1,1𝑂intox𝑐 × 𝑉 dead𝑐 +
𝜓𝑉 intox𝑐 + 𝛾police𝑐 + 𝑢𝑐
(15)
where 𝛽𝑗,𝑘 captures the probability of incarceration for the victim of status 𝑗 and the offender of
status 𝑘; 𝜁 -parameters capture the mean differences in the offense types (the intoxication state of the
offender interacted with the victim’s death); 𝜓 estimate the difference in punishments when victims
were intoxicated; and 𝛾 is a vector capturing police department fixed effects. The dependent variable 𝑦𝑐
is an indicator function that equals one if the offender is punished.
Panel A of Table 7 presents the results for the probability of incarceration and Panel B for the proba-
bility of incarceration or settlement. The probability of incarceration differs across offenders and their
victims. As expected, the incarceration rates are lower when victims are poorer, but the settlement rates
are higher with such victims as well. In general, there might be reasons why some offenders are pun-
ished more severely than others, but we should expect that the punishment does not depend on the type
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Table 7: Probabilities of incarceration or settlement for the prosecuted offenders
A. Probability of prison
Victim
𝐿 𝑀 𝐻
Of
fe
nd
er
𝐿 0.256 0.309 0.488
(0.018) (0.038) (0.164)
𝑀 0.219 0.247 0.493
(0.019) (0.022) (0.142)
𝐻 0.197 0.277 0.345
(0.057) (0.104) (0.240)
B. Pr. prison or settlement
Victim
𝐿 𝑀 𝐻
Of
fe
nd
er
𝐿 0.440 0.405 0.508
(0.021) (0.044) (0.147)
𝑀 0.402 0.403 0.507
(0.019) (0.024) (0.111)
𝐻 0.391 0.416 0.524
(0.056) (0.110) (0.282)
N obs 2, 567. Sample includes cases where either victim has died or offender was intoxicated, or
both. Predicted at mean values of covariates using regression (15).
of the victim. Indeed, if I look at Panel B, there is no significant difference across victims for any given
offender status.
However, this analysis doesn’t account for the fact that these are conditional probabilities, and they
must be corrected for disparities at earlier stages. From the set of previous results (Column 2 of Table 6),
I know that around 80% of 𝐻 -type offenders are missing when victims have lower employment status,
and 50% of 𝑀-type offenders are missing when victims are 𝐿. I multiply the conditional probabilities
of incarceration for these three groups by the corresponding estimate of non-missing observations, i.e.,
the odds ratio:
Pr(𝑦|𝑟𝑜 = 𝑖, 𝑟𝑣 = 𝑗) = Pr(𝑦|𝑃 = 1, 𝑟𝑜 = 𝑖, 𝑟𝑣 = 𝑗)
𝜌𝑖𝑗(𝑟𝑣 = 𝑗)
𝜌𝑖𝑗(𝑟𝑣 = 𝑖)
(16)
I estimate the standard errors using Delta method, assuming that the covariance of the estimators is
zero.
Table 8: Ex-ante (corrected) probabilities of incarceration or settlement
Pr. prison or settlement
Victim
𝐿 𝑀 𝐻
Of
fe
nd
er
𝐿 0.440 0.405 0.508
(0.021) (0.044) (0.147)
𝑀 0.252𝑐 0.403 0.507
(0.044) (0.024) (0.111)
𝐻 0.083𝑎 0.084𝑏 0.524
(0.064) (0.056) (0.282)
a,b,c The estimates from Table 7 (Panel B) are multiplied by the following estimates from Table 6 (Column 2): (a) 𝜌𝐻𝐿 (𝑟𝑣=𝐿)𝜌𝐻𝐿 (𝑟𝑣=𝐻) , (b)
𝜌𝐻𝑀 (𝑟𝑣=𝑀)
𝜌𝐻𝑀 (𝑟𝑣=𝐻)
, (c) 𝜌𝑀𝐿 (𝑟𝑣=𝐿)𝜌𝑀𝐿 (𝑟𝑣=𝐻)
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Table 8 presents the results for the ex-ante probabilities and shows that only 8% of 𝐻 offenders are
incarcerated or settled when the victim is 𝐿 or𝑀 , which is lower than 50% estimate for 𝐻 victim, but not
statistically different. For 𝑀 offenders, 25% are punished when the victim is 𝐿, which is substantially
lower than 40% observed for 𝑀-victims. Notice that these differences wouldn’t have been observed
without the correction. It means that the bulk of the disparities happen at the very early stages of the
judicial process.
1.3.4.2 The odds-ratio approach
Finally, I apply my identification strategy directly on the sample of cases in which the offender has been
punished in court, and the results confirm the absence of impartiality – richer offenders are less likely to
settle or be incarcerated. Table 9 presents the results for the symmetric odds ratios, which estimate the
ratio of the relative court-punishment rates. For example, here 𝜌𝐻𝐿 (𝑟𝑣 = 𝑙) is the relative rate at which
the system punishes 𝐻 with respect to 𝐿 offenders in court, when victims are 𝐿-type. It shows that one
in two of𝑀-type offenders avoid the punishment when their victims are 𝐿-type. It roughly corresponds
to the estimates in Table 8, i.e. 0.252/0.403 ≈ 0.6. Moreover, 𝐻 -type offenders are almost never punished
when their victims are 𝐿-type and only 14% are punished when the victims are𝑀-type. These estimates
are broadly in line with the results in Table 8: 0.083/0.524 ≈ 0.16 and 0.084/0.524 ≈ 0.16. All odds ratios
are significantly below one, rejecting the impartiality of the justice system.
Table 9: The symmetric odds ratios: Incarceration+Settlement cases
Groups Ratio est. se p-val H0: Ratio= 1 N
Poor=𝐿, Rich=𝑀 𝜌
𝑀𝐿 (𝑠𝑣 = 𝐿)
𝜌𝑀𝐿 (𝑠𝑣 = 𝑀)
0.486 (0.136) 0.000 1,014
Poor=𝐿, Rich=𝐻 𝜌
𝐻𝐿 (𝑠𝑣 = 𝐿)
𝜌𝐻𝐿 (𝑠𝑣 = 𝐻)
0.005 (0.026) 0.000 489
Poor=𝑀 , Rich=𝐻 𝜌
𝐻𝑀 (𝑠𝑣 = 𝑀)
𝜌𝐻𝑀 (𝑠𝑣 = 𝐻)
0.142 (0.142) 0.000 655
* The table reports the estimates of the odds ratios as in Table 5, but for the sample of cases
with the intoxicated offenders or victim deaths which have resulted in a settlement or an
incarceration of the offender.
** Standard errors are estimated using Delta method.
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1.3.5 How do rich offenders disappear?
Although it is clear that many rich offenders are missing when victims are poor, it is hard to say why and
how exactly they avoid prosecution. This section provides a few hypotheses and suggestive evidence on
the matter.
For instance, more educated offenders may simply be better defenders of their own interests, pro-
viding a better witness account of events.17 If so, this channel should have also benefited academics,
doctors, or teachers. While they are more educated than the average workers, in Russia they usually do
not earn more than average. According to the official statistics for 2013, the average monthly salaries
varied from 21, 000 RUB (c. 680 USD) for the junior medical workers to 42, 000 RUB for medical doctors
and science workers, which is comparable to the 30, 000 RUB average monthly salary across all profes-
sions, but substantially below 60, 000 RUB in financial and mining sectors. Table 10 shows that these
workers are also much more likely to have a college degree than any comparable employment status
group.
Table 10: The share of college graduates
By sphere:
𝑠𝑜 Other Medicine, education, science
𝑀 0.205 0.620
𝐻 0.430 0.778
Based on 61, 000 offenders.
I again estimate (14) on the sample of prosecuted cases but including a separate dummy for those
highly-educated yet non-wealthy workers:
1{𝑠𝑜 = 𝑖 𝑣𝑠. 𝑗}𝑐 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑀1{𝑠𝑣 = 𝑀}𝑐 + 𝛽𝐻1{𝑠𝑣 = 𝐻}𝑐
+ ̂𝛽med,edu,sci1{V works in medicine, education, science}
+ 𝛾𝑝𝑐 + 𝜏𝑡 𝑡𝑐 + 𝜏𝑚𝑚𝑐 + 𝜏𝑦𝑦𝑐 + 𝑢𝑐
𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ {𝐿,𝑀, 𝐻}
(17)
and present the results in Table 10. I do not find supporting evidence for this hypothesis since the
coefficient 𝛽𝑚𝑒𝑑,𝑒𝑑𝑢,𝑠𝑐𝑖 is not significantly different from zero, whereas the estimates for 𝛽𝑀 and 𝛽𝐻
have not changed with respect to the results in Table 4.
17 I would like to thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this possible channel.
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Table 11: Regression results: medical, education, and science workers.
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3)
1{𝑠𝑜 = 𝑀 𝑣𝑠. 𝐿} 1{𝑠𝑜 = 𝐻 𝑣𝑠. 𝐿} 1{𝑠𝑜 = 𝐻 𝑣𝑠. 𝑀}
̂𝛽𝑀 0.114 0.069 0.015
(0.017) (0.021) (0.013)
̂𝛽𝐻 0.046 0.092 0.092
(0.057) (0.083) (0.046)
̂𝛽𝑚𝑒𝑑,𝑒𝑑𝑢,𝑠𝑐𝑖 −0.004 0.022 −0.038
(0.049) (0.061) (0.033)
p-value for H0: ̂𝛽𝑚𝑒𝑑,𝑒𝑑𝑢,𝑠𝑐𝑖 = 0 0.931 0.717 0.249
Fixed effects:
Police department ✔ ✔ ✔
Hour×Day, month, yr ✔ ✔ ✔
* These are the results for the OLS regression of the status of the offender on the status of the
victim including the dummy for medical, education, and science workers as in Equation (17).
** Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the police level.
The results also suggest that in more egregious cases rich offenders avoid prosecution at least as
often as they are missing from less severe ones. I contend that this is more probably attributable to
corruption, rather than other channels. If this result was driven solely by prosecutors choosing the
easier-to-prosecute cases, therewould be no reason to observe fewer rich offenders in themost egregious
cases.The same reasoning applies if one believes that the quality of lawyers of both offenders and victims
played a pivotal role. While it might be easier for rich offenders to be illegitimately reclassified from
intoxicated offenders into sober ones by influencing the medical report, it is harder to imagine why rich
offenders are less likely to be prosecuted when their victims die.
1.3.6 Checking for residual spatial correlation
So far I have attributed the low share of rich offenders among poor victims to the lack of impartiality
of the legal system. However, we could also imagine that these results are driven by a substantial spa-
tial segregation of rich and poor individuals within the boundaries of police departments. Such spatial
segregation would imply that poorer victims are naturally less likely to encounter rich offenders in a
given police department, i.e., Pr(𝑟𝑜 = 𝐻 |𝑟𝑣 = 𝐿) < Pr(𝑟𝑜 = 𝐻 |𝑟𝑣 = 𝐻), which would violate the indepen-
dence assumption in the identification strategy. While I cannot test for this residual spatial segregation
directly – because accident location is reported only at police department resolution – I can provide
some indirect evidence on the magnitude of the potential problem.
1.4 conclusion 23
First, I test whether police-level location controls are enough to remove the spatial segregation with
respect to other individual characteristics such as being a foreign citizen, a public employee, or a student.
I assume that if the economic activity in Russian society is sharply segregated at a very localized level,
my empirical test should also fail to remove the positive correlation between victims and offenders of
that belong to the above-mentioned groups, which is not the case. Citizenship and the employment
status as a public employee show substantial correlation, which disappears after controlling for police
departments. See Appendix 1.E.4 for more details.
Second, I test the robustness of my results by gradually removing large police department (those
with the largest number of observations), assuming that the number of observations per department
is positively dependent on the size of the territory the department oversees. The point estimates do
not change substantially, although the exercise leads to a loss of precision as the result of a substantial
decrease in the data variability. Nevertheless, the odds ratios that have been precisely estimated to begin
with remain significantly below one – i.e., below the impartiality level – even after dropping the police
departments with as little as twenty observations. See Appendix 1.E.5.
1.4 conclusion
I propose a new approach to measure unjustified disparities in judicial and police outcomes, by looking
at criminal traffic offences and comparing the odds ratios of observing rich offenders when victims are
poor andwhen they are rich.The quasi-experimental and unintentional nature of traffic accidents allows
for causal interpretation of the observed asymmetries in the odds ratios. Unlike conventional measures
of judicial disparities, this approach does not require to observe all legally relevant characteristics.
I apply the methodology on an original dataset compiled from Russian police records for 2013–2014
and classify offenders and victims of criminal traffic offenses into resource brackets based on their em-
ployment status. I find that rich offenders are prosecuted less frequently when their victims are poor
than when their victims are rich. Moreover, the number of missing rich offenders does not decline with
the severity of their offense.
The results can be interpreted as an indicator of the broader institutional quality of the Russian justice
system. Indeed, whatever channels have contributed to the disparities in criminal traffic cases are also
likely to be used by rich offenders in other types of criminal cases. Moreover, for intentional crimes, rich
offenders could rationally choose to victimize less powerful individuals, increasing the extent to which
rich offenders are missing.
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The conventional method in the literature on disparities in socio-economic status would have failed to
find any difference in court outcomes using the same data. Compared to this approach, mymethodology
offers the advantage of measuring directly the relative ex-ante probabilities of court punishment for
different groups of offenders and victims. Moreover, offenders involved in unintentional crimes – like
traffic offenses – are more representative of their underlying social group compared to those involved
in intentional crimes.
The odds-ratios approach can be easily applied to other countries and settings. The analysis could be
extended by exploiting the representative body of the texts of court rulings. In the absence of wealth
proxies for victims, the methodology may potentially be extended for car-to-car collisions to use the
imputed car prices both for offenders and for victims. Moreover, the odds-ratio approach can be used to
test other types of police and judicial disparities – like gender, ethnic, or racial biases.
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1.a identification for continuous resources
When resources are continuous, given the randommatching and the impartiality of justice, the observed
density of victim’s resources, 𝑟𝑣 , should be independent from the density of offender’s resources, 𝑟𝑜 . To
test the independence, I can fit a following population regression function:
𝑟𝑜,𝑐 = 𝛼+𝛽𝑟𝑣,𝑐 + 𝑢𝑐 (18)
𝐻0 ∶ 𝛽 = 0 (19)
and test whether 𝛽 is equal to zero. If it is not, it means that 𝑟𝑜 is not independent from 𝑟𝑣 , which
rejects the impartiality of prosecution.
Denote the density of offenders in the population as 𝑓 (𝑟𝑜). Then, the observed density of offenders
among the prosecuted cases conditional on victim’s resources is:
𝑓 (𝑟𝑜 |𝑟𝑣 , 𝑃 = 1) =
𝜋(𝑟𝑜 , 𝑟𝑣)𝑓 (𝑟𝑜)
∫ 𝜋(𝑟𝑜 , 𝑟𝑣)𝑓 (𝑟𝑜)𝑑𝑟𝑜
Thus, for any two levels of offenders resources 𝑟?̲? and ̄𝑟𝑜 and any two levels of victim’s resources 𝑟?̲?
and ̄𝑟𝑣 , such that 𝑟?̲? < ̄𝑟𝑜 and 𝑟?̲? < ̄𝑟𝑣 , the following ratio is a measure of relative prosecution ratios:
𝑓 ( ̄𝑟𝑜 |𝑟?̲? , 𝑃 = 1)/𝑓 (𝑟?̲? |𝑟?̲? , 𝑃 = 1)
𝑓 ( ̄𝑟𝑜 | ̄𝑟𝑣 , 𝑃 = 1)/𝑓 (𝑟?̲? | ̄𝑟𝑣 , 𝑃 = 1)
= 𝜋( ̄𝑟𝑜 , 𝑟?̲?)/𝜋(𝑟?̲? , 𝑟?̲?)𝜋( ̄𝑟𝑜 , ̄𝑟𝑣)/𝜋(𝑟?̲? , ̄𝑟𝑣))
= 𝜌
̄𝑟𝑜𝑟?̲? (𝑟?̲?)
𝜌 ̄𝑟𝑜𝑟?̲? ( ̄𝑟𝑣)
(20)
To estimate (20), I need to empirically approximate the conditional densities 𝑓 (𝑟𝑜 |𝑟?̲? , 𝑃 = 1) and
𝑓 (𝑟𝑜 | ̄𝑟𝑣 , 𝑃 = 1).
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1.b additional descriptive statistics
Figure 2: Number of observations by the police department’s sample size
within each Offender-Victim resource combination (Columns correspond to the employment status of the victim: rows,
to the offender)
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1.c all odds ratios
Table 12: The odds ratios at different combinations of offenders’ and victims’ employment statuses
𝜌𝑖𝑗 ∶
𝜌𝑀𝐿 𝜌𝐻𝐿 𝜌𝐻𝑀
Vi
cti
ms
𝜌𝑖𝑗 (𝑠𝑣=𝐿)
𝜌𝑖𝑗 (𝑠𝑣=𝑀)
. 0.618 0.561 0.846
. (0.046) (0.089) (0.129)
. [0.000] [0.000] [0.233]
.
𝜌𝑖𝑗 (𝑠𝑣=𝐿)
𝜌𝑖𝑗 (𝑠𝑣=𝐻)
. 0.828 0.488 0.439
. (0.197) (0.257) (0.147)
. [0.382] [0.047] [0.000]
.
𝜌𝑖𝑗 (𝑠𝑣=𝑀)
𝜌𝑖𝑗 (𝑠𝑣=𝐻)
. 1.340 0.870 0.518
. (0.306) (0.445) (0.163)
. [0.267] [0.770] [0.003]
* The table reports odds ratios that estimate the relative prosecution rate, 𝜌
𝑖𝑗 (𝑟𝑣=𝑘)
𝜌𝑖𝑗 (𝑟𝑣=𝑙)
as in Equation (13), where the column indicates
𝜌𝑖𝑗 , while the rows indicate the full ratio. For example, the ratio of 0.618 in the first row and the first column corresponds to
𝜌𝑀𝐿 (𝑠𝑣=𝐿)
𝜌𝑀𝐿 (𝑠𝑣=𝑀)
.
** Standard errors are in parentheses, estimated using Delta method.
*** p-values, in square brackets, for testing the null hypothesis that justice is impartial, i.e. ‘the odds ratio = 1’
1.d results using other proxies
Table 13 presents selected odds ratios estimated using car and education as alternative proxies for of-
fenders’ resources, 𝑟𝑜 = 𝑐𝑜 or 𝑟𝑜 = 𝑒𝑜 , while victims’ resources are still proxied by the employment
status. According to the results, every second luxury-car driver is missing for 𝐿 victims using 𝐻 victims
and inferior cars as the controls. At the same time, there is no evidence of missing drivers of luxury cars
for 𝑀 victims using 𝐻 victims and the drivers of normal cars as the controls. Also, the distribution of
normal to inferior car drivers appears balanced across 𝐿 and 𝑀 victims.
According to Panel B of Table 13, every fifth offender with vocational training is missing for 𝐿 victims,
using𝑀 victims and offenderswith a school degree as the controls. At the same time, there is no evidence
that college graduates are disproportionately missing either for 𝐿 or 𝑀 victims.
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Table 13: The odds ratios using alternative proxies: Prosecuted cases
Groups Ratio est. se p-val H0: Ratio= 1
A. Car as the proxy for 𝑟𝑜
Offender: Poor= inf, Rich= nor 𝜌
𝑛𝑜𝑟
𝑖𝑛𝑓 (𝑠𝑣=𝐿)
𝜌𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑓 (𝑠𝑣=𝑀)
1.112 (0.108) 0.303
Victim: 𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑟 = 𝐿, 𝑅𝑖𝑐ℎ = 𝑀
Offender: Poor= inf, Rich= lux 𝜌
𝑙𝑢𝑥
𝑖𝑛𝑓 (𝑠𝑣=𝐿)
𝜌𝑙𝑢𝑥𝑖𝑛𝑓 (𝑠𝑣=𝐻)
0.505 (0.182) 0.007
Victim: 𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑟 = 𝐿, 𝑅𝑖𝑐ℎ = 𝐻
Offender: Poor= nor, Poor= lux 𝜌𝑙𝑢𝑥𝑛𝑜𝑟 (𝑠𝑣=𝑀)𝜌𝑙𝑢𝑥𝑛𝑜𝑟 (𝑠𝑣=𝐻) 1.201 (0.412) 0.626Victim: 𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑟 = 𝑀 , 𝑅𝑖𝑐ℎ = 𝐻
B. Education as the proxy for 𝑟𝑜
Offender: Poor= sch, Rich= voc 𝜌
𝑣𝑜𝑐
𝑠𝑐ℎ (𝑠𝑣=𝐿)
𝜌𝑣𝑜𝑐𝑠𝑐ℎ (𝑠𝑣=𝑀)
0.792 (0.088) 0.017
Victim: 𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑟 = 𝐿, 𝑅𝑖𝑐ℎ = 𝑀
Offender: Poor= sch, Rich= col 𝜌
𝑐𝑜𝑙
𝑠𝑐ℎ(𝑠𝑣=𝐿)
𝜌𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑐ℎ(𝑠𝑣=𝐻)
0.786 (0.432) 0.620
Victim: 𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑟 = 𝐿, 𝑅𝑖𝑐ℎ = 𝐻
Offender: Poor= voc, Poor= col 𝜌𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑜𝑐 (𝑠𝑣=𝑀)𝜌𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑜𝑐 (𝑠𝑣=𝐻) 0.825 (0.227) 0.441Victim: 𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑟 = 𝑀 , 𝑅𝑖𝑐ℎ = 𝐻
* The table reports the estimates of the odds ratios as in equation 11.
** Standard errors are estimated using Delta method.
1.e other robustness checks
1.e.1 Victim’s culpability in the accident
If we imagine that prosecutors select cases based on the culpability of offender’s behavior relative to
victim’s behavior, it may lead to observed correlation of offenders and victims both likely to engage in
reckless behavior. If reckless behavior correlates with resources, then it may naturally create correlation
of rich victims with rich offenders. For example, the prosecutor does not prosecute the offender when
his victim was drunk at the time of the accident, unless the offender himself was drunk. If poor individ-
uals are more likely to be drunk, we will observe more cases with poor offenders and poor individuals.
To check for this, I estimate model with an indicator variable for intoxicated victims on the indicator
variable for intoxicated offenders, while constraining the sample only to offenders and victims of the
same employment status.The estimates in Table 14 show no correlation between the intoxication of vic-
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tims and offenders. I use it as an evidence that prosecutors mainly base their decisions on the culpability
of offender in the accident.
Table 14: Intoxicated offenders and intoxicated victims
Dependent variable is
Victim was intoxicated
Est. SE
̂𝛽 : Offender was intoxicated .007 (.016)
Sample: Cases where offenders and victims are of the
same employment status: 𝑠𝑑 = 𝑠𝑣 .
1.e.2 Robustness to missing time information
I test whether the missing information on the hour of the traffic accident correlates with a particular
combination of offender-victim statuses by running the following regression:
1{ℎ𝑎𝑠 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟}𝑐 =𝛼 + 𝛽𝑀1{𝑠𝑜 = 𝑀}𝑐 + 𝛽𝐻1{𝑠𝑜 = 𝐻}𝑐
+ 𝛾𝑀1{𝑠𝑣 = 𝑀}𝑐 + 𝛾𝐻1{𝑠𝑣 = 𝐻}𝑐
+ ∑
𝑗∈{𝑀,𝐻}
∑
𝑘∈{𝑀,𝐻}
𝜁𝑗,𝑘1{𝑠𝑜 = 𝑗}𝑐1{𝑠𝑣 = 𝑘}𝑐 + 𝑢𝑐
(21)
where the dependent variable 1{ℎ𝑎𝑠 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟}𝑐 is the dummy, which equals to one if the information on
the hour is present, and the explanatory variables are dummies for statuses of offenders and victims.
Importantly, all 𝜁 -parameters should be equal to zero, lest it biases the results. Higher offender status is
correlated the presence of information on the time of the accident. However, all the interaction terms –
including the type of the victim – are jointly insignificant (Table 15). Only one of the interaction terms,
for 𝐻 -𝐻 group, seems to be significantly different from zero at 10% significance level. Since the sign
is negative, the missing hour information makes 𝐻 -type offenders disappear disproportionately for 𝐻 -
type victims from my sample. Such disappearance may bias my results but in the opposite direction: it
will make the odds ratios seem higher and thus the results look closer to an impartial justice.
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Table 15: Probability the time information is missing. N obs. 8, 136
est. se p-val
𝑠𝑜 :
𝛽𝑀 .025 (.0110) .0226
𝛽𝐻 .057 (.0251) .0226
𝑠𝑣 :
𝛾𝑀 −.021 (.0171) .2274
𝛾𝐻 .069 (.0567) .2221
𝑠𝑜 × 𝑠𝑣 :
𝜁𝑀,𝑀 .011 (.0233) .6400
𝜁𝑀,𝐻 −.078 (.0777) .3168
𝜁𝐻,𝑀 .001 (.0422) .9834
𝜁𝐻,𝐻 −.174 (.0953) .0683
𝛼 .800 (.0077) .0000
𝐻0 ∶ 𝛿𝑖,𝑗 = 0, ∀𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ {𝑀, 𝐻}
p-value 𝐻0 = 0.5161
1.E other robustness checks 31
1.e.3 Robustness to regional breakdowns
The degree of missing rich offenders does not vary across different regional breakdowns of Russia. First,
I split regions into terciles based on an index of petty corruption.18 Then, I divide the regions by income
inequality, which I proxy with the ratio of the median to average wage incomes in the region.19 Finally,
I look at the regional breakdown based on the median wage income. Figure 3 reports the results of
replicating the three odds ratios from Table 5 across regional breakdowns and shows that the estimates
are not significantly different across them.
Figure 3: Relative probability of prosecution by different regional breakdown
(Columns correspond to the employment status of the victim: rows, to the offender)
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The odds ratio “𝑖 vs 𝑗” estimates 𝜌
𝑗
𝑖 (𝑠𝑣=𝑖)
𝜌𝑗𝑖 (𝑠𝑣=𝑗)
as in Table 5; The odds ratio of 𝜌𝐻𝐿 (𝑠𝑣=𝐿)𝜌𝐻𝐿 (𝑠𝑣=𝐻) is non-estimable for the middle tercile by corruptionindex and the upper tercile by median income due to the lack of variation.
18 TheMinistry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation and the Public Opinion Foundation calculated the petty corrup-
tion index for 70 regions based on survey results in 2010.The report in Russian is available at www.indem.ru/corrupt/doklad_
cor_INDEM_FOM_2010.pdf. I have imputed the index for the remaining 13 regions based on the index of the neighboring regions.
19 The statistics on the median and average wage income is provided by the Federal State Statistics Service at www.gks.ru/free_
doc/new_site/population/bednost/tabl/3-1-5.doc
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1.e.4 Placebo tests
Table 16 presents the results of the tests for residual spatial segregation using other characteristics of
offenders and victims. I expect these characteristics to be spatially correlated – e.g., student-drivers tend
to drive closer to student-pedestrians, foreigners tend to live in certain neighborhoods where they cross
roads and drive cars. At the same time I do not expect these characteristics to fail impartiality test.
Table 16: Placebo tests on other characteristics
(1) (2) (3)
A. Offender is a Russian citizen
̂𝛽 : Victim is a Russian citizen 0.082 0.023 0.022
(0.027) (0.030) (0.030)
?̂? 0.879 0.937 0.938
p-value for H0: ̂𝛽 = 0 0.003 0.433 0.455
B. Offender is a public employee
̂𝛽 : Victim is a public employee 0.114 0.004 0.009
(0.045) (0.059) (0.058)
?̂? 0.026 0.029 0.029
p-value for H0: ̂𝛽 = 0 0.010 0.949 0.882
C. Offender is a student
̂𝛽 : Victim is a student 0.013 -0.013 -0.015
(0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
?̂? 0.028 0.028 0.028
p-value for H0: ̂𝛽 = 0 0.418 0.448 0.383
Fixed effects:
Police department ✔ ✔
Hour×Day, month, yr ✔
* These are the results for OLS regression: 𝑂𝑐 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑉𝑐 + 𝛾𝑝𝑐 + 𝜏𝑡 𝑡𝑐 + 𝜏𝑚𝑚𝑐 + 𝜏𝑦𝑦𝑐 + 𝑢𝑐 , where 𝑝 – police department, 𝑡 –
Hour×Day, 𝑚 – month, 𝑦 – year, 𝑂 – dummy for the offender’s characteristic, 𝑉 – dummy for the victim’s characteristic
** Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the police level.
*** The sample for the public employees consists of cases where offenders and victims are both𝑀-types: 𝑠𝑜 = 𝑠𝑣 = 𝑀 ; The public
employee category excludes law enforcement and other government officials; 𝛼 is reconstructed at the means of covariates
First, I observe that Russian citizens as victims predict Russian citizens as offenders, see Panel A in
Table 16. The highest concentration of foreign citizens is expected in big cities and the regions that
border with other countries. Hence, the observed correlation is probably linked to the spatial allocation
of foreigners in Russia. Of course, it may be also linked to general income differences between foreigners
and citizens and the system’s bias against foreign victims. Crucially, by adding controls for the police
department and time of the accident, the correlation drops, and, while not dropping to zero, it becomes
statistically insignificant.
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I then repeat the exercise for public employees (excluding law enforcement and other government
officials). I use only the cases where both offenders and victims are𝑀-type to avoid contamination by the
relative resource imbalances. As expected, public employees as victims show substantial correlationwith
public employees as offenders and the correlation disappears after the inclusion of the fixed effects (See
Panel B). Similarly, I look at university students and find that they do not show statistically significant
correlation before or after the inclusion of the fixed effects (Panel C).
Overall, it seems that the chosen controls for location and time work as intended, maintaining the
question of why we see statistically significant disparities across the resource groups.
1.e.5 Robustness to excluding big police departments
Next, I check the robustness of my main results to a gradual removal of the observationally big police
departments from the sample. First, I exclude the departments with a hundred or more observations.
Then I lower the cut-off point to 50, 40, 30, and 20 observations.
Figure 4 present the results of this exercise for the odds ratios for prosecution (Subfigure 5a) and for
court punishment (Subfigure 5c). For convenience, the figure also provide the baseline estimates for the
whole sample under label ‘all’(the results of Table 5 and Table 9). The information on the remaining
sample size at each cut-off point is in Subfigures 5b and 5d.
Subfigures 5a and 5c show that the point estimates for the odds ratios do not change much across
different choices for cut-off points. The confidence intervals, however, expand, especially for the odds
ratios that have been imprecisely estimated to beginwith. Nevertheless, there are odds ratios that remain
always robust: those that compare 𝐿 to 𝑀 individuals for the probability of prosecution and 𝐿 to 𝐻
offenders for the probability of court punishment.
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Figure 4: Odds ratios at different cut-offs for police departments
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(c) Court punishment: est. with 95% CI
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(d) Court punishment: sample size
Cut offs: all – all police departments, < 𝑥 – only those police departments with less than 𝑥 observations, 𝑥 ∈ {100, 50, 40, 30, 20};
The odds ratio “𝑖 vs 𝑗” estimates 𝜌
𝑗
𝑖 (𝑠𝑣=𝑖)
𝜌𝑗𝑖 (𝑠𝑣=𝑗)
as in Table 5 or Table 9; CI = confidence interval
2
WHO DO WE HELP ? EV IDENCE FROM CAR CRASHES AND DR I VERS ’
DEC I S IONS TO STAY OR FLEE
Helping strangers in need binds people together in society.Whether driven by empathy, norms, habit, or
a belief in reciprocity, mutual help is desirable and is arguably a good indicator of social capital. However,
assistance is not always extended to those who need it most. The ability to empathize is dampened by
distance, real or perceived, between those in need and those who are able to help.
In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith remarked how human sentiments are mediated by
distance:
Let us suppose that the great empire of China, with all its myriads of inhabitants, was
suddenly swallowed up by an earthquake, and let us consider how a man of humanity in
Europe, who had no sort of connection with that part of the world, would be affected upon
receiving intelligence of this dreadful calamity. He would, I imagine, first of all, express
very strongly his sorrow for the misfortune of that unhappy people, he would make many
melancholy reflections upon the precariousness of human life, and the vanity of all the
labours of man, which could thus be annihilated in a moment. […] And when all this fine
philosophy was over, when all these humane sentiments had been once fairly expressed, he
would pursue his business or his pleasure, take his repose or his diversion, with the same
ease and tranquillity, as if no such accident had happened.
In this thought experiment, the distance between the humanitarian and those in need of help is at the
same time geographical, cultural, social, ethnic, and mediated by travel time. We may thus ask whether,
if the obstacles of distance did not apply, we are still willing to extend a helping hand to those who are
near us, but don’t belong to the same group.
In this paper we examine one such circumstance where people have the opportunity to immediately
help complete strangers after being bound together by fate: we study inter-group empathy in U.S. society
by investigating hit-and-run drivers and their willingness to help victims of different groups.
In particular, we look at traffic collisions in which the driver of a motor vehicle hits and seriously
injures a single non-motorist (namely, a pedestrian or cyclist). We will call such collisions pedestrian-
vehicle crashes or simply crashes. After colliding with a pedestrian, drivers face a choice of whether to
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stop and provide assistance to the injured person, whose life may depend on it, or flee the scene. Drivers
who stay do so out of feeling of empathy or a moral obligation towards their victims, but also perhaps
out of fear of greater punishment if identified after running away. At the same time, some drivers do
run-away in an attempt to avoid any legal consequences of their actions. Such a consequential choice
happens in a few brief moments, following a sudden, unexpected, and perhaps shocking event, and could
thus be clouded by feelings of guilt and fear. In such a moment, the salient characteristics of the victim
may sway the decision of some drivers to stay or to leave, if those characteristics define the degree of
empathy. Henceforth, we study whether gender or race of the pedestrian changes the probability that
the driver flees. In particular, we are interested in which category of drivers (by sex, age, socio-economic
status) change their behavior, for who, and by how much?
To answer the question, we exploit the unintentional and quasi-experimental nature of traffic acci-
dents. The same driver may by chance hit a white or a black, a woman or a man. The probability of
hitting a pedestrian of a certain demographics may differ from neighborhood to neighborhood, as well
as the composition of drivers. However, for accidents that happen in the same neighborhood and un-
der similar circumstances, the characteristics of the pedestrian should not predict the characteristics of
the driver. If all drivers care about their victims equally, then the profile of drivers who stayed should
remain uncorrelated with the profile of the victims. If some drivers are more empathetic towards spe-
cific individuals, we will see an imbalance of those who stayed across victims. Moreover, we are able to
estimate the extent to which their probability of staying changes with the victim’s characteristics.1
We use the data provided by the Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) for 2010-2016, which
covers all car crashes in the U.S. that resulted in human deaths. We restrict our attention to a single-
driver-single-pedestrian crashes. We observe sex and age of the driver and the victim. For the victim, we
also observe the race. We construct the socio-economic profile of drivers from the drivers’ zip-code and
the type of car driven. We match pedestrians by proximity of the accident using the radius matching
from 500 to 3000 meters (citation). We match crashes that happened under similar circumstances, i.e.,
the same road type (arterial, local), light conditions at the time of the accident (daylight, dark but lit,
dark and unlit), and only within neighborhoods that are close in racial composition.
1 The identification approach of our paper is a modified version of the identification strategy in Kurmangaliyeva (2018) (i.e., Chapter
1 of this thesis), which in turn is based on Levitt and Porter (2001). In the latter paper, Levitt and Porter use car-to-car crashes
to estimate how many more deaths drunk drivers cause on roads in comparison to sober drivers. If both types of drivers are as
likely to get involved in a deadly accident, then they would have observed equal mixing of the types of drivers on roads. Like in
Kurmangaliyeva (2018), our paper uses the assumption of equal mixing of pedestrians and drivers on streets to study decision-
making. Moreover, unlike in Kurmangaliyeva (2018), we use more precise location controls by matching crashes based on their
coordinates.
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Given that we observe only fatalities rather than all the crashes with severe injuries to pedestrians,
we estimate the upper and lower bounds of the changes in drivers’ behavior due to gender or race of
the pedestrian.
Accounting for the selection bias, we find that drivers do not on average react differently to the
gender of the pedestrian they hit. Exceptions include either the richest and whitest (by population)
neighborhoods – where drivers help women more than men. For example, expensive car drivers are 21%
more likely to stop for a woman than for a man. On the contrary, in the black-majority neighborhoods,
drivers are less likely to stop after hitting a woman rather than a man. We do not have an intuitive
explanation for this result yet.
We also find that drivers are less likely to stop for an African American in comparison to a non-
hispanic white pedestrian. Such behavior is prevalent almost across all locations. The analysis reveals
that it is the resident-drivers (40% less likely) and drivers of expensive cars (30-37% less likely) in the
white-majority neighborhoods who differentiate their behavior the most for blacks versus white pedes-
trians. The black-majority neighborhoods are the only type of location for which we cannot reject the
hypothesis of non-discriminating behavior by race of the pedestrian. There, we cannot reject the null
hypothesis for most types of drivers, except for expensive car drivers who tend to stop more often for
black pedestrians rather than for white pedestrians.
This paper contributes to the literature on the revealed taste-based discrimination for race and gender
groups in charitable giving (e.g., Fong and Luttmer 2009; Duarte, Siegel, and Young 2015; Jenq, Pan, and
Theseira 2015) and in other settings (e.g., Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor 1999; Bertrand and Mullainathan
2004). This paper is different to the mentioned literature as it involves high benefits/costs for both par-
ties involved – something that is difficult to replicate on purpose in an experiment. In terms of external
validity, our results are less precise for the population that lives in low-density areas (e.g., Alaska). How-
ever, the data on car crashes allows to study economic agents’ decisions not influenced by the laboratory
or interviewer procedures. Moreover, the data is generated every year – at least for big cities – and re-
ported in a standardized manner, which allows to trace the changes in the taste-based discrimination
throughout time (our current work-in-progress).
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2.1 describes the data sources and matching methods, Sec-
tion 2.2 shows what categories of victims tend to be helped more often. Section2.3 asks which categories
of drivers are more likely to help, and 2.4 concludes by outlining future areas of research.
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2.1 data
The primary source of data is the US Fatality Analysis Report System (FARS), compiled by the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration. The database combines information on all traffic accidents in
the United States which resulted in motorists or non-motorists’ deaths within 30 days after the accident.
The data is collected and standardized from such sources as police crash reports, death certificates, state
vehicle registration and files, medical reports, and other sources within each State and the District of
Columbia. All the data is then compiled together into the yearly FARS database at the crash-, person-,
and vehicle- levels. The databases are available in open access online.2
We have merged FARS datasets for 2010 to 2016, so that each crash contains information also for
each person and vehicle involved. We kept only those crashes that involved a single vehicle – and thus
a single driver – and a single pedestrian or bicyclist, and that resulted in the death of a non-motorist
but not the death of the driver.3 From this point onwards, we will refer to the resulting data simply as
“the FARS data”.
In total, the FARS data includes 32, 481 single-vehicle, single-pedestrian crashes that occurred in 2010–
2016with non-missingGlobal Positioning coordinates (theworking sample). According to FARSmanual,
longitude and latitude are based on the Police Crash Report, where the coordinates are either stated
directly or imputed based on the accident address. Unfortunately, there are some crashes that have
missing coordinates. In our case, there are other 534 qualifying crashes that do not have coordinates,
which we have omitted from our analysis, assuming that the occurrences of missing coordinates are
independent from the combination of drivers and pedestrian characteristics.
Next, we merge the FARS data with the U.S. Census data. First, using the coordinates reported in
FARS, overlay crash locations in the corresponding Census Block Group and the ZIP-code area. Census
Block Groups are the smallest geographical unit for which the U.S. Census Bureau publishes statistical
data. In the sample of crashes, the median population of the Block Group is 1, 412 people and the mean
is 1, 607. We will refer to the Block Groups as neighborhoods throughout the paper.
Secondly, the location of the accident allows us to know if the crash happened within the home zip-
code area of the driver (if identified), in which case we label such drivers as resident drivers.
2 For more information on how to access the data and on the coding and analytical manuals, please visit https://www.nhtsa.
gov/research-data/fatality-analysis-reporting-system-fars
3 In terms of FARS variables, this corresponds to the following conditions in terms of the FARS coded variables: PER_TYP is either
‘Driver of a Motor Vehicle In-Transport’ or ‘Pedestrian’ or ‘Bicyclist’; VE_TOTAL = 1; VE_FORMS = 1; PEDS = 1; DEATHS = 0 in
the driver’s PERSON form and missing value of DEATHS in the non-motorist’s PERSON form; FATALS = 1.
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Table 17: Classification of neighborhoods and ZIP-code areas
I. Neighborhoods (Block groups)
Definition Condition
urban % urban population >75%
upper-white-quintile % non-hispanic white residents >86%
white(black)-majority % non-hispanic white (African-American) residents >50%
high(low)-income average annual household income is >(<) the median 44,107 USD
upper-income-quintile average annual household income >65,938 USD
Data source: U.S. Census 2010 (retrieved from Manson et al. 2017), all percentile cut-offs are based on the working sample
II. ZIP-code areas
Definition Condition
upper-white-quintile % non-hispanic white residents >86%;
upper-black-quintile % African-American residents >25%
bottom-income-tercile average annual income per capita ≤ 21, 800 USD;
middle-income-tercile average annual income per capita >21,800 and < 29,000 USD;
upper-income-tercile average annual income per capita ≥ 29,000 USD
Data source: 2016 American Community Survey: 5-Year Data [2012-2016, ZIP-code level] (retrieved from Manson et al. 2017),
all percentile cut-offs are based on the working sample
Finally, we obtain the demographic and income characteristics of the home zip-code area of the driver.
The mean and the median population across zip-codes in the working sample is 30, 312 and 28, 260
people, correspondingly.
We classify the neighborhoods (Census block groups) and ZIP-code areas in the working sample
based on the income and racial profiles of those areas, as defined in Table 17. This level of granularity
is particularly important given the localized level of residential ethnic segregation observable in many
US cities (see Figure 6 showing Census Block Group boundaries and ethnic composition for New York
City).
2.1.1 Descriptive statistics
The spatial distribution of crashes naturally resembles the population density in the USA –more crashes
in the cities and populated coastal parts of the United States (See Figure 8).
Table 18 shows summary totals for all 32481 crashes in the U.S. recorded in FARS between 2010 and
2016. About 60% of all accidents happen on arterial roads, the category in which we included all inter-
states, U.S./state highways, and county roads (see. Women represent about 28% of pedestrian fatalities
on roads. A small majority of pedestrian victims are white, 17% are non-hispanic white, and 14% are
Hispanic.
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Table 18: Summary totals for all recorded vehicle-pedestrian crashes, 2010–2016
n share
Road type
Arterial 19605 0.603
Local 12740 0.392
NA 136 0.004
Pedestrian gender
Men 23469 0.72
Women 8959 0.28
NA 53 0.00
Pedestrian race
White 16500 0.51
Black 5396 0.17
Hispanic 4501 0.14
Asian 1325 0.04
Other 1239 0.04
NA 3520 0.11
Total 32481
Most accidents happen during the dark hours (see Figure 7).
Tables 19, 20 provides the descriptive statistics for the working sample. It also provides the statistics
for different samples of pedestrians: blacks, whites, women, men.
Black pedestrians tend to die in neighborhoods with a higher share of black residents, and white
pedestrians in those with a higher share of white residents. The table reveals that on average 81% of
drivers stay and 19% flee after hitting a pedestrian. The rate of hit-and-runs is considerably higher when
the victim is black.
In order to avoid the potential bias involved in comparing accidents that happen in different locations,
we need to group observations that happened in the same location. Hence, we match observations
according to the algorithm described in the following section.
2.1.2 Radius matching with replacement
We split the sample into two groups 𝑇 and 𝐶 (treatment and controls). Then we use match observations
using radius matching with replacement (for more information on the matching technique see Stuart
2010; Becker and Ichino 2002). Each crash 𝑖 ∈ 𝑇 is matched to one or more crashes from group 𝐶 as long
as they are located within a certain radius 𝑅 around the crash 𝑖 and they all happened under the same
conditions:
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Table 19: Descriptive statistics: by pedestrian types
All By pedestrian type:
White Black Women Men
Total crashes 32,481 16,500 5,396 8,959 23,469
Neighborhoods:
% in urban area 0.79 0.75 0.84 0.81 0.79
% in richest-quintile 0.20 0.22 0.12 0.22 0.19
% high-income 0.50 0.55 0.35 0.52 0.49
majority-white 0.57 0.75 0.33 0.58 0.56
majority-black 0.12 0.05 0.41 0.11 0.12
Crash types:
arterial road 0.61 0.65 0.59 0.57 0.62
daylight time 0.26 0.29 0.19 0.32 0.25
night-time 0.36 0.32 0.41 0.34 0.36
dark 0.32 0.34 0.35 0.29 0.34
southern state 0.40 0.40 0.58 0.36 0.41
hour of day 13.98 14.08 13.95 14.15 13.92
day of week 15.62 15.65 15.42 15.79 15.56
day of the week 4.15 4.15 4.19 4.14 4.16
month 6.93 6.90 6.86 6.97 6.91
year 2,013.22 2,013.21 2,013.38 2,013.20 2,013.22
Not at intersection 0.71 0.73 0.73 0.66 0.73
Four-way intersection 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.22 0.17
t-intersection 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.09
wet road 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.14
no traffic controls 0.80 0.81 0.84 0.76 0.82
n. road lanes 2.84 2.76 2.90 2.80 2.85
speed limit 42.17 43.15 41.88 40.26 42.90
• the same type of the road – arterial roads or local road type;
• light conditions – daylight, dark roads with artificial lights, or dark roads with no lights);
• urbanity – urban or rural neighborhoods;
• racial profile of the neighborhoods for local road accidents – the maximum allowed difference in
the shares of white or black residents set at 25 percentage points between crash 𝑖 and anymatched
crash 𝑗.
For example, an accident that happened on the busy highway is likely to generate different types
of drivers than accidents on a local street just around the corner. Hence, we do not mix arterial-road
accidents with the local-road accidents. Similarly, an accident that happened during the daylight will not
be matched to an accident that happened at night, even if they both happened at the same spot. Finally,
imagine two local streets parallel to a highway from both sides. One street is in a residential area with
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Table 20: Descriptive statistics: by pedestrian types (continued)
All By pedestrian type:
White Black Women Men
Total crashes 32,481 16,500 5,396 8,959 23,469
Pedestrians:
% male 0.28 0.28 0.26 1.00 0.00
age 46.92 48.44 43.28 48.13 46.45
% child-teen 0.10 0.08 0.12 0.11 0.09
% senior 0.14 0.16 0.07 0.19 0.13
white 0.57 1.00 0.00 0.59 0.56
black 0.19 0.00 1.00 0.18 0.19
black 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.17
intoxicated (ped) 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.16 0.24
Drivers:
stayed 0.81 0.84 0.76 0.83 0.81
identified 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08
t-intersection crash 0.29 0.30 0.29 0.31 0.29
avg age 41.85 42.22 40.42 42.91 41.43
driver ≤35 0.42 0.42 0.45 0.40 0.43
driver ≥56 0.23 0.24 0.20 0.25 0.22
valid licence 0.81 0.85 0.74 0.83 0.81
previous offence 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.38 0.38
driving under influence 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.09
speeding 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06
resident of richest ZIP 0.20 0.22 0.14 0.22 0.19
resident of whitest ZIP 0.20 0.28 0.09 0.21 0.20
resident of blackest ZIP 0.20 0.14 0.50 0.19 0.21
ZIP code resident 0.27 0.29 0.23 0.29 0.26
expensive car 0.26 0.28 0.23 0.28 0.26
pickup vehicle 0.18 0.19 0.15 0.19 0.17
truck 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.08
predominantly white population, while another one is in a residential area with predominantly black
population. The crashes from these two streets will not be matched across.
For the analysis, we are interested in matching each female pedestrian (group 𝑇 ) with one or more
male pedestrian crashes (group 𝐶) that satisfy the above-mentioned conditions. For the radius of 500
meters, 807 female pedestrians have successfully beenmatched to at least onemale-pedestrian, resulting
in 1, 691 observation used in total. For the radius of 3, 000meters, the number expands to 3, 789 women.
Alternatively, we classify 𝑇 and 𝐶 based on racial profile of pedestrians. We match each African-
American pedestrian to one or more non-hispanic white pedestrians.Thematching results in 264 groups
formed for the radius 500 meters up to 1, 619 groups for the radius of 3, 000 meters.
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By matching, we oversample urban areas due to a higher probability of finding a match in denser
areas. It is evident from the summary statistics in Tables 21 and 22 and by comparing columns 2-7,
which report statistics for the matched samples, to the first column with the working sample averages.
The share of observations in urban areas increases from 79% in the unmatched sample to 96-98% in the
matched samples both by gender and by race (See Table 21).
Also, the demographic profile of neighborhoods and circumstances of the crashes change for the
matched samples. The matched samples come from poorer neighborhoods with lower (higher) share of
white (black) residents. When we match by race and gender, we oversample the crashes that happen at
night but on lit roads. When we match by gender, we also oversample crashes that happened on local
roads, on intersections, and in the presence of traffic controls.
Figure 9 presents the normalized differences in the characteristics of thematched black-white, female-
male pedestrians, according to a slightly altered formula than in Imbens and Wooldridge (2009). Since
there are many-to-one matches, we first calculate the mean value of a covariate 𝑋 for the controls
matched to 𝑖 ∈ 𝑇 , denoted as ̄𝑋𝐶𝑖 . And then we calculate the normalized difference as:
𝑛𝑑 =
̄𝑋𝑇 − ̄𝑋𝐶
√
?̂?2𝑇+?̂?2𝐶
2
(22)
where ?̂?𝑇 = 1𝑛𝑋
𝑇𝑖 , ?̂?𝐶 = 1𝑛 ̄𝑋
𝐶𝑖 , and 𝑛 is the number of matched 𝑇 -observations. Similarly, ?̂?2𝑇 and ?̂?2𝐶
are the estimates of the variances of 𝑋𝑇𝑖 and ̄𝑋𝐶𝑖 , respectively.
Figure 9 shows that the normalized difference in the characteristics of the pedestrians (women vs
men, blacks vs whites) substantially narrows down after we match the crashes.
The next section provides an empirical framework on how to proceed with the analysis of this data.
2.2 which victims are helped more on average?
2.2.1 The setup
Consider a stylized description of events surrounding a vehicle-pedestrian crash: a driver collides with
a pedestrian in a given location. There are two types of pedestrians – 𝑃 ∈ {𝑇 , 𝐶} where 𝑇 is short for
treatment and 𝐶 for control – and two types of drivers – 𝐷 ∈ {𝐴, 𝐵}. At the time of the crash, 𝐷 and
𝑃 are drawn randomly and independently from each other, from the underlying population at risk in
the given location 𝑔. The probability of drawing type 𝑃 pedestrian is Pr(𝑃|𝑔) = 𝜙(𝑔)𝑃 and the probability
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Table 21: Descriptive statistics: all sample versus matched data
Matching Blacks to Whites: Matching Women to Men:
Matching radius All 500m 1,500m 3,000m 500m 1,500m 3,000m
Total crashes 32,481 539 1,622 3,488 1,691 5,159 9,602
Neighborhoods:
% in urban area 0.79 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.97
% in richest quintile 0.20 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.18
% high-income 0.50 0.36 0.39 0.40 0.42 0.44 0.45
majority-white 0.57 0.34 0.36 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.38
majority-black 0.12 0.28 0.25 0.25 0.17 0.15 0.15
Crash types:
arterial road 0.61 0.67 0.64 0.62 0.51 0.48 0.49
daylight time 0.26 0.09 0.14 0.16 0.21 0.24 0.25
night-time 0.36 0.63 0.63 0.60 0.59 0.58 0.56
dark 0.32 0.27 0.22 0.23 0.20 0.18 0.19
southern state 0.40 0.50 0.48 0.47 0.34 0.32 0.33
hour of day 13.98 14.20 14.25 14.35 14.32 14.18 14.12
day of the month 15.62 14.93 15.12 15.48 15.68 15.56 15.58
day of the week 4.15 4.10 4.18 4.17 4.11 4.19 4.14
month 6.93 6.80 6.81 6.84 6.98 6.91 6.91
year 2,013.22 2,013.46 2,013.37 2,013.32 2,013.27 2,013.23 2,013.20
not at intersection 0.71 0.68 0.66 0.67 0.59 0.58 0.61
four-way intersection 0.19 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.29 0.29 0.27
t-intersection crash 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11
wet road 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
no traffic controls 0.80 0.76 0.77 0.77 0.72 0.71 0.73
n. road lanes 2.84 3.31 3.24 3.19 3.34 3.21 3.16
speed limit 42.17 42.34 40.95 40.69 39.22 38.30 38.63
of type 𝐷 driver is Pr(𝐷|𝑔) = 𝜙(𝑔)𝐷 . The identifying assumption is that 𝐷 ⟂ 𝑃 , Pr(𝑃 |𝐷, 𝑔) = 𝜙(𝑔)𝑃 and
Pr(𝐷|𝑃, 𝑔) = 𝜙(𝑔)𝐷
After hitting 𝑃 , the driver 𝐷 either flees – denoted as 𝑆 = 0 – or stays to help the victim – 𝑆 = 1,
where Pr(𝑆 = 1 ∣ 𝐷, 𝑃) is the probability that she stays. The victim may die in the aftermath of the
severe crash, which we denote by †. If the driver stays and helps, the pedestrian dies with probability
Pr(†|𝑆 = 1) = 𝑑𝑠 ∈ (0, 1), otherwise, he dies with probability Pr(†|𝑆 = 0) = 𝑑𝑓 ∈ (0, 1). We assume that
𝑑𝑓 ≥ 𝑑𝑠 , i.e., drivers who stop and help do not aggravate and likely improve the chances of their victims
surviving.
2.2 which victims are helped more on average? 45
Table 22: Descriptive statistics: all sample versus matched data
Matching Blacks to Whites: Matching Women to Men:
Matching radius All 500m 1,500m 3,000m 500m 1,500m 3,000m
Total crashes 32,481 539 1,622 3,488 1,691 5,159 9,602
Pedestrians:
Bicyclist 0.14 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.08 0.10 0.11
% male 0.28 0.25 0.26 0.28 0.48 0.44 0.39
age 46.92 46.21 47.22 47.10 49.96 49.76 49.17
% child-teen 0.10 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.07
% senior 0.14 0.08 0.11 0.11 0.16 0.17 0.16
white 0.57 0.51 0.53 0.54 0.47 0.46 0.46
black 0.19 0.49 0.47 0.46 0.23 0.21 0.21
black 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.20 0.21
intoxicated (ped) 0.22 0.29 0.25 0.24 0.21 0.20 0.21
Drivers:
stayed 0.81 0.77 0.78 0.78 0.80 0.79 0.79
identified 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08
t-intersection crash 0.29 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.28
avg age 41.85 41.12 41.18 41.49 42.92 42.49 42.07
driver ≤35 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.42 0.39 0.40 0.41
driver ≥56 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.25 0.24 0.23
valid licence 0.81 0.76 0.77 0.77 0.80 0.79 0.78
previous offence 0.38 0.41 0.40 0.40 0.38 0.38 0.38
driving under influence 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.08
speeding 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06
resident of richest ZIP 0.20 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.22
resident of whitest ZIP 0.20 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.09
resident of blackest ZIP 0.20 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.26 0.24 0.24
ZIP code resident 0.27 0.21 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.21
expensive car 0.26 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.25
pickup vehicle 0.18 0.17 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.14
truck 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.08
2.2.2 How do statistics for fatal crashes relate to the values of our interest?
The expected rate at which a random driver stays after hitting a pedestrian 𝑃 is thus:
E(𝑆|𝑃) = 𝜙𝐴 Pr (𝑆 = 1|𝐷 = 𝐴, 𝑃) + 𝜙𝐵 Pr (𝑆 = 1|𝐷 = 𝐵, 𝑃) (23)
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where 𝜙𝐷 = ∑𝑔 𝜙(𝑔)𝐷 Pr(𝑔) is the share of drivers of type 𝐷 averaged across different locations. The
expected share of “hit-and-stays” (i.e., vehicle-pedestrian collisions where drivers assist their victims,
as opposed to fleeing) among the fatal crashes involving 𝑃 is:
E(𝑆|𝑃 , †) = 𝑑𝑠E(𝑆|𝑃)𝑑𝑠E(𝑆|𝑃) + 𝑑𝑓 (1 −E(𝑆|𝑃))
(24)
Notice that E(𝑆|𝑃 , †) is monotonously strictly increasing in E(𝑆|𝑃), which provides the ground for
the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The expected difference in the rates of hit-and-stays for 𝑇 versus 𝐶 has the same sign
conditional or unconditional on the death of the pedestrian, i.e.:
E(𝑆|𝑇 , †) −E(𝑆|𝐶, †) = 0 ⇔ E(𝑆|𝑇 ) −E(𝑆|𝐶) = 0 (25)
E(𝑆|𝑇 , †) −E(𝑆|𝐶, †) > 0 ⇔ E(𝑆|𝑇 ) −E(𝑆|𝐶) > 0 (26)
E(𝑆|𝑇 , †) −E(𝑆|𝐶, †) < 0 ⇔ E(𝑆|𝑇 ) −E(𝑆|𝐶) < 0 (27)
Moreover, the odds ratio of a random driver staying for pedestrian 𝑇 versus pedestrian 𝐶 in fatal crashes
is equal to the equivalent odds ratio unconditional on the death of the pedestrian.
E(𝑆|𝑇 , †)/(1 −E(𝑆|𝑇 , †))
E(𝑆|𝐶, †)/(1 −E(𝑆|𝐶, †)) =
E(𝑆|𝑇 )/(1 −E(𝑆|𝑇 ))
E(𝑆|𝐶)/(1 −E(𝑆|𝐶)) ≡ 𝑂𝑅 (28)
Let us denote the difference in the expected hit-and-stays for 𝑇 versus 𝐶 pedestrians in fatal crashes
as:
diff ≡ E(𝑆|𝑇 , †) −E(𝑆|𝐶, †) (29)
Using Proposition 1 and FARS dataset, we can estimate E(𝑆|𝑇 , †) − E(𝑆|𝐶, †) and interpolate the
results from the fatal crashes to the whole population of severe crashes. In the matched dataset which
we constructed in 2.1.2, we treat each matched group 𝑔 as a separate location. We estimate the observed
mean difference in the hit-and-stays for 𝑇 versus 𝐶 pedestrians for fatal crashes using the following
formula:
d̂iff = 1𝑛
𝑛
∑
𝑔=1
(𝑆(𝑇 )𝑔 −
1
#𝑐𝑔
#𝑐𝑔
∑
𝑖=1
𝑆(𝐶)𝑔,𝑖 ) (30)
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where for each 𝑔 ∈ {1, … , 𝑛}, there is one treatment observation and #𝑐𝑔 control observations; 𝑆(𝑇 )𝑔
or 𝑆(𝐶)𝑔,𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ {1, … #𝑐𝑔}, are indicator functions denoting whether the driver stayed for 𝑇 or 𝑖 − 𝑡ℎ control
observation 𝐶 , respectively.
As 𝑛 grows, the difference in the shares of hit-and-stays converges to a random normal variable:
d̂iff 𝑑⟹ 𝒩 (diff, 1𝑛𝜎
2) (31)
where the term 𝜎2 captures the variance of the difference in mean hit-and-stays across different loca-
tions:
𝜎2 = var (𝑆(𝑇 )𝑔 ) + var(
1
#𝑐𝑔
#𝑐𝑔
∑
𝑖=1
𝑆(𝐶)𝑔,𝑖 ) − 2cov(𝑆(𝑇 )𝑔 ,
1
#𝑐𝑔
#𝑐𝑔
∑
𝑖=1
𝑆(𝐶)𝑔,𝑖 )
We estimate the odds ratio 28 as:
?̂?𝑅 =
1
𝑛 ∑
𝑛
𝑔=1 𝑆(𝑇 )𝑔 /(1 −
1
𝑛 ∑
𝑛
𝑔=1 𝑆(𝑇 )𝑔 )
1
𝑛 ∑
𝑛
𝑔=1
1
#𝑐𝑔
∑#𝑐𝑔𝑖=1 𝑆(𝐶)𝑔 /(1 − 1𝑛 ∑
𝑛
𝑔=1
1
#𝑐𝑔
∑#𝑐𝑔𝑖=1 𝑆(𝐶)𝑔 )
(32)
Using the properties of binomial distribution and the delta method, the empirical odds ratio is dis-
tributed log-normally:
log ?̂?𝑅 𝑑⟹ 𝒩 (𝑂𝑅 − 1, 1𝑛 (
1
E(𝑆|𝑇 ) +
1
(1 −E(𝑆|𝑇 )) +
1
E(𝑆|𝐶) +
1
(1 −E(𝑆|𝐶)))) (33)
Note that the estimates of (30) and (32) will represent the average treatment effects on the treated in
denser populated areas. It is because we form locations around 𝑇 pedestrians conditional on the exis-
tence of thematchwith𝐶 nearby. Hence, 𝜙𝐷 in (23)will in fact be equal to∑𝑔 𝜙(𝑔)𝐷 Pr (𝑔|𝑇 , ∃𝐶 ∶ distance|𝑇 − 𝐶| ≤ 𝑟),
where 𝑟 is the matching radius.
2.2.3 The estimates
Table 23 presents the estimation results of (30) and (32) for two combinations of treatment and control
groups:
1. Female pedestrians (𝑇 ) versus male pedestrians (𝐶);
2. African-American pedestrians (𝑇 ) versus non-hispanic white pedestrians (𝐶).
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We label the minority groups as the treatment group 𝑇 and the majority as the control group 𝐶 , which
observations we reuse if necessary for different treated.
Additionally, the table provides the estimates for different subsamples.
Table 23: The difference in the probability of staying by location types
diff 𝑂𝑅
𝑇 vs. 𝐶 pedestrians/Locations 𝑛 matches est. st.dev. t-stat[1] est. t-stat[2]
Women vs Men
All locations 2,262 -0.000 0.011 -0.03 1.00 -0.02
% in richest quintile 376 0.031 0.023 1.36 1.307 1.24
% high-income 1,024 0.008 0.015 0.56 1.061 0.50
majority-white 872 0.023 0.017 1.38 1.193 1.33
high-income white neighborhood 544 0.035 0.020 1.73 1.322 1.63
low-income white neighborhood_nbhd 326 0.002 0.028 0.08 1.017 0.08
majority-black 348 -0.077 0.030 -2.54 0.673 -2.29
high-income black neighborhood 76 0.011 0.061 0.18 1.062 0.16
low-income black neighborhood 271 -0.102 0.035 -2.92 0.597 -2.65
southern 708 -0.020 0.020 -1.02 0.884 -0.94
northern 1,554 0.009 0.013 0.68 1.056 0.61
Blacks vs non-hispanic whites
All locations 769 -0.062 0.020 -3.05 0.70 -2.90
top20income_nbhd 93 -0.111 0.054 -2.07 0.423 -2.02
% high-income 281 -0.071 0.033 -2.16 0.623 -2.14
majority-white 250 -0.092 0.033 -2.78 0.531 -2.65
high-income white neighborhood 136 -0.049 0.045 -1.09 0.692 -1.10
low-income white neighborhood_nbhd 113 -0.137 0.049 -2.78 0.422 -2.49
majority-black 232 0.029 0.038 0.77 1.176 0.74
high-income black neighborhood 48 -0.010 0.065 -0.16 0.890 -0.17
low-income black neighborhood 184 0.040 0.046 0.87 1.221 0.85
southern 374 -0.047 0.030 -1.54 0.764 -1.53
northern 395 -0.077 0.027 -2.79 0.647 -2.55
Notes: The estimate (est.) for d̂iff captures the observed difference in the shares of hit-and-stays for 𝑇 and
𝐶 pedestrians involved in fatal crashes (See formula in 30). The sample includes all the fatal crashes that in-
volve 𝑇 for which there is at least one fatal crash of type-𝐶 pedestrian within 1, 500 meters which happened
under similar neighborhood, road, and time of the day conditions (See more in ...). 𝑛 stands for the num-
ber of locations, which is the total number of 𝑇 pedestrians in the matched sample. [1] The t-statistics for
d̂iff is for the null hypothesis that the estimate is zero. [2] The t-statistics for ?̂?𝑅 is for testing ?̂?𝑅 = 1,
which we test by log-transformation, i.e. 𝑙𝑜𝑔(?̂?𝑅) = 0, where the variance of the 𝑙𝑜𝑔(?̂?𝑅) is estimated as
𝑛
𝑛−1 (
1
∑𝑛𝑔=1 𝑆(𝑇 )𝑔
+ 1𝑛−∑𝑛𝑔=1 𝑆(𝑇 )𝑔 +
1
∑𝑛𝑔=1
1
#𝑐𝑔
∑#𝑐𝑔𝑖=1 𝑆(𝐶)𝑔,𝑖
+ 1
𝑛−∑𝑛𝑔=1
1
#𝑐𝑔
∑#𝑐𝑔𝑖=1 𝑆(𝐶)𝑔,𝑖
)
The percentiles thresholds for income and racial composition are based on the statistics for all pedestrian-car
crashes in 2010-2016. Southern States include Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia. All the rest are in West and North-East category.
We use the two-sided t-test under 95% confidence level, rejecting the null hypothesis that hit-and-
stays are equally common for treatment and control groups if the t-statistics is beyond the critical value
of 1.96.
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According to Table 23, female and male pedestrians experience on average the same frequency of
hit-and-stays, as the estimate of diff for the whole sample is zero. At least we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that it is so (See Proposition 1).
However, the analysis of different subsamples reveals heterogeneity across locations of accidents.
Women are more likely to be helped in the 20% whitest neighborhoods (defined as the Census blocks
where the share of the non-hispanic white residents is above 86%). There, the odds that a woman is
helped are almost three times higher than for a man. Incidentally, the whitest neighborhoods are also
the richest ones. If we look at the census blocks where the Whites are in the majority of population,
we cannot reject the null hypothesis. However, the point estimates suggests that the drivers in richer
white-majority neighborhoods rather than poorer white-majority neighborhoods are suspected of dis-
criminating in favor of women.
Moreover, we observe the opposite behavior – women are less likely to be helped than men – in
neighborhoods where the majority of residents are Blacks, and these residents are relatively poor (have
the average annual household income below 44, 107 USD as of 2010). In such neighborhoods, the odds
that a driver helps a woman is 40% lower than for a man. Overall, the results suggest that women are
helped as much as men are helped in most places, except for certain types of neighborhoods – ultra-
white and majority-black – where the discrimination of women has opposite signs.
When we compare hit-and-stays for Black pedestrians versus the non-hispanic whites, we find that
the blacks are helped less often (See the second half of Table 23). The odds that a driver stays for a black
pedestrian are 30% lower than they are for a white pedestrian.
Black pedestrian suffer from discrimination in all types of neighborhoods locations except for the
neighborhoods with a Black-majority population. There, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of zero
discrimination, and thus we do not have the evidence that the drivers in blacker neighborhoods dis-
criminate in favor or against black pedestrians.
The negative discrimination of the blacks, however, is the strongest in whiter neighborhoods. If we
look at the neighborhoods where the whites are in majority, the odds of helping a black pedestrian are
twice lower than for a white pedestrian. Moreover, the effect seems to be driven more by the lower
income white-majority neighborhoods. At the same time, we observe strong effects also in the richest
(and whitest) neighborhoods. Overall, it seems that the drivers white neighborhoods tend to help black
pedestrians less often than the whites.
The estimates are not different for the Southern States versus the North-East of the USA (Table 23).
Moreover, the results are robust throughout different road and light conditions and under different
matching radii (See Table 30 in the appendix).
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The next section explores the characteristics of drivers who react differently to race and gender of the
pedestrian.
2.3 which drivers discriminate pedestrians?
2.3.1 The discrimination rate
We estimate the rate at which drivers of type 𝐷 stay disproportionately more (or less) for pedestrians 𝑇
compared to pedestrians 𝐶 , which we call the discrimination rate:
Δ𝐷 ≡
Pr(𝑆 = 1 | 𝐷, 𝑇 )
Pr(𝑆 = 1 | 𝐷, 𝐶) (34)
If Δ𝐷 > 1, we say that the type 𝐷 driver is discriminating in favor of 𝑇 and against 𝐶 . If Δ𝐷 < 1, then
the opposite is true – type 𝐷 is discriminating against 𝑇 and in favor of 𝐶 . When Δ𝐷 = 1, it means that
the driver of type 𝐷 does not discriminate between 𝑇 and 𝐶 .
In fatal crashes, there are two statistics of interest:
1. The probability that the driver is type 𝐷 and the driver stayed out of all crashes that involve the
pedestrian of type 𝑃 : Pr(𝑆 = 1, 𝐷|𝑃, †)
2. The expected share of type-𝐷 drivers out of all drivers who stayed for pedestrian 𝑃 : Pr(𝐷|𝑆 =
1, 𝑃, †)
Using all fatal crashes, the following ratio captures Δ𝐷 times the bias term 𝜇:
Pr(𝑆 = 1, 𝐷 | 𝑇 , †)
Pr(𝑆 = 1, 𝐷 | 𝐶, †) = Δ𝐷
𝑑𝑓 − (𝑑𝑓 − 𝑑𝑠)E(𝑆|𝐶)
𝑑𝑓 − (𝑑𝑓 − 𝑑𝑠)E(𝑆|𝑇 )⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟
≡𝜇
(35)
The bias 𝜇 results from different mortality rates of pedestrians due to the discrimination. The term 𝜇
is close to one (small bias) when the proportion of those who stay for pedestrians of type 𝑇 and 𝐶 is
close enough, or if the act of staying does not change much the probability of surviving the accident
𝑑𝑓 ≈ 𝑑𝑠 .
Using only the fatal crashes where drivers stayed, the following ratio also captures the discrimination
rate Δ𝐷 but with another bias term, which we denote as 𝜆:
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Pr(𝐷 | 𝑆 = 1, 𝑇 , †)
Pr(𝐷 | 𝑆 = 1, 𝑇 , †) = Δ𝐷
E(𝑆 | 𝐶)
E(𝑆 | 𝑇 )⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟
≡𝜆
(36)
The bias 𝜆 is simply the ratio of expected stays for 𝐶 versus 𝑇 pedestrians.
Note that 𝜇 and 𝜆 are related inversely to each other – if 𝜇 biases upwards, 𝜆 biases downwards, and
vice versa.The direction of the bias depends on the sign ofE(𝑆|𝑇 ) −E(𝑆|𝐶).This property is summarized
in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. The ratios (35) and (36) provide upper and lower bounds for the discrimination rate Δ𝐷 .
Which of the two ratios is the upper bound and which one is the lower bound, depends on E(𝑆|𝑇 ) −E(𝑆|𝐶)
in the following manner:
E(𝑆|𝑇 ) > E(𝑆|𝐶) ⇒ Pr(𝐷|𝑆 = 1, 𝑇 , †)Pr(𝐷|𝑆 = 1, 𝐶, †) < Δ𝐷 <
Pr(𝑆 = 1, 𝐷|𝑇 , †)
Pr(𝑆 = 1, 𝐷|𝐶, †) (37)
E(𝑆|𝑇 ) < E(𝑆|𝐶) ⇒ Pr(𝑆 = 1, 𝐷|𝑇 , †)Pr(𝑆 = 1, 𝐷|𝐶, †) < Δ𝐷 <
Pr(𝐷|𝑆 = 1, 𝑇 , †)
Pr(𝐷|𝑆 = 1, 𝐶, †) (38)
E(𝑆|𝑇 ) = E(𝑆|𝐶) ⇒ Pr(𝑆 = 1, 𝐷|𝑇 , †)Pr(𝑆 = 1, 𝐷|𝐶, †) = Δ𝐷 =
Pr(𝐷|𝑆 = 1, 𝑇 , †)
Pr(𝐷|𝑆 = 1, 𝐶, †) (39)
Moreover, the bias terms 𝜇 and 𝜆 are the same for both types of drivers, 𝐴 and 𝐵, which means that
the ratio (35) for 𝐷 = 𝐴 divided by the ratio (35) for 𝐷 = 𝐵 is equal to the relative rate of discrimination
Δ𝐴/Δ𝐵 . It is also equal to the ratio (36) for 𝐷 = 𝐴 divided by the ratio (36) for 𝐷 = 𝐵, i.e.:
Pr(𝑆 = 1, 𝐴|𝑇 , †)/ Pr(𝑆 = 1, 𝐴|𝐶, †)
Pr(𝑆 = 1, 𝐵|𝑇 , †)/ Pr(𝑆 = 1, 𝐵|𝐶, †) =
Δ𝐴
Δ𝐵
(40)
Pr(𝐴|𝑆 = 1, 𝑇 , †)/ Pr(𝐴|𝑆 = 1, 𝐶, †)
Pr(𝐵|𝑆 = 1, 𝑇 , †)/ Pr(𝐵|𝑆 = 1, 𝐶, †) =
Δ𝐴
Δ𝐵
(41)
Proposition 3. Depending on the sign of E(𝑆|𝑇 ) − E(𝑆|𝐶), the ratio (40) or (41) identifies at least one
discriminating type of drivers.
a) IfE(𝑆|𝑇 ) < E(𝑆|𝐶) and Δ𝐴Δ𝐵 is below (above) one, then at least the driver of type𝐴 (𝐵) is discriminating
against 𝑇 and in favor of 𝐶 .
b) IfE(𝑆|𝑇 ) > E(𝑆|𝐶) and Δ𝐴Δ𝐵 is above (below) one, then at least the driver of type𝐴 (𝐵) is discriminating
in favor of 𝑇 and against 𝐶 .
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c) If E(𝑆|𝑇 ) = E(𝑆|𝐶) and Δ𝐴Δ𝐵 is below (above) one, then the driver of type 𝐴 is discriminating against
(in favor of) 𝑇 and the driver of type 𝐵 is discriminating in favor of (against) 𝑇 .
Proof: If E(𝑆|𝑇 ) < E(𝑆|𝐶), it cannot be true that both types of drivers discriminate in favor of 𝑇 .
Hence, at least one type of drivers, 𝐴 or 𝐵 must be discriminating against 𝑇 . Then, the ratio Δ𝐴/Δ𝐵
will tell us who is discriminating for sure, 𝐴 – in cases when the relative discrimination rate is below
one, 𝐵 – in cases when it is above one, or both – in cases when it is equal to one. Note that in the
first two cases, when Δ𝐴/Δ𝐵 ≠ 1, the other type of drivers can be discriminating in favor of 𝑇 or can
be also discriminating against 𝑇 , but to a lower degree. The reverse logic applies for the case when
E(𝑆|𝑇 ) > E(𝑆|𝐶).
Using FARS data, we can empirically estimate (35) and (40) as:
Δ̂𝐷𝜇 =
1
𝑛
𝑛
∑
𝑔=1
𝑆(𝑇 )𝑔 𝐷(𝑇 )𝑔
1
𝑛
𝑛
∑
𝑔=1
1
#𝑐𝑔
#𝑐𝑔
∑
𝑖=1
𝑆(𝐶)𝑔,𝑖 𝐷(𝐶)𝑔,𝑖
(42)
Δ̂𝐴/Δ𝐵 = Δ̂𝐴𝜇/Δ̂𝐵𝜇 (43)
where 𝐷(𝑇 )𝑔 and 𝐷(𝐶)𝑔,𝑖 are indicator functions that the driver is of type 𝐷 for the case involving the
treated pedestrian or, respectively, the 𝑖-th control pedestrian in group 𝑔.
Then, we restrict the FARS matched dataset only to hit-and-stay fatal crashes. This operation will
shrink the initial number of matched groups from 𝑛 to 𝑛𝑠 matches – the matches where the driver
stayed for 𝑇 and the driver stayed for at least one 𝐶 within the vicinity. Thus, we estimate (36) and (41)
as:
Δ̂𝐷𝜆 =
1
𝑛𝑠
∑𝑛𝑠𝑔=1 𝐷(𝑇 )𝑔
1
𝑛𝑠
∑𝑛𝑠𝑔=1
1
#𝑐𝑠,𝑔
∑#𝑐𝑠,𝑔𝑖=1 𝐷(𝐶)𝑔,𝑖
|| Hit & Stays only (44)
Δ̂𝐴/Δ𝐵 = Δ̂𝐴𝜆/Δ̂𝐵𝜆 (45)
The estimates of (42), (43),( 44), and (45) will be distributed log-normally.
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2.3.2 Results: Gender discrimination
Table 24 presents the estimates of (42), (43), (44), and (45) for different classifications of drivers into types
𝐴, namely:
1. by age: 35 and less, 36 to 55, 56+;
2. women;
3. drivers of expensive cars, pickups, or trucks;
4. drivers who had previous records of accidents or traffic violations;
5. drivers by the characteristics of the zip-codes they live in: share of white/black residents, average
income.
where type 𝐵 is defined as all the other drivers that are not 𝐴.
For each of the these classifications, Table 24 provides two rows of estimates.The first row reports the
estimates and t-statistics for Δ̂𝐴/Δ𝐵 as in (43), Δ̂𝐴𝜇 and Δ̂𝐵𝜇. There are 2, 256 matches for the matching
radius of 1, 500 meters. The second row is based on the matched fatal accidents excluding hit-and-runs,
resulting in 1, 590 matches in total; reports the estimates and t-statistics for Δ̂𝐴/Δ𝐵 as in (45), Δ̂𝐴𝜆 and
Δ̂𝐵𝜆.
We keep on using the 95% confidence level for the two-sided t-test with the critical value for the
t-statistics at 1.96.
According to Table 24, senior drivers (age 56+) and truck drivers tend to discriminate in favor of
women and against men, according to Proposition 3. Moreover, the estimates of the size of the discrimi-
nation rate (taken at face value and using Proposition 2) suggest that senior drivers are 4%more likely to
stay for women than for men, but the estimate is not individually statistically significant. Truck drivers
are 24% more likely to stay for women than for men, and the estimate is individually different from zero.
For other groups, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of impartial behavior. There is tentative evidence
that the drivers of expensive cars also tend to stay more for women than for men.
Next, we look at the richest neighborhoods, for which the previous results indicated that the drivers
discriminate in favor of women. Note that now we employ a one-sided t-test with the critical value of
1.645 under 95% confidence level to test whether the ratio of discrimination rates is below or above
one. According to Proposition 3, the new null hypothesis is that type 𝐴 driver discriminates in favor
of women as much as type 𝐵 driver (equal discrimination in favor of women). According to Table 25
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and Proposition 3, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal discrimination in favor of women
for drivers by age cohorts, gender, or zip-code income. However, we see that expensive car drivers are
among the leaders in discrimination in favor of women in the richest neighborhoods.The point estimates
suggest that the expensive car drivers are 21% more likely to stop to help a woman than a man. Perhaps
surprisingly, drivers with previous accident or traffic violation records are also more likely to stop for a
woman than for man in the richest neighborhoods.
Furthermore, we repeat the analysis for the black-majority neighborhoods. According to the previous
results, we know that the drivers in the black-majority neighborhoods tend to stop less frequently for
women than for men. Using Proposition 3, the new null hypothesis is that type 𝐴 driver discriminates
against women as much as type 𝐵 driver (equal discrimination against women).
The results in Table 26 unfortunately do not shed enough light into the profiles of drivers who dis-
criminate against women in the black-majority neighborhoods. All we can say is that the middle-age
drivers (age 35 to 55) are leading the discrimination against women.
2.3.3 Results: Who discriminates against blacks?
In the previous section, we have found that drivers stay less often for Black than for (non-Hispanic)
White pedestrians. Since E(𝑆|𝑇 = Black) < E(𝑆|𝑇 = White), the estimates of the discrimination rate in
columns 6-9 are likely to be biased downwards when using the sample of all fatal crashes (odd rows)
and biased upwards when using the sample of fatal hit-and-stays (even rows), according to Proposition
2.
We know that at least some type of drivers must be discriminating against blacks pedestrians. Ac-
cording to the estimates of the relative discrimination rates and the biased estimates of discrimination
rates (Table 27) and using Proposition 3, the drivers who discriminate against the Blacks are those who:
• Live in high income zip-code areas (the top-30th percentile by income): 20% less likely to stay for
the Blacks than for the Whites;
• Live in zip-code areas with no sizable black population (the bottom-80th percentile by the share
of Black residents): 5% to 15% less likely to stay for the Blacks than for the Whites;
• Live in in the area where accident happened (resident drivers): 23% less likely to stay for the Blacks
than for the Whites;
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• Drive expensive cars (for a one-sided test only, t-statistics is 1.9>1.645): 9% to 20% less likely to
stay for the Blacks than for the Whites.
For all other types of drivers we cannot reject the null hypothesis that they discriminate against blacks
pedestrians to the same extent.
Notice, that despite the upwards bias 𝜆 > 1, the estimate Δ̂𝐴𝜆 is still significantly below one for
resident drivers and high-income zip-code drivers. Hence, if we did not have the estimates of the relative
discrimination rates which we estimate without a bias, we would still be able to tell that these drivers
tend to discriminate against the Blacks and in favor of the Whites.
The results overall align with the previous set of results that black pedestrians are discriminated
primarily in richer and whiter neighborhoods.The driver profile analysis shows that it is exactly drivers
from richer and whiter zip-codes who are missing for black pedestrians.
Next, we repeat the analysis separately for the white-majority neighborhoods. Table 28 shows that
the middle-age drivers are 28% less likely to stop after hitting a black person than a white person, as
well as drivers of expensive cars (30% to 37% less likely), and zip-code resident drivers (40% less likely).
Table 29 shows the results for the black-majority neighborhoods, for which we have not found an
evidence of discrimination against blacks/whites in Section 2.2.3. Using a two-sided t-test, we find that
expensive car drivers in the black-majority neighborhoods are 67% to 80%more likely to stop after hitting
a black pedestrian than a white pedestrian. All other classifications of drivers do not show differential
discrimination rates.
Overall, we find that black pedestrians are negatively discriminated by residents in whiter zip-codes,
drivers of expensive cars, drivers who live in the area specifically for accidents in the whiter neighbor-
hoods. In the black-majority neighborhoods, we cannot say that black and white pedestrians are treated
differently, except for drivers of expensive cars who tend to stop for black pedestrians and flee more if
the pedestrian is white.
2.4 conclusion
This paper asks how empathy and assistance are extended across social and ethnic groups. The question
is of great importance for gauging the extent of social cohesion and the amount of human capital in a
society. In particular, it is important to highlight across which social and ethnic groups the fault lines
are deepest. Precise measurement of the phenomenon is complicated whenever social and ethnic groups
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live separately from one another, and are thus less likely to find themselves in a position to interact with
each other.
We employ a quasi-natural experimental estimation by examining what happens in the aftermath of a
fatal vehicle-pedestrian crash in the United States. Such an event can bring together complete strangers
from different groups. It is mostly non-intentional event by nature, but is sufficiently egregious to be
relevant and recorded in administrative data.The dynamics of the accident involving a pedestrian victim
make assistance a necessity, and the driver is morally expected to provide help.
We combine data from the Fatality Analysis Reporting System and U.S. Census to observe whether
drivers involved in a serious collision with a pedestrian stay to help, or flee.The geolocation of accidents
from FARS, along with a plethora of accident characteristics, combined with urban demographic details
from US Census data allows to draw comparisons between commensurable observations. This is of
particular importance considering the extent of racial residential segregation in the US.
In particular, to precisely identify effects, we consider groups of accidents occurring in the same area
under similar circumstances, to estimate how often drivers of different groups stay or flee after the
accident, depending on the the observable characteristics of both drivers and pedestrians
We employ a methodology based on the assumption of independence of driver and pedestrian types
in crashes, conditional on the location and other circumstances of the accident.
We find that gender of the pedestrian does not change (on average) the decision of the driver to stop
after the accident. However, the race of the pedestrian does. Almost across all locations, drivers are more
likely to flee when hitting a black pedestrian rather than a non-hispanic white pedestrian.
We plan to extend the analysis to include a longer time-span, and to further control for the demo-
graphic characteristics of accident locations by adding local political preferences.
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Figure 6: Position of crashes (red dots) in Manhattan in 2000–2016. Census block group boundaries in white; color
intensity of block groups denotes share of non-hispanic white residents.
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Figure 7: Number of fatal crashed by hour of day
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Figure 8: Location of fatal traffic accidents reported in FARS across 48 contiguous US states, 2010–2016.
Figure 9: Balancing of characteristics in the matched datasets
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Table 24: The discrimination rates for Female vs Male pedestrians by driver types
Type A driver Sample Δ𝐴/Δ𝐵 Δ𝐴 ∗ (𝜇 or 𝜆) Δ𝐵 ∗ (𝜇 or 𝜆)
desc. 𝑛 gr. est. t-stat[1] est. t-stat[1] est. t-stat[1]
driver ≤35 all 2,256 0.980 -0.37 0.986 -0.31 1.006 0.21
stayed 1,590 1.007 0.13 1.004 0.09 0.997 -0.09
driver 36–55 all 2,256 0.913 -1.66 0.943 -1.27 1.033 1.09
stayed 1,590 0.947 -1.02 0.967 -0.74 1.021 0.74
driver ≥56 all 2,256 1.148 2.14 1.107 1.71 0.965 -1.47
stayed 1,590 1.061 0.92 1.045 0.72 0.985 -0.72
t-intersection crash all 2,258 1.019 0.30 1.013 0.23 0.994 -0.22
stayed 1,591 1.024 0.39 1.017 0.30 0.993 -0.30
expensive car all 2,262 1.122 1.90 1.085 1.49 0.967 -1.28
stayed 1,595 1.124 1.93 1.087 1.49 0.967 -1.49
pickup vehicle all 2,262 1.103 1.18 1.086 1.03 0.985 -0.74
stayed 1,595 1.123 1.35 1.104 1.16 0.983 -1.16
truck all 2,262 1.268 2.35 1.237 2.14 0.975 -1.33
stayed 1,595 1.293 2.53 1.257 2.27 0.972 -2.27
resident of whitest ZIP all 2,224 1.202 1.67 1.183 1.54 0.984 -0.87
stayed 1,560 1.144 1.19 1.130 1.08 0.988 -1.08
resident of blackest ZIP all 2,224 0.947 -0.82 0.959 -0.67 1.013 0.55
stayed 1,560 1.019 0.28 1.015 0.23 0.996 -0.23
high-income ZIP code all 2,224 0.994 -0.10 0.997 -0.07 1.002 0.08
stayed 1,560 0.992 -0.16 0.995 -0.11 1.003 0.11
medium-income ZIP code all 2,224 0.970 -0.50 0.979 -0.39 1.009 0.35
stayed 1,560 0.987 -0.22 0.991 -0.17 1.004 0.17
low-income ZIP coder all 2,224 1.034 0.59 1.023 0.46 0.989 -0.39
stayed 1,560 1.022 0.37 1.014 0.28 0.993 -0.28
ZIP code resident all 2,262 1.118 1.70 1.088 1.38 0.973 -1.14
stayed 1,595 1.057 0.85 1.043 0.67 0.987 -0.67
previous offence all 2,262 1.034 0.64 1.019 0.46 0.986 -0.45
stayed 1,595 1.016 0.30 1.009 0.22 0.993 -0.22
Notes: The odd rows provide the estimates of the rates of discrimination of female versus male pedestrians based
on all matched fatal crashes. Δ𝐴 is the discrimination rate by type 𝐴 as defined in the first column. Δ𝐵 is the
discrimination rate by type 𝐵, which is all other drivers that are not 𝐴. The odd rows estimate Δ𝐴/Δ𝐵 using (43);
Δ𝐴𝜇 and Δ𝐵𝜇 using (42). The even rows estimate Δ𝐴/Δ𝐵 as in (45); Δ𝐴𝜆 and Δ𝐵𝜆 using (44). For odd rows, the sample
includes all the fatal crashes that involve 𝑇 for which there is at least one fatal crash of type-𝐶 pedestrian within
1, 500 meters which happened under similar neighborhood, road, and time of the day conditions (See more in ...).
For odd rows, the sample is constructed similar to odd rows, but restricted to fatal hit-and-stays. 𝑛 gr. stands for
the number of locations, which is the total number of 𝑇 pedestrians in the matched sample. [1] The t-statistics is
for testing 𝑒𝑠𝑡 = 1, which we test by log-transformation, i.e. log(𝑒𝑠𝑡) = 0.
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Table 25: The discrimination rates for Women vs Men by driver types in top 20th percentile of neighbor-
hoods by income
Type A driver Sample Δ𝐴/Δ𝐵 Δ𝐴 ∗ (𝜇 or 𝜆) Δ𝐵 ∗ (𝜇 or 𝜆)
desc. 𝑛 gr. est. t-stat[1] est. t-stat[1] est. t-stat[1]
driver ≤35 all 374 1.074 0.56 1.084 0.73 1.009 0.13
stayed 299 1.087 0.64 1.057 0.48 0.973 -0.48
driver 36–55 all 374 0.952 -0.40 1.004 0.04 1.055 0.77
stayed 299 0.956 -0.38 0.974 -0.27 1.019 0.27
driver ≥56 all 374 0.976 -0.16 1.016 0.12 1.041 0.74
stayed 299 0.961 -0.27 0.971 -0.21 1.010 0.21
t-intersection crash all 375 1.245 1.49 1.218 1.45 0.979 -0.39
stayed 300 1.294 1.75 1.211 1.37 0.936 -1.38
expensive car all 376 1.266 1.68 1.227 1.59 0.969 -0.55
stayed 301 1.312 1.95 1.214 1.50 0.925 -1.50
pickup vehicle all 376 0.949 -0.24 0.989 -0.05 1.042 1.03
stayed 301 1.068 0.29 1.060 0.26 0.992 -0.26
truck all 376 1.332 1.54 1.317 1.52 0.989 -0.26
stayed 301 1.375 1.75 1.301 1.47 0.946 -1.48
ZIP code resident all 376 1.255 1.44 1.235 1.41 0.985 -0.30
stayed 301 1.265 1.45 1.203 1.18 0.951 -1.18
high-income ZIP code all 365 1.001 0.01 1.038 0.53 1.036 0.34
stayed 290 0.911 -0.75 0.965 -0.54 1.059 0.54
medium-income ZIP code all 365 0.807 -1.35 0.879 -0.86 1.089 1.63
stayed 290 0.852 -1.02 0.885 -0.81 1.038 0.81
low-income ZIP coder all 365 1.324 1.45 1.314 1.45 0.992 -0.17
stayed 290 1.502 1.97 1.416 1.71 0.942 -1.71
previous offence all 376 1.334 2.36 1.227 2.08 0.920 -1.16
stayed 301 1.150 1.18 1.084 0.85 0.943 -0.85
Notes:The odd rows provide the estimates of the rates of discrimination of Black versus non-hispanic white pedes-
trians based on all matched fatal crashes. Δ𝐴 is the discrimination rate by type 𝐴 as defined in the first column. Δ𝐵
is the discrimination rate by type 𝐵, which is all other drivers that are not 𝐴. The odd rows estimate Δ𝐴/Δ𝐵 using
(43); Δ𝐴𝜇 and Δ𝐵𝜇 using (42). The even rows estimate Δ𝐴/Δ𝐵 as in (45); Δ𝐴𝜆 and Δ𝐵𝜆 using (44). For odd rows, the
sample includes all the fatal crashes that involve 𝑇 for which there is at least one fatal crash of type-𝐶 pedestrian
within 1, 500meters which happened under similar neighborhood, road, and time of the day conditions (See more
in ...). For odd rows, the sample is constructed similar to odd rows, but restricted to fatal hit-and-stays. 𝑛 gr. stands
for the number of locations, which is the total number of 𝑇 pedestrians in the matched sample. [1] The t-statistics
is for testing 𝑒𝑠𝑡 = 1, which we test by log-transformation, i.e. 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑒𝑠𝑡) = 0.
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Table 26: The discrimination rates for Women vs Men by driver types in majority black neighborhoods
Type A driver Sample Δ𝐴/Δ𝐵 Δ𝐴 ∗ (𝜇 or 𝜆) Δ𝐵 ∗ (𝜇 or 𝜆)
desc. 𝑛 gr. est. t-stat[1] est. t-stat[1] est. t-stat[1]
driver ≤35 all 346 1.193 1.22 0.992 -0.07 0.832 -2.07
stayed 210 1.103 0.69 1.059 0.49 0.960 -0.49
driver 36–55 all 346 0.653 -2.85 0.690 -3.02 1.057 0.65
stayed 210 0.697 -2.47 0.804 -1.79 1.153 1.79
driver ≥56 all 346 1.456 1.87 1.213 1.02 0.833 -2.85
stayed 210 1.506 1.93 1.395 1.61 0.926 -1.62
t-intersection crash all 346 1.000 0.00 0.895 -0.76 0.895 -1.49
stayed 210 0.973 -0.17 0.981 -0.13 1.008 0.13
expensive car all 348 1.008 0.05 0.905 -0.62 0.898 -1.56
stayed 211 0.928 -0.41 0.945 -0.33 1.018 0.33
pickup vehicle all 348 1.028 0.10 0.922 -0.31 0.897 -1.96
stayed 211 0.895 -0.39 0.905 -0.35 1.012 0.35
truck all 348 1.703 1.75 1.464 1.28 0.859 -2.81
stayed 211 1.719 1.66 1.641 1.52 0.954 -1.54
ZIP code resident all 348 0.812 -1.04 0.760 -1.44 0.936 -1.05
stayed 211 0.713 -1.65 0.762 -1.37 1.069 1.37
high-income ZIP code all 345 1.044 0.25 0.924 -0.50 0.886 -1.73
stayed 209 1.129 0.69 1.094 0.54 0.969 -0.54
medium-income ZIP code all 345 1.020 0.12 0.908 -0.64 0.890 -1.60
stayed 209 0.930 -0.45 0.950 -0.34 1.022 0.34
low-income ZIP coder all 345 0.953 -0.34 0.872 -1.28 0.916 -0.92
stayed 209 0.968 -0.23 0.982 -0.17 1.015 0.17
previous offence all 348 1.092 0.62 0.941 -0.59 0.862 -1.51
stayed 211 1.106 0.73 1.053 0.52 0.952 -0.52
Notes:The odd rows provide the estimates of the rates of discrimination of Black versus non-hispanic white pedes-
trians based on all matched fatal crashes. Δ𝐴 is the discrimination rate by type 𝐴 as defined in the first column. Δ𝐵
is the discrimination rate by type 𝐵, which is all other drivers that are not 𝐴. The odd rows estimate Δ𝐴/Δ𝐵 using
(43); Δ𝐴𝜇 and Δ𝐵𝜇 using (42). The even rows estimate Δ𝐴/Δ𝐵 as in (45); Δ𝐴𝜆 and Δ𝐵𝜆 using (44). For odd rows, the
sample includes all the fatal crashes that involve 𝑇 for which there is at least one fatal crash of type-𝐶 pedestrian
within 1, 500meters which happened under similar neighborhood, road, and time of the day conditions (See more
in ...). For odd rows, the sample is constructed similar to odd rows, but restricted to fatal hit-and-stays. 𝑛 gr. stands
for the number of locations, which is the total number of 𝑇 pedestrians in the matched sample. [1] The t-statistics
is for testing 𝑒𝑠𝑡 = 1, which we test by log-transformation, i.e. 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑒𝑠𝑡) = 0.
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Table 27: The discrimination rates for Black vs non-hispanic white pedestrians by driver types
Type A driver Sample Δ𝐴/Δ𝐵 Δ𝐴 ∗ (𝜇 or 𝜆) Δ𝐵 ∗ (𝜇 or 𝜆)
desc. 𝑛 gr. est. t-stat[1] est. t-stat[1] est. t-stat[1]
driver ≤35 all 769 1.025 0.27 0.936 -0.91 0.913 -1.58
stayed 481 1.003 0.03 1.001 0.02 0.999 -0.02
driver 36–55 all 769 0.854 -1.61 0.833 -2.18 0.975 -0.49
stayed 481 0.830 -1.88 0.887 -1.38 1.069 1.38
driver ≥56 all 769 1.190 1.45 1.057 0.49 0.888 -2.86
stayed 481 1.281 1.94 1.214 1.58 0.947 -1.58
t-intersection crash all 769 0.921 -0.76 0.869 -1.42 0.944 -1.28
stayed 481 0.840 -1.55 0.881 -1.20 1.049 1.20
expensive car all 769 0.818 -1.82 0.796 -2.26 0.973 -0.60
stayed 481 0.881 -1.10 0.911 -0.86 1.034 0.86
pickup vehicle all 769 0.922 -0.55 0.861 -1.04 0.934 -1.87
stayed 481 1.027 0.17 1.023 0.15 0.996 -0.15
truck all 769 0.766 -1.34 0.722 -1.66 0.943 -1.77
stayed 481 0.844 -0.77 0.856 -0.71 1.014 0.72
resident of whitest ZIP all 762 0.931 -0.35 0.862 -0.72 0.926 -2.33
stayed 474 0.941 -0.29 0.945 -0.26 1.005 0.26
resident of blackest ZIP all 762 1.246 2.28 1.056 0.68 0.848 -3.07
stayed 474 1.187 1.72 1.115 1.26 0.940 -1.26
high-income ZIP code all 762 0.838 -1.68 0.814 -2.19 0.971 -0.61
stayed 474 0.755 -2.64 0.825 -1.99 1.092 2.00
medium-income ZIP code all 762 1.075 0.70 0.969 -0.34 0.901 -2.17
stayed 474 1.199 1.69 1.134 1.28 0.946 -1.28
low-income ZIP coder all 762 1.095 0.95 0.974 -0.34 0.889 -2.15
stayed 474 1.098 0.96 1.060 0.70 0.965 -0.70
ZIP code resident all 769 0.782 -2.05 0.762 -2.42 0.975 -0.60
stayed 481 0.712 -2.69 0.768 -2.17 1.079 2.18
previous offence all 769 1.144 1.47 0.992 -0.12 0.867 -2.35
stayed 481 1.154 1.55 1.080 1.10 0.937 -1.10
Notes:The odd rows provide the estimates of the rates of discrimination of Black versus non-hispanic white pedes-
trians based on all matched fatal crashes. Δ𝐴 is the discrimination rate by type 𝐴 as defined in the first column. Δ𝐵
is the discrimination rate by type 𝐵, which is all other drivers that are not 𝐴. The odd rows estimate Δ𝐴/Δ𝐵 using
(43); Δ𝐴𝜇 and Δ𝐵𝜇 using (42). The even rows estimate Δ𝐴/Δ𝐵 as in (45); Δ𝐴𝜆 and Δ𝐵𝜆 using (44). For odd rows, the
sample includes all the fatal crashes that involve 𝑇 for which there is at least one fatal crash of type-𝐶 pedestrian
within 1, 500meters which happened under similar neighborhood, road, and time of the day conditions (See more
in ...). For odd rows, the sample is constructed similar to odd rows, but restricted to fatal hit-and-stays. 𝑛 gr. stands
for the number of locations, which is the total number of 𝑇 pedestrians in the matched sample. [1] The t-statistics
is for testing 𝑒𝑠𝑡 = 1, which we test by log-transformation, i.e. log(est) = 0.
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Table 28: The discrimination rates for Black vs White pedestrians by driver types in the majority-white
neighborhoods
Type A driver Sample Δ𝐴/Δ𝐵 Δ𝐴 ∗ (𝜇 or 𝜆) Δ𝐵 ∗ (𝜇 or 𝜆)
desc. 𝑛 gr. est. t-stat[1] est. t-stat[1] est. t-stat[1]
driver ≤35 all 250 1.098 0.60 0.944 -0.46 0.859 -1.62
stayed 173 1.161 0.95 1.090 0.68 0.939 -0.68
driver 36–55 all 250 0.727 -1.86 0.720 -2.18 0.990 -0.12
stayed 173 0.624 -2.68 0.726 -2.01 1.164 2.02
driver ≥56 all 250 1.277 1.30 1.070 0.39 0.838 -2.42
stayed 173 1.417 1.77 1.296 1.40 0.915 -1.40
t-intersection crash all 250 0.778 -1.39 0.746 -1.78 0.959 -0.55
stayed 173 0.738 -1.66 0.806 -1.27 1.092 1.27
expensive car all 250 0.611 -2.75 0.632 -2.84 1.034 0.43
stayed 173 0.614 -2.64 0.708 -2.02 1.153 2.03
pickup vehicle all 250 0.816 -0.88 0.755 -1.27 0.925 -1.24
stayed 173 0.867 -0.59 0.889 -0.50 1.025 0.50
truck all 250 0.679 -1.07 0.624 -1.32 0.919 -1.65
stayed 173 0.748 -0.75 0.764 -0.70 1.021 0.70
ZIP code resident all 250 0.593 -2.64 0.601 -2.75 1.014 0.19
stayed 173 0.506 -3.25 0.594 -2.60 1.175 2.62
high-income ZIP code all 247 0.871 -0.83 0.816 -1.44 0.937 -0.76
stayed 170 0.746 -1.78 0.832 -1.30 1.116 1.30
medium-income ZIP code all 247 1.251 1.40 1.020 0.15 0.815 -2.21
stayed 170 1.226 1.26 1.133 0.91 0.924 -0.91
low-income ZIP coder all 247 0.887 -0.62 0.814 -1.13 0.918 -1.20
stayed 170 1.119 0.55 1.090 0.44 0.974 -0.44
previous offence all 250 1.114 0.70 0.949 -0.44 0.852 -1.64
stayed 173 1.147 0.88 1.081 0.63 0.942 -0.63
Notes:The odd rows provide the estimates of the rates of discrimination of Black versus non-hispanic white pedes-
trians based on all matched fatal crashes. Δ𝐴 is the discrimination rate by type 𝐴 as defined in the first column. Δ𝐵
is the discrimination rate by type 𝐵, which is all other drivers that are not 𝐴. The odd rows estimate Δ𝐴/Δ𝐵 using
(43); Δ𝐴𝜇 and Δ𝐵𝜇 using (42). The even rows estimate Δ𝐴/Δ𝐵 as in (45); Δ𝐴𝜆 and Δ𝐵𝜆 using (44). For odd rows, the
sample includes all the fatal crashes that involve 𝑇 for which there is at least one fatal crash of type-𝐶 pedestrian
within 1, 500meters which happened under similar neighborhood, road, and time of the day conditions (See more
in ...). For odd rows, the sample is constructed similar to odd rows, but restricted to fatal hit-and-stays. 𝑛 gr. stands
for the number of locations, which is the total number of 𝑇 pedestrians in the matched sample. [1] The t-statistics
is for testing 𝑒𝑠𝑡 = 1, which we test by log-transformation, i.e. 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑒𝑠𝑡) = 0.
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Table 29: The discrimination rates for Black vs White pedestrians by driver types in the majority-black
neighborhoods
Type A driver Sample Δ𝐴/Δ𝐵 Δ𝐴 ∗ (𝜇 or 𝜆) Δ𝐵 ∗ (𝜇 or 𝜆)
desc. 𝑛 gr. est. t-stat[1] est. t-stat[1] est. t-stat[1]
driver ≤35 all 232 1.260 1.37 1.176 1.29 0.933 -0.61
stayed 139 1.150 0.82 1.078 0.58 0.937 -0.58
driver 36–55 all 232 0.856 -0.85 0.939 -0.40 1.097 0.99
stayed 139 0.921 -0.45 0.949 -0.33 1.031 0.33
driver ≥56 all 232 0.864 -0.61 0.923 -0.35 1.069 0.90
stayed 139 0.893 -0.41 0.910 -0.35 1.019 0.35
t-intersection crash all 232 1.308 1.38 1.256 1.31 0.961 -0.46
stayed 139 1.175 0.77 1.123 0.60 0.956 -0.60
expensive car all 232 1.849 2.75 1.672 2.45 0.904 -1.28
stayed 139 2.128 3.12 1.796 2.51 0.844 -2.55
pickup vehicle all 232 0.958 -0.13 1.000 0.00 1.044 0.68
stayed 139 1.280 0.66 1.250 0.60 0.976 -0.61
truck all 232 0.463 -1.90 0.509 -1.69 1.100 1.57
stayed 139 0.570 -1.21 0.592 -1.13 1.038 1.15
ZIP code resident all 232 0.936 -0.30 0.988 -0.06 1.055 0.69
stayed 139 0.906 -0.44 0.928 -0.35 1.024 0.35
high-income ZIP code all 229 0.749 -1.38 0.833 -0.94 1.112 1.30
stayed 137 0.713 -1.54 0.778 -1.21 1.091 1.21
medium-income ZIP code all 229 0.989 -0.05 1.026 0.14 1.037 0.44
stayed 137 1.104 0.46 1.075 0.36 0.974 -0.36
low-income ZIP coder all 229 1.254 1.33 1.162 1.22 0.926 -0.65
stayed 137 1.198 1.05 1.100 0.74 0.918 -0.74
previous offence all 232 0.985 -0.09 1.032 0.27 1.048 0.38
stayed 139 1.194 1.04 1.092 0.74 0.915 -0.74
Notes:The odd rows provide the estimates of the rates of discrimination of Black versus non-hispanic white pedes-
trians based on all matched fatal crashes. Δ𝐴 is the discrimination rate by type 𝐴 as defined in the first column. Δ𝐵
is the discrimination rate by type 𝐵, which is all other drivers that are not 𝐴. The odd rows estimate Δ𝐴/Δ𝐵 using
(43); Δ𝐴𝜇 and Δ𝐵𝜇 using (42). The even rows estimate Δ𝐴/Δ𝐵 as in (45); Δ𝐴𝜆 and Δ𝐵𝜆 using (44). For odd rows, the
sample includes all the fatal crashes that involve 𝑇 for which there is at least one fatal crash of type-𝐶 pedestrian
within 1, 500meters which happened under similar neighborhood, road, and time of the day conditions (See more
in ...). For odd rows, the sample is constructed similar to odd rows, but restricted to fatal hit-and-stays. 𝑛 gr. stands
for the number of locations, which is the total number of 𝑇 pedestrians in the matched sample. [1] The t-statistics
is for testing 𝑒𝑠𝑡 = 1, which we test by log-transformation, i.e. 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑒𝑠𝑡) = 0.

2.A main results using different radius of matching 67
2.a main results using different radius of matching
Table 30: The difference in the probability of staying for 𝑇 vs 𝐶 pedestrians
𝑇 vs 𝐶 pedestrians radius n groups est. st.dev. t-stat
Women vs Men 500 807 -0.002 0.018 -0.12
Women vs Men 1,000 1,553 0.012 0.013 0.94
Women vs Men 1,500 2,262 -0.000 0.011 -0.03
Women vs Men 2,000 2,884 -0.011 0.009 -1.15
Women vs Men 2,500 3,397 -0.003 0.008 -0.40
Women vs Men 3,000 3,789 0.003 0.008 0.38
Blacks vs non-hispanic whites 500 264 -0.035 0.037 -0.96
Blacks vs non-hispanic whites 1,000 511 -0.057 0.026 -2.19
Blacks vs non-hispanic whites 1,500 769 -0.062 0.020 -3.05
Blacks vs non-hispanic whites 2,000 1,064 -0.069 0.017 -4.03
Blacks vs non-hispanic whites 2,500 1,355 -0.073 0.015 -4.86
Blacks vs non-hispanic whites 3,000 1,619 -0.073 0.013 -5.41
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Table 31: The discrimination rates for Female vs Male pedestrians by driver types. Radius 500 meters
Type A driver Sample Δ𝐴/Δ𝐵 Δ𝐴 ∗ (𝜇 or 𝜆) Δ𝐵 ∗ (𝜇 or 𝜆)
desc. 𝑛 gr. est. t-stat[1] est. t-stat[1] est. t-stat[1]
driver ≤35 all 805 1.074 0.78 1.041 0.53 0.970 -0.62
stayed 551 1.087 0.91 1.054 0.67 0.970 -0.67
driver 36–55 all 805 0.908 -1.04 0.937 -0.84 1.031 0.63
stayed 551 0.964 -0.40 0.977 -0.29 1.013 0.29
driver ≥56 all 805 1.029 0.27 1.017 0.17 0.988 -0.28
stayed 551 0.946 -0.52 0.960 -0.41 1.015 0.41
t-intersection crash all 806 1.000 -0.00 0.997 -0.03 0.997 -0.06
stayed 551 0.958 -0.40 0.969 -0.31 1.011 0.31
expensive car all 807 0.946 -0.54 0.958 -0.46 1.013 0.30
stayed 552 1.035 0.33 1.025 0.26 0.990 -0.26
pickup vehicle all 807 0.895 -0.78 0.907 -0.71 1.013 0.39
stayed 552 0.998 -0.02 0.998 -0.01 1.000 0.01
truck all 807 1.247 1.36 1.214 1.21 0.973 -0.86
stayed 552 1.195 1.08 1.170 0.96 0.979 -0.96
resident of whitest ZIP all 792 1.130 0.62 1.116 0.56 0.988 -0.41
stayed 539 0.928 -0.36 0.933 -0.34 1.006 0.34
resident of blackest ZIP all 792 1.014 0.13 1.008 0.08 0.994 -0.15
stayed 539 1.078 0.67 1.058 0.53 0.982 -0.53
high-income ZIP code all 792 1.071 0.72 1.043 0.51 0.974 -0.54
stayed 539 1.071 0.73 1.045 0.54 0.976 -0.54
medium-income ZIP code all 792 0.855 -1.56 0.893 -1.25 1.045 0.98
stayed 539 0.822 -1.92 0.871 -1.47 1.060 1.47
low-income ZIP coder all 792 1.078 0.81 1.046 0.57 0.970 -0.61
stayed 539 1.117 1.17 1.075 0.86 0.962 -0.86
ZIP code resident all 807 1.344 2.61 1.254 2.13 0.932 -1.79
stayed 552 1.213 1.67 1.161 1.34 0.957 -1.35
previous offence all 807 0.918 -0.97 0.950 -0.75 1.034 0.62
stayed 552 0.926 -0.88 0.957 -0.63 1.033 0.63
Notes: The odd rows provide the estimates of the rates of discrimination of female versus male pedestrians based
on all matched fatal crashes. Δ𝐴 is the discrimination rate by type 𝐴 as defined in the first column. Δ𝐵 is the
discrimination rate by type 𝐵, which is all other drivers that are not 𝐴. The odd rows estimate Δ𝐴/Δ𝐵 using (43);
Δ𝐴𝜇 and Δ𝐵𝜇 using (42).The even rows estimate Δ𝐴/Δ𝐵 as in (45); Δ𝐴𝜆 and Δ𝐵𝜆 using (44). For odd rows, the sample
includes all the fatal crashes that involve 𝑇 for which there is at least one fatal crash of type-𝐶 pedestrian within
1, 500 meters which happened under similar neighborhood, road, and time of the day conditions (See more in ...).
For odd rows, the sample is constructed similar to odd rows, but restricted to fatal hit-and-stays. 𝑛 gr. stands for
the number of locations, which is the total number of 𝑇 pedestrians in the matched sample. [1] The t-statistics is
for testing 𝑒𝑠𝑡 = 1, which we test by log-transformation, i.e. 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑒𝑠𝑡) = 0.
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Table 32: The discrimination rates for Black vs non-hispanic white pedestrians by driver types. Radius
500 meters
Type A driver Sample Δ𝐴/Δ𝐵 Δ𝐴 ∗ (𝜇 or 𝜆) Δ𝐵 ∗ (𝜇 or 𝜆)
desc. 𝑛 gr. est. t-stat[1] est. t-stat[1] est. t-stat[1]
driver ≤35 all 263 1.163 0.93 1.043 0.33 0.897 -1.12
stayed 155 1.142 0.80 1.081 0.57 0.946 -0.57
driver 36–55 all 263 0.831 -1.11 0.848 -1.16 1.021 0.23
stayed 155 0.959 -0.24 0.973 -0.18 1.015 0.18
driver ≥56 all 263 1.037 0.18 0.982 -0.10 0.947 -0.75
stayed 155 0.878 -0.59 0.904 -0.47 1.030 0.47
t-intersection crash all 264 0.844 -0.93 0.846 -1.01 1.002 0.03
stayed 156 0.812 -1.06 0.860 -0.82 1.059 0.82
expensive car all 264 0.780 -1.35 0.799 -1.35 1.025 0.31
stayed 156 0.770 -1.30 0.826 -1.01 1.073 1.02
pickup vehicle all 264 0.728 -1.42 0.739 -1.42 1.014 0.21
stayed 156 1.022 0.09 1.018 0.07 0.996 -0.07
truck all 264 0.880 -0.32 0.846 -0.42 0.962 -0.71
stayed 156 0.807 -0.49 0.818 -0.46 1.014 0.46
resident of whitest ZIP all 262 1.035 0.07 0.982 -0.04 0.948 -1.00
stayed 155 0.834 -0.39 0.842 -0.37 1.010 0.37
resident of blackest ZIP all 262 1.539 2.53 1.254 1.56 0.815 -2.28
stayed 155 1.497 2.16 1.318 1.63 0.880 -1.63
high-income ZIP code all 262 0.699 -1.95 0.737 -1.85 1.055 0.66
stayed 155 0.636 -2.40 0.732 -1.81 1.152 1.82
medium-income ZIP code all 262 1.310 1.48 1.149 0.85 0.877 -1.61
stayed 155 1.358 1.61 1.238 1.23 0.912 -1.23
low-income ZIP coder all 262 1.077 0.46 0.992 -0.06 0.921 -0.85
stayed 155 1.146 0.80 1.088 0.58 0.949 -0.58
ZIP code resident all 264 0.654 -2.14 0.693 -1.99 1.060 0.78
stayed 156 0.621 -2.21 0.697 -1.76 1.121 1.77
previous offence all 264 0.847 -1.05 0.876 -1.15 1.034 0.31
stayed 156 0.974 -0.16 0.986 -0.11 1.012 0.11
Notes: The odd rows provide the estimates of the rates of discrimination of female versus male pedestrians based
on all matched fatal crashes. Δ𝐴 is the discrimination rate by type 𝐴 as defined in the first column. Δ𝐵 is the
discrimination rate by type 𝐵, which is all other drivers that are not 𝐴. The odd rows estimate Δ𝐴/Δ𝐵 using (43);
Δ𝐴𝜇 and Δ𝐵𝜇 using (42).The even rows estimate Δ𝐴/Δ𝐵 as in (45); Δ𝐴𝜆 and Δ𝐵𝜆 using (44). For odd rows, the sample
includes all the fatal crashes that involve 𝑇 for which there is at least one fatal crash of type-𝐶 pedestrian within
1, 500 meters which happened under similar neighborhood, road, and time of the day conditions (See more in ...).
For odd rows, the sample is constructed similar to odd rows, but restricted to fatal hit-and-stays. 𝑛 gr. stands for
the number of locations, which is the total number of 𝑇 pedestrians in the matched sample. [1] The t-statistics is
for testing 𝑒𝑠𝑡 = 1, which we test by log-transformation, i.e. 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑒𝑠𝑡) = 0.

3
TAKE ME TO COURT : EXPLA IN ING V ICT IM -DEFENDANT SET TLEMENTS
UNDER ASYMMETR IC BARGA IN ING POS I T IONS
The state intervenes into disputes that threaten social interests, guided by detterence, retribution, or
incapacitation concerns. Such disputes are usually labeled as criminal cases, and the state leaves limited
role for the victim’s opinion in sentencing decisions.1 However, many countries, including Europe, the
U.S., and the U.K., have recently been expanding the victims’ role through different forms of Victim-
Defendant mediation, sometimes used as a pre-requisite for the decision to grant probation (Wood 2015;
Harland 1982). Even more extreme, Russia (and some other post-Soviet countries) allows to stop crim-
inal prosecution for unintentional or non-serious crimes if the defendant monetarily compensates and
apologizes to the victim’s satisfaction, i.e., settles with the victim. Sometimes, such Victim-Defendant
settlements are not officially allowed but happen anyways, when the victim is a crucial witness, e.g., in
rape cases (Hubbard 1999). Such settlements blur the boundary between the criminal process and the
civil litigation. In this paper, we investigate who settles with whom in Victim-Defendant settlements
and whether is is optimal from the criminal justice design perspective.
On the one hand, compared to prisons, monetary payments are more cost-efficient in crime deter-
rence (Polinsky and Shavell 1984).2 Moreover, Victim-Defendant settlements can help to improve the
victim’s compensation when civil courts cannot enforce payments.3 On the other hand, a legal scholar
Fiss (1984) argues that settlements are not cost-saving when the disputing parties are unequal in re-
sources. Since poor victims do not have enough resources to litigate, rich defendants may settle with
such victims at lower offers. Hence, poor victims still incur implicit costs of litigation through a reduced
settlement amount, which goes against the core idea of justice that should prevent such distortions. In
fact, Glaeser, Scheinkman, and Shleifer (2003) show that judicial inequality can be a cause and the result
of the subversion of institutions by the wealthy. Hence, civil-style settlements in criminal justice may
raise concerns over deterrence, fairness, and the influence of wealth.
1 See Shapland (1984), Sebba (1996), and Strang and Sherman (2003)
2 Prisons are costly. For example, the median cost per inmate per month in Europe was around 1,800 Euros in 2014, which is
comparable to average salaries in the region, and most of the prisons operated at their capacity (Aebi, Tiago, and Berger-Kolopp
2017). According to the World Prison Brief, in sixty nine countries the number of inmates exceeds 200 per 100’000 population,
with the U.S. leading the ranking exceeding 600. See http://www.prisonstudies.org/highest-to-lowest/prison_population_rate.
3 See Polinsky (2006) who shows that when the offender can hide his wealth, it is optimal to provide him with the choice between
incarceration or fine, so that wealthier offenders pay voluntarily to avoid prison.
71
72 explaining victim-defendant settlements under asymmetric bargaining positions
We propose a stylized model that explores the process of Victim-Defendant settlements in criminal
justice where the disputing parties can spend their resources on legal efforts or on settlement. We model
criminal prosecution (e.g., finding guilty, imprisonment) as a perfect-information Tullock-type contest
between two players – the victim and the defendant – who may differ in their bargaining positions.
An improvement in the bargaining position of a player can be caused by a looser budget constraint, or
lower costs of converting money to contest effort, or higher valuation of the prize.4 Before the fight,
the defendant can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the victim subject to his monetary wealth, and if
accepted, the game ends.
Under perfect information, the settlement offer decreases (increases) when the defendant’s (victim’s)
bargaining position strengthens.
Hence, relaxing the defendants’s resource constraint allows him to settle more often for two reasons.
First, assuming a continuity of victim’s bargaining positions, it makes him able to afford better offers for
stronger victims (the volume effect). Second, higher wealth allows the player to increase his effort in the
contest stage, reducing the victim’s equilibrium payoff and driving the optimal settlement offer down
(the price effect). Whether the richer defendant in expectation pays more (the volume effect dominates)
depends on the distribution of potential victims bargaining positions. For intentional crimes, when the
defendant can choose his victim (e.g. rape), the defendant will always choose the weaker type, and pay
less than a poorer defendant would.
Do defendants always settle when they can afford the offer? When the victim is not very vindictive
– i.e. her winning benefit is less than the disutility of prosecution the defendant faces – the defendant
always prefers to make an offer. However, if the victim extracts high vengeance benefits, even feasible
settlements can fail to happen: the defendant who has sufficient resources to pay the settlement amount
instead decides to enter the contest. This scenario requires the victim to be strong enough, which makes
the settlement relatively expensive. For unintentional crimes, this is an additional reason why we might
see disproportionately more rich defendants prosecuted for crimes involving rich victims. The other
reason is the higher rate of settlements or winning the contest for crimes involving poor victims.
Next, using the model, we evaluate Victim-Defendant settlements for criminal traffic offenses in Rus-
sia. These crimes are unintentional and often involve strangers. In particular, we exploit the variation in
the socio-economic statuses of victims and offenders to recover the distribution of players’ bargaining
4 The contest stage of the model is based on Yamazaki (2008). Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (1997) study an asymmetric Tullock
contest and prove the existence of a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Yamazaki (2008) extends their result by adding player-
specific budget constraints and focusing on a very general contest success function. Baye, Kovenock, and De Vries (1994) analyze
a discrete Tullock rent-seeking model with two homogeneous players and a contest success function that displays increasing
returns to scale. In this class of games, the equilibrium cannot be derived from first-order conditions. The authors, however, prove
that a symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies exists and develop an algorithm to construct it. We use the indicated results to
analyze contestants’ decision to settle among themselves.
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positions. The database has around 56,000 cases for 2013-2014, which includes the settled cases (17%)
and the cases where the offender have been found guilty.
The further empirical analysis is complicated by two limitations: we do not observe the price at which
the two parties settle and the cases in which the defendant was not prosecuted, i.e., won the contest,
are missing. The number of missing cases can be a substantial portion if the defendant is richer than
his victim, according to the model and empirical evidence (See Chapter 1). Since the further empirical
analysis (as for now) does not deal with the selection bias, the results shall be interpreted with caution.
First, we focus on the law enforcement officers and government officials. We provide the reduced
form (indirect) evidence that connections or knowledge of the system – i.e., lower costs of transforming
wealth into effort – drive the settlement price. Controlling for defendants’ wealth – the expected price
of their cars – the law enforcement officers and government officials are more (less) likely to settle with
their victims (end up in prison) than other offenders. Vice versa, when they are involved as victims, the
share of settlements drop. It goes in line with the prediction of the model. We do not think that this
result is driven by the selection bias. Since better bargaining position is associated with both higher rate
of settlements and higher rate of winning, it will manifest as a higher proportion of settled cases out
of the observed cases (settled + prosecuted). Hence, assuming same wealth and distribution of victims,
the results tell us that law enforcement officers and government officials are for some reason in a better
bargaining position.
Further, we structurally estimate the model. Overall, the proposed theoretical framework successfully
replicates the observed probabilities to settle, to end up in court and to get a real sentence. On average,
victims hold ten times less wealth than defendants. Moreover, the degree of the resource imbalance be-
comes stronger when we focus on Pedestrian-Vehicle crashes. Victims who happen to be close relatives
of their offenders are almost ten times less vindictive than strangers (pedestrians). At the same time,
the value of winning the case for each opponent positively depends on his / her wealth.
In the structural setting, the law enforcement officers and government officials are estimated to have
better bargaining position, but through wealth and not through lower effort costs.
We find that 30% of the settled cases (more than 2’850 cases) would have closed with an imprison-
ment sentence. If all these individuals had been convicted for one year, this would have costed Russia
additional €2.3 million in 2013-2014. 5
Moreover, the optimal settlement offer has an inverse 𝑈 -shape with respect to the offender’s wealth.
When the defendant is relatively poor and his resource constrain relaxes slightly, the volume effect
5 The calculation is based on €2.2 per day for one prisoner. See http://www.rbc.ru/society/11/02/2015/54db24779a794752506f1ebf.
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prevails, and the average settlement offer rises. At some point, the offender becomes sufficiently rich,
and the price effect starts dominating.
To complete the analysis, we look at victim-defendant settlements from the social welfare prospective.
In our theoretical setting, such settlements do not make any party worse off, and defendants gain much
more than victims. Hence, with the utilitarian welfare function, when the policymaker simply aggre-
gates utilities over all victims and defendant, the Victim-Defendant settlements never hurt the society.
However, if the policymaker also cares about deterrence or has equality concerns, Victim-Defendant
settlements may reduce social welfare because they lead to significantly milder sanctions for offend-
ers with better bargaining positions. Particularly, the ban of out-of-court agreements improves the
Gini coefficient, computed for the expected disutility of punishment defendants face, by 37% in case
of Pedestrian-Vehicle crashes and by 21.8% for all crashes. The given effect exceeds cost-saving bene-
fits attributed to Victim-Defendant settlements when the policymaker displays strong preferences for
fairness.
In future, we plan to improve the identification strategy by implementing a three-step procedure to
adjust for the missing cases. First, we will proxy the defendant’s wealth by expected prices of their cars.
For the drivers with no car information, the drivers of buses, trucks, or motorcycles, and the pedestrians,
we will proxy their wealth by using the defendants with known car prices who are the closest to them
geographically and in observable characteristics (e.g. employment profile). Secondly, we will estimate
how many cases are missing from our dataset based on the identification strategy in Chapter 1. Then
we will randomly impute the missing cases to simulate the complete dataset. Finally, we will search
for a set of parameters of the model which maximizes the likelihood of the complete data we simulate,
repeating the analysis multiple times to estimate the variance of the estimates.
This paper brings together two strands of the Law and Economics literature: the research on settle-
ments and the literature dealing with resource imbalances and unequal access to justice. The former
field uses game-theoretic models of settlements. Here, settlements are praised as cost-efficient, both in
civil litigations and in the criminal justice (the plea bargaining between the prosecutor and the defen-
dant), whereas trials are treated as a failure to achieve an agreement.6 A considerable body of research
has been trying to explore what provokes this inefficiency (Spier 2007).7 We show that relaxing the
defendant’s budget constraint does not necessarily lead to more settlements and higher compensation
amounts in equilibrium. On the contrary, the willingness to settle may vanish because the defendant
6 For the literature that criticises settlements, see the papers that raise questions about the increased coercion of guilty pleas from
innocents (Langbein 1978; Alschuler 1981) and about the inability to reach socially desirable outcomes (Polinsky and Rubinfeld
1988; Garoupa and Stephen 2008)
7 Among the reasons, the literature cites asymmetric information (Reinganum (1986)), divergent beliefs of the parties (Landes (1971);
Priest (1984)) and, for civil disputes, binding budget constraints defendants may face.
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can use the resources to increase his probability to win the trial instead. Hence, in our model, a no-
settlement outcome can not be interpreted as a negotiation failure: actually, going to court might be
optimal from the defendant’s prospective.
In conflict-resolution literature, Robson and Skaperdas (2008) in dynamic contest setting also find
that going to court immediately can be preferred to a settlement.8 The result is driven by contestants’
willingness to save on enforcement costs and avoid discounting.We show that the defendant can strictly
prefer to go to court even if the settlement does not require any additional cost. This finding strongly
relates to contestants’ heterogeneity in preferences and effort costs.
Moreover, our work contributes to the body of research that structurally estimate the models of set-
tlements. The most recent studies include Silveira (2017), Merlo and Tang (2016), Watanabe (2006), and
Sieg (2000).9 Our work differs from the aforementioned studies in several respects. First, we concentrate
on Victim-Defendant settlements in the criminal justice. Second, imperfect information concerns are left
out, and the research focuses on resource asymmetries. Third, we build upon a different model: if no
settlement happens, the case outcome depends on the efforts of the conflicting parties. Fourth, we do
not observe settlement offers, but our theoretical framework and case-specific controls available allow
us to build a parametric estimator and to recover the distributions of players’ preferences and effort
costs.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.1 describes how Russian justice system processes criminal
traffic offenses. Section 3.2 introduces the model and states our main theoretical results. Section 3.3
characterizes the data and a structural setup, reports estimation results and counterfactual experiments.
Section 3.4 concludes.
8 Our paper essentially models a conflict, and this research field, including the paper by Robson and Skaperdas (2008), builds upon
a contest mechanism. Robson and Skaperdas (2008) consider different ways to resolve conflicts over property rights. They employ
a dynamic contest setting with two players. The parties can either settle or go to court, but both options are associated with
positive enforcement costs. Other examples include Sambanis, Skaperdas, andWohlforth (2017), who analyze a fight between two
groups, the government and the rebels, under a threat of an external intervention. The interaction is modeled as a Tullock-type
contest where the rebels can make the government a settlement offer. However, this study does not take account of asymmetric
resource constraints and in this respect differs from the model we propose. Another example where the conflict analysis builds
on a Tullock-type contest without budget constraints is Esteban and Ray (2011).
9 Silveira (2017) focuses on Bebchuk (1984)’s model of bargaining under asymmetric information and proposes a non-parametric
estimator to recover the distribution of defendants’ types (their probabilities to be found guilty). Merlo and Tang (2016) look at
civil settlements in medical malpractice disputes and recover beliefs of the conflict participants. As the authors claim, a failure to
reach a pre-court agreement may arise from excessive optimism of the parties involved.They find that the plaintiff’s perception of
winning the trial changes with the harm made and the identity of his opponent (in this case, a doctor). Sieg (2000) and Watanabe
(2006) also employ the data onmedical malpractice litigations.The former paper shows that the bargainingmodel with settlements
replicates all observed patterns quite well. Watanabe (2006) studies dynamic aspects of the negotiation process and emphasizes
the role of learning about the opponent’s beliefs in achieving the settlement.
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3.1 a legal process for criminal traffic offenses in russia
According to Russian laws, all traffic offenses are classified into civil and criminal cases. The accident
enters the latter group if it resulted in serious bodily injuries, which must be certified by the forensic
medical exam results. 10 The Criminal Code of Russia categorizes respective traffic offenses based on
a number of fatalities (namely, no death, one death, and multiple deaths). Moreover, it distinguished
between sober and drunk drivers. The combination of these two characteristics defines six types of
criminal traffic accidents. The highest possible prison sentence changes with the offense category. For
example, a driver of “no death & sober” type can get at most two years of incarceration. At the same time,
an offender from “multiple deaths & drunk” group may spend up to nine years in jail. On top of prison
sentences, drivers can temporary lose his licenses. 11 Also, the court decides how much the defendant
must pay in order to cover all moral damages the victim faced. The compensation of medical expenses
and property damages is determined by civil courts, and this usually involves insurance companies.
Assume a traffic accident happens. The police station that controls the location where the offense
took place must register the case as a criminal one if there is at least one death or a medical report about
serious bodily injuries. Then, the case goes to an investigator who collects and analyzes all pieces of
evidence: medical certificates, witness testimonies, experts’ reports, photographs and video materials
etc. If the offender escapes after the accident, it is also the police job to find this person. By the end of
the process, the investigator passes all the materials to a prosecutor.
Based on the evidence, the prosecutor decides whether to send the case to court. 12 At this stage,
the defendant with no criminal history and the victim can settle in a civil case fashion and dismiss the
criminal charge. In particular, the offender voluntarily compensates all moral damages the victim faced.
The victim forgives the defendant and officially, in a written form, asks for the criminal prosecution
to be stopped, subject to the approval of the investigator (with the permission of the prosecutor) or
to the judge. 13 The offender gets no criminal record because his guilt has not been verified in court.
However, the fact of the settlement enters all police databases and can be observed by external parties
(for example, potential employers or other government entities).
10 According to the Criminal Code, bodily injuries can be classified into light, average, and serious ones for the purposes of prosecu-
tion. The division builds on the forensic medical exam results. According to the Code, a serious bodily injury must be “hazardous
for human life” or involve the loss of sight, speech, hearing, or any organ or the loss of the organ’s functions. Also, the legal
definition accounts for a permanent loss of a general ability to work, an interruption of pregnancy, mental derangements, or
post-traumatic addictions.
11 In case of imprisonment, the license withdrawal starts the day after the offender’s release from jail.
12 When the police identifies a deceased person as the offender, the case usually does not go to court and closes with conviction.
13 If a true victim dies, his / her close relatives are recognized as victims.
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If no settlement agreement was reached, the judge uses the evidence provided and decides on the
defendant’s guilt. One remarkable feature of Russian criminal system is that in-court acquittals are very
rare (less than 1% out of all cases). If the defendant is found guilty, the judge may suspend the prison
sentence. 14 For the “no death & sober” offense type, the judge may also replace a real incarceration
term with different restrictions of liberty, which are milder than prison. It allows the offender live usual
life, except for certain geographical limitations.
3.2 the model
3.2.1 Model Setup
To characterize the interaction between the victim (𝑉 , or she) and the defendant (𝐷, or he), we intro-
duce a simple contest model with two heterogeneous players. Such a setup is commonly used in the
conflict literature to represent situations where parties exert costly effort in order to win a battle.15 In
our instance, 𝑉 fights against𝐷 for the case being considered in court. Once it happens,𝐷 can get recog-
nized as guilty, and the punishment follows. Also, we depart from standard models in two ways. First,
𝑉 and 𝐷 can settle among themselves before entering the contest. Second, we introduce asymmetric
budget constraints for the players, and this modification leads to a richer set of possible equilibria and
non-trivial settlement decisions.16
Suppose an accident happens, and 𝑉 and𝐷 are matched against each other. In the beginning, consider
a so-called “in-court” scenario. Let 𝑝ℎ be a probability that𝐷 is found guilty.17Then,𝐷 gets a punishment
𝑥 ≥ 0 and faces a total monetary disutility of {−𝑏𝑥} where 𝑏 > 0.18 At the same time, 𝑉 gains {𝑎𝑥} in
monetary terms, 𝑎 > 0. We interpret 𝑎 as 𝑉 ’s vindictiveness and do not restrict how 𝑏 and 𝑎 relate to
each other (both 𝑎 ≥ 𝑏 and 𝑎 < 𝑏 are feasible).
Clearly, 𝑉 and 𝐷 have misaligned preferences. The “in-court” outcome is desirable for 𝑉 (victim);
however, 𝐷 (defendant) would like to avoid this scenario. It results in a conflict where both 𝑉 and 𝐷 are
willing to exert effort (𝑒𝑉 and 𝑒𝐷 , respectively) and change the outcome in their favor. To model how
14 The sentence suspension applies only to first-convicted offenders. Otherwise, the judge must assign a real jail term.
15 For example, see Esteban and Ray (2011), Sambanis, Skaperdas, and Wohlforth (2017), and Robson and Skaperdas (2008)).
16 For example, 𝐷 may not want to settle even if he has enough budget to do so.
17 Generally, 𝑝ℎ must depend on the true state of guilt: those who are actually culpable are more likely to get a conviction. Since we
concentrate on unintentional crimes (namely, traffic accidents), we simply the analysis and do not introduce guilty / non-guilty
types separately. However, the model can accommodate the guilt-dependent likelihood of conviction easily.
18 Generally, the punishment 𝑥 is case-specific and depends on the level of harm made to a victim and the degree of quilt.
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a probability to end up in court (𝑃𝐶 ) depends on players’ effort choices, we employ a standard Tullock
contest success function:
𝑃𝐶 (𝑒𝑉 , 𝑒𝐷) =
𝑒𝑟𝑉
𝑒𝑟𝑉 + 𝑒𝑟𝐷
, 𝑟 = 1
Also, we state that if no party exerts positive effort, the case certainly goes to court, i.e. 𝑃𝐶 (0, 0) = 1.
This assumption is not standard in the literature; however, in case of criminal offenses, it makes perfect
sense to break a “0–0” tie in the victim’s favor.
Next, suppose 𝑉 (𝐷) has a total budget of 𝑤𝑉 ≥ 0 (𝑤𝐷 ≥ 0), which can be spent on effort 𝑒𝑉 (𝑒𝐷). Also,
define a player-specific cost parameter,𝑚𝑖 , 𝑖 = {𝑉 , 𝐷}. Hence, the total monetary cost of exerting 𝑒𝑉 (𝑒𝐷)
is {𝑚𝑉 𝑒𝑉 } ({𝑚𝐷𝑒𝐷}).19 We treat 𝑤𝑖 and 𝑚𝑖 , 𝑖 = {𝐷, 𝑉 } as monetary and non-monetary fighting abilities,
respectively. The interpretation of 𝑤𝑖 is quite intuitive: more resources can buy stronger lawyers who
are able to build a high quality defense. Non-monetary fighting abilities reflect players’ connections (for
example, their access to or the position in the network of legislators etc.). In particular, lower𝑚𝑖 means
that every monetary unit transforms into higher effort, and player 𝑖 can fight more with the same total
budget. We assume that contestants’ utility is additively separable in the punishment (𝑥) and the cost of
effort ({𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑖}, 𝑖 = {𝑉 , 𝐷}). Finally, monetary and non-monetary fighting abilities, as well as contestants’
preferences, constitute common knowledge.
At the contest stage, 𝑉 and 𝐷 choose their effort levels to maximize expected payoffs given budget
constraints:
𝑉 ∶ max𝑒𝑉 𝜋𝑉 (𝑒𝑉 , 𝑒𝐷)
𝑠.𝑡. 𝜋𝑉 (𝑒𝑉 , 𝑒𝐷) = 𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ𝑃𝐶 (𝑒𝑉 , 𝑒𝐷) − 𝑚𝑉 𝑒𝑉
𝑚𝑉 𝑒𝑉 ≤ 𝑤𝑉 , 𝑒𝑉 ≥ 0
𝐷 ∶ max𝑒𝐷 𝜋𝐷 (𝑒𝑉 , 𝑒𝐷)
𝑠.𝑡. 𝜋𝐷 (𝑒𝑉 , 𝑒𝐷) = −𝑏𝑥𝑝ℎ𝑃𝐶 (𝑒𝑉 , 𝑒𝐷) − 𝑚𝐷𝑒𝐷
𝑚𝐷𝑒𝐷 ≤ 𝑤𝐷 , 𝑒𝐷 ≥ 0
Now, we introduce a pre-contest stage where 𝑉 and 𝐷 can settle. Assume the defendant makes an offer
𝑆 to the victim before entering the conflict phase.20 21 For simplicity, if 𝑆 is such that the victim is indif-
19 Here, we work with a linear cost function. The analysis extends to the case of convex cost specifications.
20 As lawyers say, in most of the cases it is indeed the defendant who makes a settlement offer.
21 In principle, one could model the pre-contest stage as a Nash bargaining game where 𝑉 and 𝐷 split the surplus among themselves.
However, to identify contestants bargaining power, it is crucial to observe the settlement amount, which is never reported. For
this reason, we stick to a simplistic assumption of 𝐷 making a first move and extracting all the surplus.
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ferent between settling and fighting, she accepts the offer.22 Further, we define contestants’ bargaining
positions.
Definition. Contestant 𝑖’s bargaining position, 𝑖 = {𝑉 , 𝐷} is a combination of his / her (dis)utility of
punishment, monetary and non-monetary fighting abilities (𝑤𝑖 and 𝑚𝑖 , respectively).
Overall, the game proceeds as follows:
1. Defendant (𝐷) makes an offer 𝑆 to Victim (𝑉 ). If 𝑉 accepts the proposal, the game ends. Otherwise,
𝐷 and 𝑉 move to the contest stage.
2. 𝐷 and 𝑉 simultaneously choose their effort levels, 𝑒𝐷 and 𝑒𝑉 , respectively.
3. The contest outcome realizes (the two parties either end up in court or the case closes), and agents
get their payoffs.
To solve the game, we proceed by backward induction.
3.2.2 The Contest Stage
When 𝑉 and 𝐷 do not manage to settle, they move to the contest stage. Proposition 1 provides a general
equilibrium characterization of the contest game:
Proposition 2. The equilibrium of the contest stage exists and is unique.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The existence and uniqueness results are proven by construction. In equilibrium, both contestants
always stay active. When players’ budget constraints do not bind, we get a standard asymmetric Tullock
contest with two participants. This case is well-studies in the literature. With the given contest success
function, the equilibrium is always interior and unique. Also, it features pure strategies. If only one
constraint binds, a player with limited resources expends all the budget, i.e. 𝑒𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖𝑚𝑖 , 𝑖 = {𝑉 , 𝐷} becomes
optimal.The opponent’s best reply to 𝑒𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖𝑚𝑖 solves his / her first-order condition and satisfies feasibility
(𝑚𝑗𝑒𝑗 ≤ 𝑤𝑗 , 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖). Here, the constrained player strictly prefers to stay active because only then he / she
gets a chance to win against the advantaged opponent.
When both budget constraints bind, the players decide whether to exert positive effort (𝑒𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖𝑚𝑖 ) or
abstain from participation (𝑒𝑖 = 0). In this case, the total effort cost contestants pay if choose 𝑒𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖𝑚𝑖 > 0
22 The analysis extends to the case when 𝑉 can randomize between settling and fighting.
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is always lower than the relative benefit of avoiding the punishment for𝐷 ( 𝑏𝑥𝑝
ℎ
𝑚𝐷
) / imposing the sanction
on 𝐷 for 𝑉 ( 𝑎𝑥𝑝
ℎ
𝑚𝑉
):23
2
∑
𝑖=1
𝑤𝑖
𝑚𝑖
< min {𝑎𝑥𝑝
ℎ
𝑤𝑉
, 𝑏𝑥𝑝
ℎ
𝑤𝐷
}
Since a winner gains a lot compared to the cost paid, the competition is attractive for both players.
Hence, 𝑉 and 𝐷 optimally select 𝑒𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖𝑚𝑖 > 0 and never abstain from participation.
Further, we summarize how contestants’ equilibrium effort depends on the structure of their fighting
abilities and the preferences over punishment.
Proposition 3. Contestants’ equilibrium effort, 𝑒∗𝑖 , 𝑖 = {𝑉 , 𝐷} always increases in his / her valuation of
punishment and 𝑤𝑖 , decreases in 𝑚𝑖 :𝜕𝑒∗𝑉
𝜕𝑎 ≥ 0,
𝜕𝑒∗𝐷
𝜕𝑏 ≥ 0,
𝜕𝑒∗𝑖
𝜕𝑤𝑖
≥ 0, 𝜕𝑒
∗𝑖
𝜕𝑚𝑖
≤ 0, 𝑖 = {𝑉 , 𝐷}
For 𝑎𝑚𝑉 ≥
𝑏
𝑚𝐷
1. 𝑒∗𝑉 increases in 𝑏 and 𝑒∗𝐷 decreases in 𝑎
2. 𝑒∗𝑉 decreases in 𝑚𝐷 and increases in 𝑤𝐷
3. 𝑒∗𝐷 increases in 𝑚𝑉 and decreases in 𝑤𝑉 if and only if 𝑤𝑉 ≥ 𝑏𝑥𝑝
ℎ𝑚𝑉
4𝑚𝐷
> 0. Otherwise, 𝑒∗𝐷 strictly
decreases in 𝑚𝑉 and strictly increases in 𝑤𝑉
For 𝑎𝑚𝑉 <
𝑏
𝑚𝐷
1. 𝑒∗𝑉 strictly decreases in 𝑏 and 𝑒∗𝐷 strictly increases in 𝑎
2. 𝑒∗𝑉 increases in 𝑚𝐷 and decreases in 𝑤𝐷 if and only if 𝑤𝐷 ≥ 𝑎𝑥𝑝
ℎ𝑚𝐷
4𝑚𝑉
> 0. Otherwise, 𝑒∗𝑉 strictly
decreases in 𝑚𝐷 and strictly increases in 𝑤𝐷
3. 𝑒∗𝐷 strictly decreases in 𝑚𝑉 and strictly increases in 𝑤𝑉
Proof. See Appendix A.
Some results stated in Proposition 2 are straightforward. Players’ equilibrium effort never decreases in
the valuation they attach to the punishment. Higher 𝑎 and 𝑏 drive contestants’ willingness to win up
23 Here, we work with a rescaled version of the original contestants’ programs where
?̃?𝑉 (𝑒𝑉 , 𝑒𝐷) = 𝑎𝑥𝑝
ℎ
𝑚𝑉
𝑃𝐶 (𝑒𝑉 , 𝑒𝐷) − 𝑒𝑉
?̃?𝐷 (𝑒𝑉 , 𝑒𝐷) = − 𝑏𝑥𝑝
ℎ
𝑚𝐷
𝑃𝐶 (𝑒𝑉 , 𝑒𝐷) − 𝑒𝐷
This monotone transformation does not change the equilibrium 𝑉 and 𝐷 play.
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and make the competition more intense.24 Also, better non-monetary fighting abilities (namely, lower
𝑚𝑖 , 𝑖 = {𝑉 , 𝐷}) decrease the effort cost and allow the players to fight more with the same budget. These
two facts are well-documented in the contest literature. Other effects depend on both relative winning
benefits ( 𝑎𝑚𝑉 and
𝑏
𝑚𝐷
) and players’ resources (𝑤𝐷 and 𝑤𝑉 ).
Take 𝑎𝑚𝑉 ≥
𝑏
𝑚𝐷
when 𝑉 displays a stronger willingness to compete than her opponent. Here, the
winning is relatively more desirable for the victim. Then, if 𝐷 gets better stimuli to clash (𝑏 goes up
or 𝐷’s monetary and non-monetary fighting abilities improve), 𝑉 wants to increase her effort as well
and fights back. The opposite holds for the defendant. When 𝑎 increases, the victim who already has an
advantage ( 𝑎𝑚𝑉 ≥
𝑏
𝑚𝐷
) gets even stronger incentives to fight. This discourages 𝐷, and in equilibrium, he
exerts less effort. The same happens if the victim has enough resources to expend (𝑤𝑉 ≥ 𝑏𝑥𝑝
ℎ𝑚𝑉
4𝑚𝐷
> 0)
and her monetary or non-monetary fighting abilities rise. However, the pattern reverts when 𝑉 ’s budget
constraint shrinks (𝑤𝑉 ∈ [0, 𝑏𝑥𝑝
ℎ𝑚𝑉
4𝑚𝐷
)).25 In this case, 𝐷 has enough monetary resources (compared to
𝑤𝑉 ) to overcome the victim’s advantage and win. Similar logic applies when 𝑎𝑚𝑉 <
𝑏
𝑚𝐷
, i.e. 𝐷 displays a
better bargaining position than 𝑉 .
3.2.3 The Settlement Stage
In this subsection, we move one step back and analyze when 𝑉 and 𝐷 settle. Let 𝜋 ∗𝑖 , 𝑖 = {𝑉 , 𝐷} be 𝑖’s
equilibrium payoff at the contest stage. First, we characterize how the optimal settlement offer 𝑆 must
look like.
Lemma 1. The optimal settlement offer equals to 𝑉 ’s equilibrium payoff at the contest stage, i.e. 𝑆 = 𝜋 ∗𝑉 .
Proof. The proof is straightforward. Without loss of generality, suppose 𝐷’s budget is unlimited, and he
can afford any settlement offer. Also, assume 𝐷 incurs significant losses in case of fight and is willing
to avoid the contest stage. Formally, fix 𝜋 ∗𝐷 ≪ − (𝜋 ∗𝑉 + 𝜏) where 𝜏 ≫ 0 is sufficiently high.26 First, take
𝑆 = 𝜋 ∗𝑉 + 𝜀, 𝜀 > 0 is small enough. The victim strictly prefers to accept the offer, and 𝐷’s payoff becomes
𝜋 𝜀+𝐷 = − (𝜋 ∗𝑉 + 𝜀). Next, consider 𝑆 = 𝜋 ∗𝑉 − 𝜀. Now, the victim does not want to settle, the game proceeds
to the contest stage, and 𝜋 𝜀−𝐷 = 𝜋 ∗𝐷 . Finally, check 𝑆 = 𝜋 ∗𝑉 . In this case, 𝑉 accepts the proposal (see the
assumptions of Subsection 3.2.1), and 𝐷 gets 𝜋𝐷 = −𝜋 ∗𝑉 . 𝑆 = 𝜋 ∗𝑉 strictly dominates all other alternatives:
𝜋𝐷 = −𝜋 ∗𝑉 > 𝜋 𝜀+𝐷 > 𝜋 𝜀−𝐷
24 If 𝑎 goes up, 𝑉 extracts more utility from 𝐷 being punished. Higher values of 𝑏 translate into bigger costs of conviction for 𝐷, and
his incentives to avoid the court stage increase.
25 Although 𝑉 has stronger incentives to win, she does not have a sufficient amount of money to support a desirable effort level.
26 The extreme case would be 𝜋 ∗𝐷 = −∞.
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and 𝐷 prefers this strategy.
Lemma 1 illustrates a typical first-mover advantage. Since 𝐷 makes a “take-it-or-leave-it” offer, he
extract all the surplus in the absence of private information. If 𝐷 prefers to avoid the contest stage
(𝜋 ∗𝐷 < −𝜋 ∗𝑉 ), proposing 𝑆 = 𝜋 ∗𝑉 allows him to terminate the game, save on settlement costs and get the
highest possible payoff.
Once the optimal settlement offer is defined, we check how it depends on the “victim–defendant”
characteristics.
Proposition 4. The optimal settlement offer 𝑆 always decreases (increases) in 𝐷’s (𝑉 ’s) willingness to win
𝑏 (𝑎) and his fighting abilities. 𝑆 always increases in 𝑉 ’s non-monetary fighting ability. 𝑆 increases in 𝑤𝑉
if and only if 𝑤𝑉 is sufficiently small (𝑤𝑉 ∈ [0, ?̃?𝑉 ], ?̃?𝑉 > 0).
Proof. See Appendix A.
This result is quite intuitive. If the defendant gets stronger incentives to compete (either his winning
benefit increases or fighting abilities improve), he exerts more effort. Depending on 𝑉 ’s characteristics,
the victim can either fight back or give up.27 Under the former scenario, 𝑉 faces higher effort cost; in the
latter case, her winning probability decreases. Overall, 𝑉 ’s equilibrium payoff declines, and it becomes
easier to settle for the defendant.
The opposite happens when 𝑉 ’s willingness to win grows or her ability to fight rises. In this case, 𝐷
faces a stronger opponent who exerts significant effort, wins with a high probability and, consequently,
obtains larger equilibrium payoff. To prevent the fight, 𝐷 must give the competitor a sufficient amount
of money. Hence, settling with a mighty victim is more expensive (it may be even infeasible).
The effect of 𝑤𝑉 on the optimal settlement offer depends on contestants’ relative winning benefits
(namely, 𝑎𝑚𝑉 and
𝑏
𝑚𝐷
). 𝑆 becomes sensitive to 𝑤𝑉 if and only if 𝑉 ’s budget constraint binds, which
happens for 𝑤𝑉 small enough. Next, take the case of 𝑎𝑚𝑉 ≥
𝑏
𝑚𝐷
when 𝑉 ’s relative utility from 𝐷 being
punished is sufficiently high. Then, if 𝑉 ’s budget constrain binds, the optimal settlement offer 𝑆 always
increases in 𝑤𝑉 .28 This happens because 𝑉 has a stronger willingness to win than her opponent. Hence,
more resources allow the victim increase the effort, succeed with a higher probability, and obtain better
equilibrium payoff.
Further, assume 𝑎𝑚𝑉 <
𝑏
𝑚𝐷
. Now, 𝐷 has more incentives to win the contest and avoid the punishment.
When 𝑉 ’s budget constraint binds and𝑤𝑉 increases, two effects emerge. Obviously, the victim can fight
27 See Proposition 3 for more details.
28 See the proof of Proposition 4 for more details.
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more, i.e. 𝑒𝑉 goes up. However, 𝐷 also responds to growing 𝑤𝑉 with higher effort.29 In other words, the
defendant, whose willingness to win is higher, does not feel discouraged when his opponent displays
better monetary fighting abilities. With higher values of 𝑤𝑉 , 𝐷 engages into more fight, and at some
point,𝑉 ’s winning probability starts decreasing. Also, the effort cost the victimmust pay (𝑚𝑉𝑤𝑉 ) grows,
and this coupled with lower values of 𝑃𝐶 (⋅) drives 𝑉 ’s equilibrium payoff down. Hence, the optimal
settlement offer 𝑆 declines in 𝑤𝑉 for 𝑤𝑉 sufficiently high because 𝐷 competes more aggressively.
Proposition 4 implies that matching with a richer defendant does not lead to a better settlement offer
(keeping 𝑉 ’s characteristics constant). If 𝑤𝐷 grows and 𝐷 uses all his budget, the value of 𝑆 must go
down. The victim still accepts the offer made; however, her equilibrium payoff diminishes. This result
goes against a conventional perception developed in the literature on “victim-defendant” settlements.
The difference stems from our way to model the interaction between players. In particular, we use the
contest framework where 𝑉 and 𝐷 challenge each other. Then, 𝐷’s fighting abilities affect 𝑉 ’s equilib-
rium payoff directly, and vice versa. The previous studies on the topic did not employ this competitive
approach and could not discover the pattern we find here.
Overall, increasing 𝑤𝐷 has two effects. For simplicity, take a population of potential victims. First,
more resources allow the defendant settle with stronger opponents. In particular, he can afford the
offers that were infeasible before. We call this the “volume effect”. Second, those settlements that could
appear even under lower values of 𝑤𝐷 can happen with smaller offers.30 This pattern is labeled as the
“price effect”. Hence, more resources available make it easier for the defendant to avoid the fight not
only because he can convince many victim types to settle, but also because it gets cheaper (the amount
of 𝑆 reduces).
Next, we analyze when the settlement indeed takes place. In order to prevent the conflict, two con-
ditions must hold:
𝜋 ∗𝐷 ≤ −𝑆 ⇔ −𝑥𝑝ℎ𝑃𝐶 (𝑒∗𝑉 , 𝑒∗𝐷) (𝑎 − 𝑏) + 𝑚𝑉 𝑒∗𝑉 +𝑚𝐷𝑒∗𝐷 ≥ 0 (46)
𝑆 ≤ 𝑤𝐷 ⇔ 𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ𝑃𝐶 (𝑒∗𝑉 , 𝑒∗𝐷) − 𝑚𝑉 𝑒∗𝑉 ≤ 𝑤𝐷 (47)
where asterisks denote equilibrium values. Condition (46) states that 𝐷 must be willing to settle, i.e.
his payoff from entering the contest stage cannot exceed the settlement benefit. On top of this, the
defendant has to hold enough resources to make an offer the victim would accept (inequality (47)). If at
least one condition violates, the settlement does not happen. The first thing to notice connects players’
preferences and 𝐷’s willingness to settle. When 𝑉 is not sufficiently vindictive (i.e. 𝑎 ≤ 𝑏), condition
29 See Proposition 3 for more details.
30 If𝐷’s budget constraint did not bind in a particular match under lower𝑤𝐷 , the settlement offer does not change with𝑤𝐷 adjusting
upward. Otherwise, 𝑆 decreases with 𝑤𝐷 . See Proposition 4 for details.
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(46) always holds. In this case, the settlement is efficient. Otherwise, 𝐷 may prefer to fight even if he
has enough resources to make the offer required. Further, we concentrate on the latter case specifically.
Definition. Let 𝑦 = (𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑚𝑉 , 𝑚𝐷 , 𝑤𝑉 , 𝑤𝐷) be a “preference–abilities” profile, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑌 ≡ R6≥.
Also, define 𝑌𝑎>𝑏 :
𝑌𝑎>𝑏 = {𝑦 ∈ 𝑌 ∶ 𝑎 > 𝑏}
Proposition 5 illustrates that condition (47) not necessarily implies 𝐷’s willingness to settle.
Proposition 5. There exist non-empty sets of “preference–abilities” profiles 𝑌 ̄𝑆 ⊂ 𝑌𝑎>𝑏 and 𝑌𝑆 ⊂ 𝑌𝑎>𝑏 such
that
• For any 𝑦 ∈ 𝑌 ̄𝑆 the defendant has enough resources to settle but is not willing to do so:
⎧
⎨
⎩
−𝑥𝑝ℎ𝑃𝐶 (𝑒∗𝑉 , 𝑒∗𝐷) (𝑎 − 𝑏) + 𝑚𝑉 𝑒∗𝑉 +𝑚𝐷𝑒∗𝐷 < 0
𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ𝑃𝐶 (𝑒∗𝑉 , 𝑒𝐷) − 𝑚𝑉 𝑒∗𝑉 ≤ 𝑤𝐷
≠ Ø
• For any 𝑦 ∈ 𝑌𝑆 the defendant has enough resources to settle and is willing to do so:
⎧
⎨
⎩
−𝑥𝑝ℎ𝑃𝐶 (𝑒∗𝑉 , 𝑒∗𝐷) (𝑎 − 𝑏) + 𝑚𝑉 𝑒∗𝑉 +𝑚𝐷𝑒∗𝐷 ≥ 0
𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ𝑃𝐶 (𝑒∗𝑉 , 𝑒𝐷) − 𝑚𝑉 𝑒∗𝑉 ≤ 𝑤𝐷
≠ Ø
Proof. See Appendix A.
The result stated in Proposition 5 strongly relates to the victim’s advantage (or disadvantage) in the
contest. Whether feasible settlements always happen (namely, condition (47) implies (46)) also depends
on whose budget constraint binds in equilibrium. Take the case when both contestants have enough
resources to choose the interior effort level. Then, the defendant wants to settle if and only if 𝑉 ’s non-
monetary fighting ability is relatively low (𝑚𝑉 ≥ 𝑎𝑚𝐷(𝑎−𝑏)2𝑏2 > 0).
31 Since both players are unconstrained
and the victim turns to be vindictive enough (𝑎 > 𝑏), a single possibility 𝐷 can dominate in the competi-
tion and drive the optimal settlement offer down comes from non-monetary fighting abilities (𝑚𝑉 and
𝑚𝐷). If 𝑉 has an advantage in both 𝑎 and𝑚𝑉 , in equilibrium, the amount of 𝑆 must rise (Proposition 4),
and the settlement becomes expensive. If the offer is accepted, 𝐷 pays the value of 𝑆 with probability 1.
31 The condition of interest can also be rewritten in terms of relative winning benefits:
𝑚𝑉 ≥
𝑎𝑚𝐷 (𝑎 − 𝑏)
2𝑏2 ⇔
𝑎
𝑚𝑉
≤ 𝑏𝑚𝐷
2𝑏
(𝑎 − 𝑏)
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However, if the game proceeds to the contest stage, the defendant faces the punishment with probabil-
ity less than 1, and his equilibrium payoff turns to be higher.32 Hence, 𝐷 prefers to fight even if he has
enough resources to afford the settlement offer.
Next, take the case when only 𝐷’s budget constraint binds. Here, the victim’s advantage stems from
both higher willingness to win (𝑎 > 𝑏) and more resources available. In this case, the defendant who
has enough money to make the settlement offer always prefers to do so (condition (47) implies (46)).
If the victim dominates in non-monetary fighting abilities as well (𝑚𝑉 < 𝑚𝐷), the optimal amount of
𝑆 increases sufficiently. Then, the defendant who has limited resources can never afford the settlement
offer andmust proceed to the contest stage.When𝐷 has an advantage in non-monetary fighting abilities
(𝑚𝑉 > 𝑚𝐷), he can compete more and drive the optimal amount of 𝑆 down. Thus, avoiding the contest
stage becomes feasible.33
If only 𝑉 has limited resources, the case is similar to the unconstrained equilibrium we analyzed
before. Again, 𝑉 ’s characteristics affect the outcome of the settlement stage. When the victim dominates
in non-monetary fighting abilities and / or incentives to win, this partly offsets 𝐷’s advantage in 𝑤𝐷 ,
and the optimal offer 𝑆 rises. As a result, the defendant no longer wants to settle and prefers to move to
the contest stage. However, if high values of 𝑤𝐷 are couples with better non-monetary fighting abilities
and / or stronger willingness to avoid the punishment (𝑏), the settlement can happen.
Importantly, more wealth on𝐷’s side (𝑤𝐷) not necessarily means that𝐷 is keen to settle. For example,
take the case when only 𝐷’s budget constraint is active. Also, assume 𝑤𝐷 is sufficient to make the
optimal offer 𝑆. Then, feasibility (condition (47)) implies𝐷’s willingness to settle (condition (46)).34 Now,
increase 𝑤𝐷 such that 𝐷’s budget constraint does not bind and the resources are sufficient to make the
new optimal offer 𝑆. If 𝑉 has an advantage in non-monetary fighting abilities (𝑚𝑉 < 𝑎𝑚𝐷(𝑎−𝑏)2𝑏2 ), the
defendant is no longer willing to settle even if he holds enough budget. Here, making 𝐷 stronger in
terms of resources available does not offset the victim’s dominance in winning benefits (𝑎 > 𝑏) and
𝑚𝑉 . Specifically, the optimal settlement offer 𝑆 does not reduce much. However, more money available
allows the defendant increase his effort and avoid the punishment with a higher probability. The latter
effect prevails, and the fight turns to be more attractive for 𝐷. Hence, those defendants who do not
manage to settle not necessarily fail to meet the feasibility requirement (condition (47)): they can just
display no willingness to avoid the contest stage.
32 To make the contest more attractive than the settlement, 𝐷’s equilibrium winning probability must be sufficiently high.
33 Similar patterns appear when both contestants face binding budget constraints. See the proof of Proposition 5 for more details.
34 See the proof of Proposition 5 for more details.
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The case where the defendant prefers to fight corresponds to relatively high aggregate equilibrium
effort. Also, it features 𝑉 ’s dominance in winning benefits and fighting abilities. In other words, victims
win more often, and non-settled cases end up in court with a higher probability.
It is an open question whether no willingness to settle, combined with a sufficient amount of re-
sources available to the defendant, can create any problems for the society. If the institute of “victim-
defendant” settlements aims to delegate the case resolution to the parties involved when offenders have
enough money to compensate their opponents and reduce the total load on courts, this goal might not
be achieved. As emphasized earlier, this type of non-settled matches also features significant aggre-
gate effort. It may translate into longer trials and higher processing costs for prosecutors and judges as
well. Further, victims, who exert more effort in the given scenario, pay an additional cost on top of the
harm they have already encountered. This observation drives us to revictimization concerns. Overall,
the cases with feasible but not desirable settlements may generate some cost for the society, and we
leave a broader discussion for the future.
3.3 the empirical analysis
In this section, we bring the proposed theoretical model to the data on criminal traffic offenses in Russia.
As it was emphasized earlier, for this group of crimes, Russian laws allow defendants settle with their
victims before entering the court stage. Also, traffic offenses constitute unintentional crimes where
two conflicting parties are matched randomly. We exploit this feature in our identification strategy,
structurally estimate the model, and highlight which channels explain the settlements observed.
3.3.1 The Data
3.3.1.1 Data Sources
To estimate the model, we use centralized databases that aggregate police-level data across 84 Russian
regions for the period from 2013 to 2014. All investigators must fill in special statistical cards, which con-
tain the information about different stages of the process. 35 The first database represents the universe
of criminal traffic offenses that have been registered by police stations. 36 Here, a unit of observation is
a case. The information available includes:
35 The Institute for the Rule of Law at the European University at Saint Petersburg has an access to police-level statistical cards. This
information is provided for research purposes under a restricted user agreement.
36 We exclude the cases with military defendants because they are considered under the jurisdiction of military courts.
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1. The time and the date when the accident happened (Form 1); 37
2. The aggregate data on victims such as a number of deaths and / or serious bodily injuries, average
bodily injuries plus the employment status of up to two victims (Form 1); 38
3. The outcome of the investigation stage (Form 3).
Another database incorporates information about offenders’ characteristics. Now, a unit of observation
is a defendant. We observe:
1. The data on defendants’ demographic attributes such as gender, his / her socio-economic status
etc. (Form 2)
2. The defendant’s history of criminal and administrative records (Form 2);
3. The court outcome, including the type of punishment and its duration (Form 6).
For every registered case, there can be no defendant (an offender has not been caught or did not get an
accusation), exactly one defendant, and more than one defendant (the crime was committed by a group).
Using the case identifier, the code of the police department, and the year when the accident happened,
we merge the two datasets. Overall, 56′000 records have at least one defendant.
The third database provides detailed information for each victim. It includes:
1. Gender, which age and ethnic group the victim belongs to (Form 5);
2. The victim’s employment status (Form 5);
3. His / her citizenship and residency (Form 5);
4. The harm caused by the offense (Form 5).
Once we merge this information with the first database, 57′000 cases have at least one entry from
Form 5. However, some crimes stay unmatched. One possible explanation comes from investigators’
behavior. Since Form 5 partly duplicates Form 1, they may skip this card in order to save time. As a
piece of supportive evidence, we find a positive correlation between a probability of Form 5 missing and
a number of victims reported in Form 1. Also, the absence of Form 5 displays a weak positive correlation
with the outcome of the investigation stage, especially if investigators or prosecutors decided not to
press charges.
37 All form numbers are set by the federal law.
38 Unfortunately, the form does not allow us distinguish who, out of the two victims, got more severe injuries.
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The data also include a so-called fabula that describes the case shortly. Often, investigators use this
document for their own easy reference. The description style and the amount of details it contains show
significant variation across police departments. Usually, the fabula consists of two parts. First, it pro-
vides general information on the situation (time, location, weather conditions etc.) and the participants
starting from the description of the offender’s actions. As a rule, the text specifies the types of cars driven
by the defendant and the victim (where applicable). It also mentions whether pedestrians were involved.
The second part of the fabula describes the harm made and clarifies who the victim is: a pedestrian, a
passenger, or a driver.
Using the information on cars mentioned in the fabula, their expected prices are imputed. To approx-
imate these values, we collect data on prices of same-brand second-hand cars posted on https://auto.ru/
in October, 2014. 39 Then, the first car mentioned in the fabula is attributed to the offender. We assign
the second vehicle that appears in the fabula to the victim if and only if
• It is mentioned in the first part of the text and
• The second part explicitly attributes the victim to this car.
The information from all the fabulas is automatically processed with the use of regular expressions.
3.3.1.2 Descriptive Statistics
The dataset includes more than 70′000 registered criminal traffic offenses. This covers all 84 Russian
regions, 2′500 police departments, and 700 courts. 40 Around 14′000 cases have no offender identified.
Partly, it explains with hit-and-runs. On top of this, the accidents that took place in the end of 2014 were
still under investigation when the dataset was collected. Finally, the police does not press charges for
some of the identified offenders, and the prosecutors happen to drop cases as well.
In total, charges are pressed in 55′000 out of 70′000 cases. The information on victims is available
for almost all registered criminal traffic offenses. Offenders’ characteristics become observable only
if the charges apply. We restore car prices for roughly a half of the offenders. At the same time, the
information on vehicles where the victim has been injured is available only for a small subset of cases.
Table 33 summarizes all the data available.
We sort the variables into four blocks:
1. Characteristics of the accident and the harm made;
39 https://auto.ru/ is one of the largest on-line platforms for private car sales in Russia.
40 The data on courts are incomplete because around a half of the processed cases have no court identifiers.
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Table 33: Descriptive Statistics of The Data
Number of
police departments 2′533
courts 705
regions 84
Number of cases
by stage:
case registered 73′661
offender is identified 59′868
offender is charged by the police 56′010
offender is charged by the prosecutor 55′240
by information available:
info on victims 72′294
info on car prices for victims 5′904
info on offenders 56′280
info on car prices for offenders 29′777
by reporting period:
2013 37′327
2014 36′334
2. Victim-specific details;
3. Offender’s characteristics;
4. The case outcomes.
Table 34 provides descriptive statistics for all the groups. The first block of observations includes a total
number of victims and specifies how many of them ended up dead or seriously injured. The data also
distinguish female victims and minors. Further, block (1) indicates whether the offender and the victim
were intoxicated. Using the information from the fabulas, we recover the cases that involve pedestrians
and passengers. 41
To make the analysis simpler, we use the information only on the first victim mentioned in Form 5; if
this is not available, we exploit Form 1. 42 One can observe the victim’s gender, his/her age group and
employment status (see Table 34). 43 Additionally, we create a dummy to distinguish those individuals
who work in law enforcement or in the government. Also, the data indicate whether two parties of the
41 Any match with the phrase “hit a pedestrian” and its variations raises the flag for the variable pedestrian. Any match with the
word “passenger” and its variations raises the flag for the variable passenger.
42 When there are many victims, the first person registered is assumed to be the one with the least disputed victim status.
43 The original data specify which age group a victim belongs to. Instead of creating a set of indicators, we recode the variable by
taking the mean for every interval.
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Table 34: Summary Statistics for Case-Specific Characteristics
Accident and Harm
variable mean sd
Number of victims 1.18 0.76
out of which:
survived in the accident 0.66 0.59
died in the accident 0.45 0.70
minors 0.12 0.35
females 0.46 0.59
Under influence:
offender 0.22 0.41
victim 0.04 0.19
Victim’s role:
pedestrian 0.27 0.44
passenger 0.26 0.44
Victim
variable mean sd
Female 0.44 0.50
Age:
1 to 13 (8 y.o.) 0.07 0.25
14 to 15 (15 y.o.) 0.02 0.16
16 to 17 (17 y.o.) 0.03 0.17
18 to 24 (20 y.o.) 0.14 0.35
25 to 29 (27 y.o.) 0.12 0.33
30 to 49 (40 y.o.) 0.31 0.46
50 to 54 (52 y.o.) 0.07 0.26
55 to 59 (57 y.o.) 0.07 0.25
≥ 60 (65 y.o.) 0.15 0.36
Employment status:
no job 0.46 0.50
worker 0.24 0.43
office worker 0.02 0.15
top-manager 0.00 0.06
entrepreneur 0.01 0.10
budget office worker 0.01 0.12
student 0.08 0.27
welfare recipient 0.03 0.16
retired 0.13 0.34
other 0.01 0.08
In law enforcement: 0.01 0.10
Related:
acquaintance 0.06 0.24
cohabitant 0.00 0.06
family 0.01 0.10
close family 0.03 0.16
Imputed car price (rub. mln) 0.31 0.26
Offender
variable mean sd
Female 0.09 0.28
Age:
16 to 17 (17 y.o.) 0.01 0.08
18 to 24 (20 y.o.) 0.21 0.41
25 to 29 (27 y.o.) 0.21 0.41
30 to 39 (35 y.o.) 0.26 0.44
40 to 49 (45 y.o.) 0.15 0.36
50 to 59 (55 y.o.) 0.11 0.32
≥ 60 (65 y.o.) 0.05 0.22
Employment status:
no job 0.41 0.49
worker 0.42 0.49
office worker 0.03 0.18
top-manager 0.01 0.10
entrepreneur 0.03 0.17
budget office worker 0.02 0.14
student 0.03 0.17
welfare recipient 0.00 0.05
retired 0.04 0.20
other 0.01 0.08
In law enforcement 0.02 0.12
Education:
college (16 years) 0.19 0.39
vocational (13 years) 0.34 0.47
technical (13 years) 0.02 0.14
high school (11 years) 0.35 0.48
secondary school (9 years) 0.08 0.27
elementary school (4 years) 0.01 0.12
no school (0 years) 0.00 0.05
Imputed car price (rub. mln) 0.29 0.25
Past offences:
criminal history 0.17 0.38
administrative fines 0.10 0.30
Outcomes
variable mean sd
Settlements 0.17 0.38
In court 0.58 0.49
out of which:
incarcerated 0.13 0.33
no information 0.24 0.43
Note: Summary statistics are provided only for the cases where offenders were charged by a prosecutor.
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conflict know each other. In particular, a victim can be an offender’s acquaintance, cohabitant, family
member, or close relative. Finally, for some victims, we manage to restore expected car prices. 44
For offenders’ personal characteristics, the dataset is a bit richer. On top of socio-economic aspects, it
provides information on offenders’ educational background, which ranges from no education to holding
a college degree (seven categories in total). All other demographic characteristics are the same as for
victims, except the age groups do not coincide. 45 Also, we trace if the offender has any past criminal
and/or administrative offense records.
As for the outcomes, the cases can be broadly categorized into:
1. Those that settled out-of-court,
2. Those that reached the court stage, and
3. Those that neither settled nor reached the court stage. 46
If the case ends up in court and the offender is recognized as guilty, he can get a real incarceration term,
receive a suspended sentence or face other forms of punishment. Some cases have missing outcomes.
Most of such offenses were registered in the end of 2014 and were still at the investigation stage when
the observation terminated. For simplicity, we treat these cases as those that have not reached the court
yet. 47
3.3.2 Non-Monetary Fighting Abilities: The Reduced Form Evidence
To illustrate that not only monetary resources affect the case outcome, consider some reduced form ev-
idence. We focus on law enforcers and government officials. Belonging to these socio-economic groups
has two non-monetary returns. First, law enforcers and government officials know the institutional
setting better and can defend themselves more efficiently in case of committing a crime / becoming a
victim. Second, these people are connected to the networks of lawyers, legislators, and other mighty
individuals. Hence, they may exploit the latter channel to affect the case outcome. For these reasons,
we expect the given group to display different patterns.
44 Apparently, this measure displays a significant noise when used to approximate the victim’s wealth. In fact, being a passenger
of a certain car gives less information about one’s income than driving this particular vehicle. To provide a robustness check, we
will also estimate the model without this wealth proxy.
45 This is the case because in Russia, criminal responsibility starts from the age of 14.
46 The last group includes only the cases that had an indicted offender but were dropped later. We also acknowledge that there can
exist criminal traffic offense that did not reach the sample, and they may constitute a sufficient share of all the cases. However,
for now we do not account for this possibility.
47 In the future, we are going to impute expected outcomes for such cases as a part of the estimation.
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Consider the following regression equation:
𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷 𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑒𝑛𝑓 𝑖𝐷 + 𝛽𝑉 𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑒𝑛𝑓 𝑖𝑉 + 𝛾𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑒𝑛𝑓 𝑖𝐷 𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑒𝑛𝑓 𝑖𝑉 + 𝜓1𝑝𝑐𝑎𝑟 𝑖𝐷 + 𝜓2𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝜓3𝑡𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 (48)
where
• 𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑒𝑛𝑓 𝑖𝑙 = 1 specifies whether 𝑙 = {𝑉 , 𝐷} is a law enforcer or a government official (otherwise,
𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑒𝑛𝑓 𝑖𝑙 = 0);
• 𝑝𝑐𝑎𝑟 𝑖𝐷 reflects a mean car price for 𝐷;
• 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 identifies a fixed effect of the police department;
• 𝑡𝑖 captures year-specific effects.
Including 𝑝𝑐𝑎𝑟 𝑖𝐷 into (48) allows us isolate the effect of 𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑒𝑛𝑓 𝑖𝑙 , 𝑙 = {𝑉 , 𝐷}. In particular, we com-
pare law enforcers and government officials with individuals of the same wealth level but from other
socio-economic groups. Estimation results are reported for three different samples. First, we consider all
criminal traffic offenses available. Then, we focus only on “car vs. pedestrian” accidents where victims
and offenders are definitely stranger. 48 Finally, to make the evidence even more convincing, we ex-
clude low-status defendants (namely, unemployed individuals and welfare recipients) from the sample.
Now, the baseline group – non-officials – becomes more comparable to law enforcers and government
officials in terms of wealth. Standard errors are clustered at the police department level because a share
of law enforcers and government officials is likely to vary across different locations.
Table 35 summarizes the estimates of 𝛽𝐷 and 𝛾 specified in (48). The first three columns include
all observations available; columns 4–6 report the results only for “car vs. pedestrian” cases; the last
subsample (columns 7–10) also disregards low-status defendants (individuals without permanent job
and welfare recipients). The “None” specification (columns 1, 4, and 7) does not control for car prices or
brands. 49 The “Price” approach (columns 2, 5, and 8) and the “Brand” model include imputed car prices
and brands as additional explanatory variables, respectively.
Now, we comment on the estimation results briefly. Controlling for defendants’ wealth proxies, law
enforcers and government officials are more likely to settle with their victims. Notice that the effect
disappears when we estimate the model on the full sample (Table 35, columns 1–3): the null hypothesis
of 𝛽𝐷 = 0 cannot be rejected. At the same time, the interaction term 𝛾 is positive and statistically
significant. It happens because the full sample accommodates all the cases where the victim got injured
inside the defendant’s car, and this implies non-random matching between the two conflicting parties.
48 With this approach, we eliminate all possible correlations between 𝑉 ’s and 𝐷’s wealth.
49 Car brands identify trucks, buses, and motorcycles as separate categories.
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Table 35: Case Outcomes When Defendants Are Law Enforcers and Government Officials
Sample: All Pedestrians† Pedestrians &
No low-status
offenders‡
Car controls: None Price Brand None Price Brand None Price Brand
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Settled
𝛽𝐷 .003 .028 .029 .083 .216* .217* .069 .163* .172*
(.014) (.028) (.026) (.047) (.086) (.086) (.050) (.081) (.081)
𝛾 .158** .142 .187 -.169 -.156 -.190 -.244 .012 -.073
(.057) (.105) (.099) (.122) (.100) (.102) (.225) (.117) (.111)
𝑁 all 50987 21939 26266 11455 5581 6508 6771 3290 3860
Among the non-settled cases
Reached the court
𝛽𝐷 -.028 -.042 -.036 .041 -.066 -.060 .029 -.069 -.060
(.020) (.036) (.034) (.047) (.104) (.099) (.060) (.114) (.110)
𝛾 -.023 -.071 -.101 -.033 -.006 -.010 -.085 -.117 .074
(.065) (.135) (.124) (.083) (.128) (.119) (.101) (.150) (.141)
Incarceration ordeprivation offreedom
𝛽𝑑 -.064*** -.075* -.062* -.007 -.177* -.146 -.015 -.157* -.137
(.018) (.030) (.028) (.058) (.073) (.078) (.070) (.079) (.084)
𝛾 .012 .149 .090 .098 .744*** .825*** .009 .107 .558***
(.060) (.122) (.112) (.195) (.111) (.115) (.161) (.151) (.152)
Incarceration
𝛽𝑑 -.027 -.032 -.030 -.039 -.149* -.111 -.023 -.126 -.099
(.015) (.024) (.022) (.042) (.065) (.070) (.048) (.068) (.074)
𝛾 -.050 .021 .001 .067 .753*** .743*** .143 .729*** .799***
(.051) (.097) (.089) (.191) (.097) (.102) (.235) (.116) (.118)
𝑁 not settled 42383 18091 21751 9485 4594 5373 5452 2636 3105
Note:
† Sample with one victim who is a pedestrian, not a student or retired;
‡ Same as † excluding low-status offenders (unemployed individuals and welfare recipients);
The regression with police department fixed effects; standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the police department level.
To compute a number of settled cases, we use the lawsuits with non-missing information on victims’ and defendants’ employment
status, which roughly matches the sample of cases with prosecutorial charges. The other outcomes – those that reached the court
and where offenders got incarcerated or faced the deprivation of freedom – are based on the sample of non-settled cases.
Car brands identify trucks, buses, and motorcycles as separate categories.
See (48) for the meaning of 𝛽𝐷 and 𝛾 .
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50 Focusing only on “car vs. pedestrian accidents” (Table 35, columns 4–9) gives a clearer prediction.
Controlling for car prices or brands, a probability to settle for law enforcers and government officials
exceeds its counterpart for the baseline group by 20 percentage points. Excluding low-status defendants
from the analysis reduces the magnitude of the effect (𝛽𝐷 gets smaller) but does not harm its statistical
significance. The interaction term 𝛾 is negative, although insignificant.
Then, we check what happens with non-settled cases. The probability to reach the court does not
display any variation across the groups: neither 𝛽𝐷 nor 𝛾 are statistically significant in the respective
regressions. However, the probability to get a strict punishment (namely, a deprivation of freedom or a
real prison term) tends to differ. In particular, law enforcers and government officials are less likely to
end up with a real sentence (𝛽𝐷 is negative and statistically significant). The effect is not so pronounced
if we look at incarceration rates separately. Remarkably, the interaction term in the “car vs. pedestrian”
sample is positive and quite large.These observations call for the following story. Suppose a law enforcer
or a government official hurts a person from the same socio-economic group. If these individuals happen
to know each other, they prefer to settle. However, if the two parties are strangers, the case is likely to
move to the court stage where the defendant has worse chances to avoid the prison.
Overall, law enforcers and government officials tend to behave differently in the case resolution.
Controlling for wealth proxies and non-randommatching does not eliminate the discrepancies observed
across groups, and we can indeed connect these patterns to non-monetary channels of influence.
3.3.3 The Structural Setup
To identify contestants’ bargaining positions, we use the variation in the harm made, case outcomes,
match- and individual-specific characteristics.Themost important proxies for players’ wealth are socio-
economic status and imputed mean car prices. Also, the non-intentional nature of traffic offenses allows
us avoid any issues related to self-selection into crime. With the proposed theoretical model, we formu-
late three key results and build the identification strategy upon them. 51
Result 1.The optimal offer 𝑆 increases in the expected punishment 𝑥𝑝ℎ.
50 For example, the victim and the defendant may be friends or colleagues who have the same occupation.
51 See Section 3.2 for technical details.
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In the data, the likelihood of observing a settlement indeed declines when the harm made (and, con-
sequently, expected punishment) grows. The model relates this fact to increasing optimal offers that
most defendants cannot afford. Hence, the variation in the observed harm can help us identify budget
constraints offenders with comparable case- and individual-specific attributes face.
Result 2.The optimal offer 𝑆 increases in the vindictiveness parameter 𝑎.
Matching with a more vindictive person makes a settlement more expensive, and the likelihood of
reaching an out-of-court agreement decreases. Notice that the indicated effect works in the same direc-
tion as the one presented in Result 1. To distinguish these two channels, we treat “Car vs. pedestrian”
accidents with purely random matches as a control group for criminal traffic offenses where two sides
of the conflict know each other. The latter subset includes more than 10% of the victim population (see
Table 34). Looking at a particular level of the harm made, we can already see that settlements are less
frequent for “Car vs. pedestrian” accidents and almost never happen for offenses with more than one
death.The proposed identification scheme requires two assumptions to produce consistent and unbiased
estimates:
1. The vindictiveness parameter 𝑎 does not depend on the harm made;
2. Judges do not internalize the effect of non-random matching, i.e. the expected punishment does
not correlate with victim-defendant relationship.
Result 3. Non-monetary fighting abilities and contestants’ preferences can be separately identified.
For this claim to hold, one must observe individual wealth or have strong proxies for this variable.
A separate identification of preferences and non-monetary fighting abilities becomes possible for two
reasons. First, our theoretical model accommodates budget constraints. Second, the dataset includes
uneven victim-defendant matches where these constraints are likely to bind. 52 Otherwise, one could
not distinguish the effect of 𝑎 (𝑏) from 𝑚𝑉 (𝑚𝐷) without additional assumptions.
To illustrate Result 3, consider a simple “2 × 2” example. Take a population of potential victims (𝑣 =
{1, ..., 𝑁 }) and defendants (𝑑 = {1, ..., 𝑁 }) who match at random. Suppose there are only two wealth levels
that are perfectly observed by an econometrician, i.e. 𝑤𝑖 = {𝑤 𝑖 , 𝑤 𝑖}, 𝑖 = {𝑉 , 𝐷}. 53 Further, assume
player 𝑖’s budget constraint always (never) binds when he (she) faces 𝑤𝑖 = 𝑤 𝑖 (𝑤𝑖 = 𝑤 𝑖). For simplicity,
we require all contestants to have identical preferences and non-monetary fighting abilities that the
econometrician must infer:
𝑎𝑣 ≡ 𝑎, 𝑚𝑉 , 𝑣 = 𝑚𝑉 ∀ 𝑣 = {1, ..., 𝑁 }
52 For instance, we observe individuals, who drive expensive cars, matched against people without a permanent job.
53 The result still holds if contestants’ wealth is observable with a small noise.
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𝑏𝑑 ≡ 𝑑, 𝑚𝐷, 𝑑 = 𝑚𝐷 ∀ 𝑑 = {1, ..., 𝑁 }
Let 𝑓(𝑤𝐷 , 𝑤𝑉 ) denote an empirical frequency of observing the (𝑤𝐷 , 𝑤𝑉 ) match in court, and assume the
following:
𝑓(𝑤𝐷 , 𝑤𝑉 ) = 𝑓(𝑤𝐷 , 𝑤𝑉 ) = 𝑓1, 𝑓(𝑤𝐷 , 𝑤𝑉 ) = 𝑓2 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑓(𝑤𝐷 , 𝑤𝑉 ) = 1 − 𝑓2
Using the theoretical model developed in Section 3.2, we can compute case-specific probabilities to end
up in court:
𝑤𝑉 = 𝑤𝑉 𝑤𝑉 = 𝑤𝑉
𝑤𝐷 = 𝑤𝐷 ?̃?𝑉?̃?𝑉 +?̃?𝐷 1 − √
?̃?𝐷
?̃?𝑥𝑝ℎ
𝑤𝐷 = 𝑤𝐷 √
?̃?𝑉
?̃?𝑥𝑝ℎ
?̃?
?̃?+?̃?
where ?̃?𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖𝑚𝑖 , 𝑖 = {𝑉 , 𝐷}, ?̃? =
𝑎
𝑚𝑉
, and ?̃? = 𝑏𝑚𝐷 . Matching these theoretical moments against their
empirical counterparts, we can obtain the following estimates:
?̂? = 𝑓1𝑤
𝑉
(1 − 𝑓1) 𝑓 22
1
𝑥𝑝ℎ , ?̂? =
(1 − 𝑓1) 𝑤𝐷
𝑓1𝑓 22
1
𝑥𝑝ℎ 𝑎𝑛𝑑
̂
(𝑚𝑉𝑚𝐷
) = (1 − 𝑥1)𝑥1
?̂?
?̂?
where 𝑥𝑝ℎ can be identified by exploring the variation in the harm made and the corresponding court
decisions. Unfortunately, we cannot separate the effect of 𝑚𝑉 from 𝑚𝐷 without imposing additional
restrictions. However, using the variation in players’ approximated wealth and empirical frequencies
to end up in court for different types of victim-defendant matches, we can estimate preferences and
non-monetary fighting abilities separately. The described strategy works well when we assume no se-
lection bias at a pre-investigation stage. If, however, some matches (for example, (𝑤𝐷 = ?̄?𝐷 , 𝑤𝑉 = 𝑤𝑉 ))
are systematically underrepresented in our sample, the estimator must be adjusted respectively. Other
identification restrictions will be discussed later.
Let 𝛾 and 𝑋 denote the sets of parameters and controls, respectively.
Definition. 𝑁𝜀∈[𝑢1, 𝑢2] (𝑚, 𝜎) denotes the truncation of a normally distributed random variable 𝜀 ∼ 𝑁 (𝑚, 𝜎)
for 𝜀 ∈ [𝑢1, 𝑢2]. Parameters 𝑚 and 𝜎 correspond to mean and standard deviation of the general normal
distribution. 54
Given the data available, we cannot distinguish 𝑥 from 𝑝ℎ and work only with the expected punish-
ment, 𝑥𝑝ℎ. Assume 𝑥𝑝ℎ is drawn from the following distribution:
54 The theoretical model we developed in Section 3.2 is well-defined only for non-negative values of 𝑥𝑝ℎ, 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑤𝑖 ,𝑚𝑖 , 𝑖 = {𝑉 , 𝐷}. For
this reason, one must restrict the supports of the underlying distributions.
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𝑥𝑝ℎ ∼ 𝑁𝑥𝑝ℎ≥0 (𝑓 (ℎ, 𝑍) , 𝜎𝑥)
where 𝑓 (ℎ, 𝑍) is a deterministic function of harm made (ℎ) and other case- and region-specific controls
(𝑍 ). 55 The draws of 𝑥𝑝ℎ are independent across Victim-Defendant matches. For every case 𝑖, we impose
the following restriction on the shape of 𝑓 (ℎ, 𝑍):
𝑓 (ℎ𝑖 , 𝑍𝑖) = 𝜆0 + 𝜆1ℎ𝑖 + 𝜆2𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖
where
• ℎ𝑖 includes all characteristics of the accident, such as:
1. A number of victims from different gender and age groups;
2. Whether 𝐷 and / or 𝑉 were drunk;
3. If 𝐷 already has criminal and / or administrative records.
All these controls enter the value of ℎ𝑖 linearly.
• 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 contains dummy variables showing where the accident happened.
As it was mentioned before, all the cases have three possible outcomes:
1. 𝑠 = 1: 𝐷 and 𝑉 settle among themselves (otherwise, 𝑠 = 0)
2. 𝑐 = 1: 𝐷 and 𝑉 do not settle, and the case goes to court (otherwise, 𝑐 = 0):
• 𝑥𝑜𝑏𝑠 = 1: the decision is known
• 𝑥𝑜𝑏𝑠 = 0: the decision is not known
3. 𝑛𝑐 = 1: 𝐷 and 𝑉 do not settle, and the case does not go to court (for example, an investigator or a
prosecutor can decide to close the file)
In practice, underlying parameters of the model, such as vindictiveness or non-monetary fighting abil-
ities, depend on victim- and defendant-specific characteristics. For this reason, we impose following
assumptions on the distributions of 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑤𝑉 , 𝑚𝐷 , 𝑚𝑉 , 𝑚𝐷 : 56
55 The distribution of 𝑥𝑝ℎ is the lower truncation of 𝑁 (0, 𝜎𝑥 ) with the 𝑥𝑝ℎ ∈ [0, ∞) support.
56 All draws are assumed to be independent across cases.
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𝑤 𝑖𝑉 ∼ 𝑁𝑤 𝑖𝑉 ≥0 (?̄?
𝑖𝑉 , 𝜎𝑤𝑉 ) 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒
?̄?𝑉 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑆𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑉 + 𝛼2𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑉 + 𝛼3𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 𝑖 + 𝛼4𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑉 + 𝛼5 (𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑉 )
2
𝑤 𝑖𝐷 ∼ 𝑁𝑤 𝑖𝐷≥0 (?̄?
𝑖𝐷 , 𝜎𝑤𝐷 ) 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒
?̄? 𝑖𝐷 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐸𝑆𝑖𝐷 + 𝛽2𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝐷 + 𝛽3𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝐷 + 𝛽4 (𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝐷)
2 + 𝛽5𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖𝐷 + 𝑝𝑐𝑎𝑟 𝑖𝐷
𝑎𝑖 ∼ 𝑁𝑎𝑖≥0 ( ̄𝑎𝑖 , ̄𝜎𝑎) 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒
̄𝑎𝑖 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝑝𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑉 + 𝛿2𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑖 + 𝛿3?̄? 𝑖𝑉 , ̄𝜎𝑎 = √𝜎2𝑎 + 𝛿22𝑉𝑎𝑟 (𝑤 𝑖𝑉 )
𝑏𝑖 ∼ 𝑁𝑏𝑖≥0 (?̄?𝑖 , ̄𝜎𝑏) 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒
?̄?𝑖 = 𝜂0 + 𝜂1?̄? 𝑖𝐷 , ̄𝜎𝑏 = √𝜎2𝑏 + 𝜂21𝑉𝑎𝑟 (𝑤 𝑖𝐷)
𝑚𝑖𝑗 ∼ 𝑁𝑚𝑖𝑗≥0 (?̄?
𝑖𝑗 , 𝜎𝑚𝑗 ) , 𝑗 = {𝑉 , 𝐷} 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒
?̄?𝑖𝑗 = 𝜋 𝑗0 + 𝜋 𝑗1 𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑒𝑛𝑓 𝑖𝑗
where
• 𝑆𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑗 denotes socio-economic status of 𝑙 = {𝑉 , 𝐷};
• 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 𝑖 = 1 if 𝑉 ’s age is below 18;
• 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑗 indicates which age group 𝑙 = {𝑉 , 𝐷} belongs to;
• 𝑝𝑐𝑎𝑟 𝑖𝐷 reflects a mean car price for 𝐷;
• 𝑝𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑉 = 1 signals that 𝑉 is a pedestrian;
• 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖𝐷 shows the highest degree 𝐷 holds (in years of education);
• 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑖 establishes if 𝑉 knows 𝐷 and how close their relationships are (for example, family
members);
• 𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑒𝑛𝑓 𝑖𝑙 = 1 specifies whether 𝑙 = {𝑉 , 𝐷} is a law enforcer or a government official. 57
We comment on these assumptions briefly. To identify parameters that shape expected wealth (?̄?𝑉 and
?̄?𝐷), we exploit the variation in players’ socio-economic status (𝑆𝐸𝑆), gender, age, educational attain-
ment, and imputed mean car prices (where applicable). Clearly, 𝑆𝐸𝑆 affects individual income and pos-
itively correlates with 𝑤𝑉 and 𝑤𝐷 . On average, we expect top-managers to display higher wealth than
57 The 𝑖𝑖𝑑 assumption stems from random matching between victims and defendants in traffic accidents, which constitute uninten-
tional crimes.
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workers and people without a permanent job. Also, we take account of 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 to explore the variation
in resources available to males and females. Mean car prices (𝑝𝑐𝑎𝑟 ) convey another piece of information
about contestants’ wealth. On average, those who drive more expensive vehicles are richer. 58 However,
car prices become a relevant proxy for 𝑉 ’s wealth if and only if the victim happened to be a driver or a
passenger but not a pedestrian. As it was mentioned earlier, the information on 𝑉 ’s car price is harder
to get from the fabulas and may contain a lot of noise. For these two reasons, we do not include 𝑝𝑐𝑎𝑟
into 𝑤𝑉 .
Child victims can display different wealth patterns because they do not have own income yet. To cap-
ture this source of variation in 𝑤𝑉 , we assign a separate indicator, 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 𝑖 , to the given group. Typically,
individuals earn less in the beginning and in the end of their career, i.e. 𝑤𝑖 , 𝑖 = {𝑉 , 𝐷} can display an
inverse 𝑈 -shape pattern with respect to 𝑎𝑔𝑒 (keeping all other characteristics constant). For this reason,
𝑤𝑖 , 𝑖 = {𝑉 , 𝐷} must be instrumented with 𝑎𝑔𝑒 and 𝑎𝑔𝑒2. Finally, well-paid jobs often require a college
degree. Thus, better educational background can be associated with higher wealth.
Next, consider what drives contestants’ preferences. In the beginning, we focus on the vindictiveness
parameter 𝑎. To identify the value of interest, two sources of variation can be exploited. First, we look
at victim-defendant relationship. Particularly, close relatives of the defendant who play on the victim’s
side may be less vindictive than strangers. Second, if richer individuals lose their ability to work and
generate more income, they can extract higher vengeance benefits from 𝐷 being punished. To capture
this effect, 𝑤𝑉 enters 𝑎. 𝐷’s disutility of being punished also correlates with his wealth. For instance,
those defendants who earn a lot or have a very promising career can lose more in case of punishment,
especially if they get a real jail term.
In the end, we explain how𝑚𝑉 and𝑚𝐷 are shaped. As it was emphasized before, being a law enforcer
or a government official gives two advantages. First, it allows the individual learn the system (its insti-
tutional setting, legal procedures etc.) better and act faster if the accident happens. Second, those who
work in the given sectors operate in the network of law enforcers, build new connections and can use
this influence if needed. Both aforementioned assets are clearly non-monetary and affect the contest
outcome. 59 Hence, we use 𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑒𝑛𝑓 to explain 𝑚𝑉 and 𝑚𝐷 .
Generally, 𝑚𝑉 and 𝑚𝐷 cannot be separately identified (see Result 3 and the discussion on Page 142).
Nevertheless, instrumenting 𝑚𝑉 and 𝑚𝐷 with 𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑒𝑛𝑓 makes it possible to quantify the advantage (or
disadvantage) law enforcers and government officials have in non-monetary fighting abilities. In the
data, we observe four types of matches:
58 Notice that 𝑝𝑐𝑎𝑟 enters 𝑤𝐷 with the weight of 1. This allows us measure 𝑤𝐷 in currency units and treat other coefficients as
exchange rates between money and the controls of interest.
59 See Subsection 3.3.2 for more details.
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1. Both 𝑉 and 𝐷 do not work in law enforcement or in the government, i.e. 𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑒𝑛𝑓𝑉 = 𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑒𝑛𝑓𝐷 = 0;
2. Only 𝑉 (𝐷) works in law enforcement or in the government, i.e. 𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑒𝑛𝑓𝑉 = 1, 𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑒𝑛𝑓𝐷 = 0
(𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑒𝑛𝑓𝑉 = 0, 𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑒𝑛𝑓𝐷 = 1);
3. Both 𝑉 and 𝐷 work in law enforcement or in the government, i.e. 𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑒𝑛𝑓𝑉 = 𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑒𝑛𝑓𝐷 = 1.
Let (𝑚𝑉𝑚𝐷 ){𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑒𝑛𝑓𝑉 , 𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑒𝑛𝑓𝐷}
denote the ratio of non-monetary fighting abilities for each {𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑒𝑛𝑓𝑉 , 𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑒𝑛𝑓𝐷}
match. Estimating the model, we obtain four values:
̂
(𝑚𝑉𝑚𝐷
)
{0, 0}
= 𝑟1,
̂
(𝑚𝑉𝑚𝐷
)
{1, 0}
= 𝑟2
̂
(𝑚𝑉𝑚𝐷
)
{0, 1}
= 𝑟3,
̂
(𝑚𝑉𝑚𝐷
)
{1, 1}
= 𝑟4
Using this information, one can compute a lower bound for the relative difference in non-monetary
fighting abilities victims and defendants from different groups display:
̂𝑚1𝑉
𝑚0𝑉
= min { 𝑟4𝑟3
, 𝑟2𝑟1
} ,
̂𝑚1𝐷
𝑚0𝐷
= min { 𝑟1𝑟2
, 𝑟2𝑟4
}
where 𝑚0𝑖 (𝑚1𝑖 ) corresponds to the 𝑚𝑖 value under 𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑒𝑛𝑓𝑖 = 0 (𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑒𝑛𝑓𝑖 = 1), 𝑖 = {𝑉 , 𝐷}.
The random nature of traffic offenses and the modeling assumptions imposed on key parameters
allow us identify the variance of underlying noise distributions. The expected punishment 𝑥𝑝ℎ must not
affect players’ preferences and fighting abilities. Including region-specific controls and distinguishing
between different types of victims (children, females etc.) help us isolate common shocks judges face
when making their decisions about sanctions. 60 Hence, the unexplained variation can be associated
with a noise term.
Players’ wealth levels, 𝑤𝑉 and 𝑤𝐷 , are assumed to be uncorrelated with their preferences and non-
monetary fighting abilities. Moreover, given that defendants and victims match at random, 𝑤𝑉 and
𝑤𝐷 must be independently drawn from different distributions. Here, we assume that two sides of the
conflict can display contrasting wealth patterns. The identification becomes possible when we use “Car
vs. car” accidents as a control group for “Car vs. pedestrian” offenses. On average, those who happen
to own a car can be richer than individuals without vehicles. Hence, 𝑤𝑉 and 𝑤𝐷 are driven by different
data generating processes. Controlling for systematic patterns (socio-economic status, age, educational
attainment, imputed mean car prices), we attribute the residual variation to wealth shocks and identify
𝜎𝑤𝑉 and 𝜎𝑤𝐷 .
60 Ideally, one should also control for policy department and court-specific fixed effects. Unfortunately, this information is not
available for all cases.
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As Result 3 shows, contestants’ preferences can be separately identified, and we model them as a
function of individual wealth. For the vindictiveness parameter 𝑎, there is one more instrumental vari-
able – victim-defendant relationship – that helps in capturing other systematic patterns. 61 Again, the
randomness of traffic accidents allows us assume a zero correlation between 𝑎 and 𝑏, which is espe-
cially true when one concentrates on “Car vs. pedestrian” matches. Hence, all unexplained variation
in players’ preferences is treated as shocks to the corresponding variables. Similar arguments apply
to the identification of 𝜎𝑚𝑉 (𝜎𝑚𝐷 ) where 𝑚𝑉 (𝑚𝐷) is assumed to be independent of wealth, preference
parameters, case- and opponent-specific characteristics.
Now, we employ the theoretical model to construct the likelihood function. Let joint distribution of
𝑤𝑉 , 𝑤𝐷 , 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑚𝑉 , 𝑚𝐷 , and 𝑥𝑝ℎ be denoted as 𝐹𝐺⊆𝑅7≥ (𝑔), 𝐺 = {𝑤𝑉 , 𝑤𝐷 , 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑚𝑉 , 𝑚𝐷 , 𝑥𝑝ℎ}. Assume 𝐼𝑗 ,
𝑗 = {1, ..., 4} is equal to a unity if equilibrium 𝑗 is played (otherwise, 𝐼𝑗 = 0). 62 Then, a complete data
likelihood for every case 𝑖 (𝐿𝑐𝑖 ) looks as follows:
𝐿𝑐𝑖 (𝛾 , 𝑋𝑖) =
4
∑
𝑗=1
𝐼𝑖𝑗 ((𝐼 𝑆𝑖𝑗)
𝑠𝑖 [(1 − 𝐼 𝑆𝑖𝑗) (𝑃 𝑖𝑗𝐶 (𝑥𝑝ℎ)
𝑥 𝑖𝑜𝑏𝑠
𝑖 )
𝑐𝑖
(1 − 𝑃 𝑖𝑗𝐶 )
𝑛𝑐𝑖]
1−𝑠𝑖
)
where
• 𝐼 𝑆𝑖𝑗 = 1 if 𝐷 and 𝑉 prefer to settle in equilibrium 𝑗 for given parameter values and budget con-
straints;
• (𝑥𝑝ℎ)𝑖 represents the expected in-court punishment.
Since we do not observe 𝑤𝑉 , 𝑤𝐷 , 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑚𝑉 , 𝑚𝐷 , and 𝑥𝑝ℎ directly, 𝐼𝑖𝑗 and 𝐼 𝑆𝑖𝑗 must be replaced with
corresponding probabilities. Also, one has to take expected values of (𝑥𝑝ℎ)𝑖 and 𝑃
𝑖𝑗
𝐶 (a probability to
end up in court for case 𝑖).
To give an example, consider equilibrium 1where budget constraints of both𝐷 and𝑉 are non-binding.
This outcome emerges if and only if: 63
⎧
⎨
⎩
𝑤𝑉 ≥ 𝑚𝑉 𝑥𝑝
ℎ𝑎2𝑏𝑚𝐷
(𝑎𝑚𝐷+𝑏𝑚𝑉 )2
𝑤𝐷 ≥ 𝑚𝐷 𝑥𝑝
ℎ𝑏2𝑎𝑚𝑉
(𝑎𝑚𝐷+𝑏𝑚𝑉 )2
Then, we can define a probability to observe equilibrium 1 in the data:
𝑃1 = 𝑃𝑟 (𝑤𝑉 ≥ 𝑚𝑉
𝑥𝑝ℎ𝑎2𝑏𝑚𝐷
(𝑎𝑚𝐷 + 𝑏𝑚𝑉 )
2 , 𝑤𝐷 ≥ 𝑚𝐷
𝑥𝑝ℎ𝑏2𝑎𝑚𝑉
(𝑎𝑚𝐷 + 𝑏𝑚𝑉 )
2)
61 Also, it is crucial that the harm made does not shape preferences for revenge (𝑎).
62 The equilibrium type depends on whose budget constrain binds in the optimum. See the proof of Proposition 2 for more details.
63 See the proof of Proposition 2 for more details.
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where 𝑃1 can be compute given 𝐹𝐺⊆𝑅7≥ (𝑔) and the assumptions on the distributions of 𝑤𝑉 , 𝑤𝐷 , 𝑎, 𝑏,𝑚𝑉 ,
𝑚𝐷 , and 𝑥𝑝ℎ. 64 Similarly, one can find the probabilities to observe equilibria 2, 3, and 4:
𝑃2 = 𝑃𝑟 (𝑤𝑉 ≥ 𝑚𝑉 𝑥𝑝
ℎ𝑎2𝑏𝑚𝐷
(𝑎𝑚𝐷+𝑏𝑚𝑉 )2
, 𝑤𝐷 < 𝑚𝐷 𝑥𝑝
ℎ𝑏2𝑎𝑚𝑉
(𝑎𝑚𝐷+𝑏𝑚𝑉 )2
)
𝑃𝑟 (𝑤𝑉 < 𝑚𝑉 𝑥𝑝
ℎ𝑎2𝑏𝑚𝐷
(𝑎𝑚𝐷+𝑏𝑚𝑉 )2
, 𝑤𝐷 ≥ 𝑚𝐷 𝑥𝑝
ℎ𝑏2𝑎𝑚𝑉
(𝑎𝑚𝐷+𝑏𝑚𝑉 )2
)
𝑃4 = 𝑃𝑟 (𝑤𝑉 < 𝑚𝑉 𝑥𝑝
ℎ𝑎2𝑏𝑚𝐷
(𝑎𝑚𝐷+𝑏𝑚𝑉 )2
, 𝑤𝐷 < 𝑚𝐷 𝑥𝑝
ℎ𝑏2𝑎𝑚𝑉
(𝑎𝑚𝐷+𝑏𝑚𝑉 )2
)
Now, for every equilibrium outcome 𝑗, we can find a probability to settle, 𝑃 𝑠𝑗 . Recall conditions (46)
and (47) where the former indicates 𝐷’s willingness to settle and the latter states when it is feasible to
prevent the fight. Then, a probability to settle becomes
𝑃 𝑠𝑗 = 𝑃𝑟 (𝜋 ∗𝐷, 𝑗 ≤ −𝜋 ∗𝑉 , 𝑗 , 𝜋 ∗𝑉 , 𝑗 ≤ 𝑤𝐷 | 𝑗)
where 𝜋 ∗𝐷, 𝑗 and 𝜋 ∗𝑉 , 𝑗 reflect contestants’ payoffs in equilibrium 𝑗. 65
Further, we turn our attention to scenario-specific probabilities to end up in court (𝑃 𝑗𝐶 ). In the complete
data case, these values look as follows:
𝑃1𝐶 =
𝑎𝑚𝐷
𝑎𝑚𝐷+𝑏𝑚𝑉
, 𝑃2𝐶 = 1 −√
𝑤𝐷𝑚𝑉
𝑚𝐷𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ
𝑃3𝐶 = √
𝑤𝑉𝑚𝐷
𝑚𝑉 𝑏𝑥𝑝ℎ
, 𝑃4𝐶 =
𝑤𝑉𝑚𝐷
𝑤𝑉𝑚𝐷+𝑤𝐷𝑚𝑉
Since we only know the distributions of 𝑤𝑉 , 𝑤𝐷 , 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑚𝑉 , 𝑚𝐷 , and 𝑥𝑝ℎ, one needs to take expected
values of 𝑃 𝑗𝐶 , 𝑗 = {1, ..., 4}:
̄𝑃 𝑗𝐶 = 𝐸 (𝑃 𝑗𝐶 | 𝑗)
𝑃 𝑗𝐶 , 𝑗 = {1, ..., 4} are well-defined over supports of the corresponding conditional distributions. 66 The
probability to avoid the court stage is just a complement of 𝑃𝐶 (or its expected value).
For each case that goes to court, the decision is either available (𝑥𝑜𝑏𝑠 = 1) or not (𝑥𝑜𝑏𝑠 = 0). In
the data, 𝑥𝑜𝑏𝑠 includes various types of punishment ranging from different limitations of freedom to
real prison sentences. To rank these options in utility (or disutility) terms, one might propose a scale.
64 There is no analytical solution for 𝑃1. To approximate this value, we simulate the 𝐹𝐺⊆𝑅7≥ (𝑔) distribution for given parameters andrecover 𝑃1.
65 See the proof of Proposition 2 for closed-form expressions of 𝜋 ∗𝐷, 𝑗 and 𝜋 ∗𝑉 , 𝑗 .
66 All values under square roots stay positive; 𝑃 𝑗𝐶 ∈ [0, 1].
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However, it requires extensive robustness checks. Instead, we employ the following (although simplistic)
assumption:
𝑥∗ =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝐷 𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑎 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑗𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
where 𝑥∗ denotes the punishment observed. With this formulation, we arrive to a typical binary choice
model:
𝑥∗ =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑥𝑝ℎ ≥ 𝑡
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑥𝑝ℎ < 𝑡
and 𝑡 indicates a threshold value to be estimated. Then, the probability to observe a particular decision
becomes:
𝑃𝑥 ∗=1 = 1 − 𝑃𝑟 (𝑥𝑝ℎ < 𝑡) , 𝑃𝑥 ∗=0 = 𝑃𝑟 (𝑥𝑝ℎ < 𝑡)
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With all computations provided, an expected likelihood function for case 𝑖 (𝐿𝑒𝑖 ) becomes:
𝐿𝑒𝑖 (𝛾 , 𝑋𝑖) =
4
∑
𝑗=1
𝑃𝑖𝑗 ((𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑗)
𝑠𝑖 [(1 − 𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑗) ( ̄𝑃 𝑖𝑗𝐶 [(𝑃𝑥 ∗=1)𝑥
∗𝑖 (𝑃𝑥 ∗=0)1−𝑥
∗𝑖 ]
𝑥 𝑖𝑜𝑏𝑠)
𝑐𝑖
(1 − ̄𝑃 𝑖𝑗𝐶 )
𝑛𝑐𝑖]
1−𝑠𝑖
)
Since draws of 𝑤𝑉 , 𝑤𝐷 , 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑚𝑉 , 𝑚𝐷 , and 𝑥𝑝ℎ are independent over cases, a full-sample expected
likelihood (𝐿𝑒) is just a product of 𝐿𝑒𝑖 :
𝐿𝑒 (𝛾 , 𝑋) =
𝑁
∏
𝑖=1
𝐿𝑒𝑖 (𝛾 , 𝑋𝑖)
where 𝑁 is a sample size. Taking logarithms, we get:
𝑙𝑒 (𝛾 , 𝑋) = 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝐿𝑒 (𝛾 , 𝑋))
Finally, to have a well-defined game, all underlying parameters of the model (such as preferences, mon-
etary and non-monetary fighting abilities) must be non-negative. The resulting program to solve is:
max𝛾 {𝑙𝑒 (𝛾 , 𝑋)}
𝑠.𝑡. min𝑖 {?̄? 𝑖𝐷 , ?̄? 𝑖𝑉 , ̄𝑎𝑖 , ?̄?𝑖 , ̄𝑒𝑖 , ?̄?𝑖 , ( ̄𝑥𝑝ℎ)𝑖} ≥ 0
To solve the given optimization program, we use a derivative-free numerical algorithm and compute
bootstrap standard errors. 67
We develop the following estimation procedure. To capture the difference in non-monetary fighting
abilities, one should concentrate on “car vs. pedestrian” cases (see Subsection 3.3.2 for the reduced form
evidence). However, working with accidental Victim-Defendant combinations only, we lose the infor-
mation on non-random matches, where 𝑉 and 𝐷 know each other. As a result, 𝑉 ’s vindictiveness (𝑎)
cannot be identified. For this reason, we run the estimation on two different samples, 𝑁𝑎𝑙𝑙 and 𝑁𝑝 .
The first dataset, 𝑁𝑎𝑙𝑙 , includes all types of criminal traffic offenses for 3 regions: Sverdlovsk Oblast
(732 cases), Chelyabinsk Oblast (868 cases), and Permsky Krai (479 cases). 68 These regions are located in
the same geographic area (namely, Ural) and share identical climate conditions. Moreover, they display
comparable socio-economic characteristics. Overall, we expect that drivers in the given regions should
have analogous behavioral patterns.
Another subsample, 𝑁𝑝 , deals with “car vs. pedestrian” accidents only. It includes 9 regions and 1055
cases in total. Also, the 𝑁𝑝 sample has a sufficient number of law enforcers and government
67 The Hessian of 𝑙𝑒 (𝛾 , 𝑋) has a sparse structure and cannot be inverted.
68 Other regions will be added later.
3.3 the empirical analysis 105
officials on both sides of the process. With this dataset, we abstract from non-random matches and aim
to estimate non-monetary fighting abilities of the parties (𝑚𝑉 and 𝑚𝐷). 69
Region Number of Number of victims Number of defendants
cases who are law enforcers or who are law enforcers or
government officials government officials
Moscow 123 0 3
Moscow Oblast 126 4 2
Permski Krai 122 2 1
Sverdlovsk Oblast 124 3 1
Tjumen Oblast 111 2 0
Omsk Oblast 74 1 0
Novosibirsk Oblast 123 2 1
Altayski Krai 123 4 3
Chabarovsk Krai 128 7 1
Total 1055 25 12
3.3.4 Estimation Results
Table 36 (Table 42) reports estimation results for the sample of all criminal traffic offenses (“car vs.
pedestrian” matches). For both 𝑁𝑎𝑙𝑙 and 𝑁𝑝 , the victims tend to have lower expected wealth than the
defendants, and the degree of resource imbalances (𝜃) is 1.7 times bigger in the 𝑁𝑝 case: 70
𝑁𝑎𝑙𝑙 ∶ 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 (?̄?𝑖𝐷) = 55′806.6, 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 (?̄? 𝑖𝑉 ) = 6′056.7
𝜃𝑎𝑙𝑙 = 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 (
?̄? 𝑖𝐷 − ?̄? 𝑖𝑉
max𝑖 {?̄?𝑖𝐷 − ?̄? 𝑖𝑉 }
) = .3
𝑁𝑝 ∶ 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 (?̄? 𝑖𝐷) = 2′257.3, 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 (?̄?𝑖𝑉 ) = 903.9
𝜃𝑝 = 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 (
?̄? 𝑖𝐷 − ?̄? 𝑖𝑉
max𝑖 {?̄? 𝑖𝐷 − ?̄? 𝑖𝑉 }
) = .52
In the 𝑁𝑎𝑙𝑙 case, 𝑤𝑉 and 𝑤𝐷 increase in 𝑎𝑔𝑒 ≥ 18, i.e. on average, elder individuals are reacher. 71
For “car vs. pedestrian” matches (the 𝑁𝑝 dataset), the pattern differs. Specifically, we find the evidence
of the inverse 𝑈 -shape relationship between 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑗 , 𝑗 = {𝑉 , 𝐷} and individual wealth (keeping other
characteristics constant):
𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑉 {?̄?𝑉 } ≈ 43, 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐷 {?̄?𝐷} ≈ 35
69 Later on, the two identification approaches must be incorporated.
70 The distribution of ?̄? 𝑖𝑉 has more mass to the left of its mean (Figure 10 for 𝑁𝑎𝑙𝑙 and Figure 12 for 𝑁𝑝 ). The distribution of ?̄? 𝑖𝐷 is
left (right) skewed in the 𝑁𝑎𝑙𝑙 (𝑁𝑝 ) case (Figure 11 and Figure 13, respectively).
71 Individuals whose age is under 18 enter the 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑉 = 1 group.
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where 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑉 and 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐷 are measured in years. In words, 𝑉 ’s (𝐷’s) wealth achieves its maximum when
the individual turns 43 (35). The difference arises from the discrepancy in 𝑉 ’s and 𝐷’s age composition.
Actually, 70% of the defendants are younger than 40, and 60% of the victims turn to be older than 30 (see
Table 34).
Next, consider how the victim’s socio-economic status (𝑆𝐸𝑆) affects her wealth. In case of the 𝑁𝑎𝑙𝑙
sample, most of the patterns are quite predictable. For example, workers, welfare recipients, and re-
tired individuals tend to be poorer than office employees (keeping other characteristics constant). At
the same time, victims who happen to be top-managers or budget office workers display the lowest
wealth level. The former observation goes against the intuition, although the corresponding coefficient
is not statistically significant. Also, the positive impact 𝑎𝑔𝑒 has on 𝑤𝑉 can offset the negative effect of
top-managers’ 𝑆𝐸𝑆: on average, these individuals are elder than their peers. 72 Once we concentrate on
random matches (the 𝑁𝑝 sample), top-managers display higher wealth than the control group (unem-
ployed individuals). Nevertheless, the magnitude of the effect is still smaller than for office workers,
students or even retired individuals. The indicated observation can be justified with a small number of
top-manager victims in the sample (less than 1%, see Table 34). In fact, these individuals are less likely
to be pedestrians and also tend to drive expensive cars, which protect them and their passengers from
serious injuries. Hence, those top-manager victims who have entered the sample might not significantly
differ from other socio-economic groups.
𝐷’s wealth behaves more predictably with respect to his socio-economic status. When we focus on all
criminal traffic offenses, top-managers display higher values of 𝑤𝐷 than their peers, excluding workers.
Overall, the frequency of observing this socio-economic group on the defendants’ side is higher: top-
managers constitute more than 1% of the offenders’ population (see Table 34). This explains why the
effect of their 𝑆𝐸𝑆 on 𝑤𝐷 turns to be more intuitive than in case of 𝑤𝑉 . Students and other individuals
are the poorest offenders in the sample. For the 𝑁𝑝 dataset, every 𝑆𝐸𝑆 unit performs better than the
baseline (namely, unemployed individuals). The top-manager defendants still hold more wealth, but the
magnitude of the effect becomes smaller than in the 𝑁𝑎𝑙𝑙 case.
Child victims (𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑉 < 18), whose resources depend on their parents’ socio-economic status, tend to
have less wealth than adults (𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑉 ≥ 18). Although the coefficient in front of 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑉 is positive, its effect
on 𝑤𝑉 turns to be weaker than the impact 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑉 has on 𝑉 ’s wealth. This result holds for both samples.
Remarkably, the effect of gender on 𝑤𝑉 and 𝑤𝐷 is positive: on average, female victims and defendants
have more resources (keeping other characteristics constant). Also, the impact of 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑉 = 1 on 𝑤𝑉
72 In the 𝑁𝑎𝑙𝑙 sample, the average age of top-manager victims reaches 36.4. This value exceeds its counterpart for most of the 𝑆𝐸𝑆
groups (except entrepreneurs, retired and unclassified individuals).
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Table 36: Estimation Results: All Cases (𝑁𝑎𝑙𝑙 )
Victim’s Wealth
Variable Coefficient St. Error
Intercept 126.1∗∗∗ 36.505
𝑆𝐸𝑆𝑉 :
worker 75.67∗∗∗ 7.272
office worker 101.95∗∗∗ 7.326
top-manager −1.13 29.254
entrepreneur 87.94∗∗∗ 13.368
budget office worker −4.96 9.346
student 229.19∗∗∗ 20.938
welfare recipient 90.7∗∗ 41.585
retired 80.56∗∗ 31.871
other 8.43 11.885
𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑉 49.93∗∗ 23.961
𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑉 245.91∗∗∗ 4.104
𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑉 −59.33∗∗ 28.231
𝑎𝑔𝑒2𝑉 4.68 10.379
Defendant’s Wealth
Intercept 2.46 4.175
𝑆𝐸𝑆𝐷 :
worker 101.2∗∗∗ 6.091
office worker 58.34∗∗∗ 8.566
top-manager 97.89∗∗ 40.272
entrepreneur 42.54∗∗ 20.718
budget office worker 76.14∗∗∗ 1.221
student −1.81 51.428
welfare recipient 47.4∗∗∗ 11.12
retired 54.77∗∗∗ 5.511
other −13.17 38.651
𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝐷 26.04 42.122
𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐷 110.92∗∗∗ 2.663
𝑎𝑔𝑒2𝐷 38.03∗∗ 17.899
𝑒𝑑𝑢𝐷 55.76∗∗ 23.568
𝑝𝑐𝑎𝑟𝐷 1 None
Vindictiveness (𝑎)
Intercept 74.87∗∗∗ 6.893
𝑝𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛 98.43∗∗∗ .295
𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 :
acquaintance 9.12 36.402
cohabitant 11.77 21.805
relative 15.2 29.053
close relative 10.24∗∗∗ 3.078
𝑤𝑉 1.49 3.491
Defendant’s Disutility of Punishment (𝑏)
Intercept 22.75∗ 12.937
𝑤𝐷 79.92∗∗ 36.435
Non-Monetary Fighting Abilities
Variable Coefficient St.Error
Victim:
Intercept 19.04 25.808
𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑒𝑛𝑓𝑉 19.77 47.113
Defendant:
Intercept 8.23 39.166
𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑒𝑛𝑓𝐷 23.63 19.48
Accident and Harm
Number of
dead victims 156.26∗∗∗ 25.078
victims with 71.63∗∗∗ 5.004
serious injuries
dead minor victims 82.58∗ 44.233
minor victims with 95.48∗∗∗ 9.647
serious injuries
dead female victims 8.11∗∗ 3.247
female victims with −17.7 12.149
serious injuries
dead minor 82.24∗∗∗ 2.021
female victims
minor female victims 84.06∗∗∗ 27.923
with serious injuries
𝑝𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛 2.83 22.32
𝑑𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑘𝐷 38.5 29.559
𝑑𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑘𝑉 19.22∗∗∗ 1.444
𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐷 65.72∗∗∗ 9.35
𝑎𝑑𝑚ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐷 89.65∗∗ 36.907
𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝐷 13.7 10.002
Region-specific Yes
controls
𝑡 325.76∗∗∗ 22.834
Underlying Distributions
𝜎𝑤𝑉 54.42 39.528
𝜎𝑤𝐷 29.99∗∗∗ 6.808
𝜎𝑎 73.24∗∗ 28.696
𝜎𝑏 16.18 32.342
𝜎𝑚𝑉 26.35∗ 15.471
𝜎𝑚𝐷 120.23∗∗∗ 20.114
𝜎𝑥 225.03∗∗∗ 51.537
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐿) –3497.16
𝑁 2079
108 explaining victim-defendant settlements under asymmetric bargaining positions
becomes weaker in the 𝑁𝑝 case. One can assume that women who happen to drive a car are richer than
their male peers. 73 This may be especially true in Russia where the culture of female drivers has been
developing recently. 74 The fact that this gender group forms only 9% of the defendants’ population
speaks in favor of the latter argument (see Table 34). 75 Finally, 𝐷’s who spent more years in education
show higher wealth: the effect of 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝐷 is positive on both samples and even more pronounced in the
𝑁𝑝 case.
Next, we analyze what defines 𝑉 ’s expected vindictiveness ( ̄𝑎) and 𝐷’s disutility of punishment (?̄?).
As we hypothesized before, both 𝑎 and 𝑏 increase in individual wealth: the coefficients in front of 𝑤𝑉
and 𝑤𝐷 are positive, although not always statistically significant. With these effects, we observe (𝑎 < 𝑏)
with probability 1 in all the matches. Specifically, 𝐷’s disutility of punishment exceeds 𝑉 ’s vengeance
benefit. At the same time, the 𝑁𝑎𝑙𝑙 sample features smaller heterogeneity in 𝑎 and 𝑏:
𝑁𝑎𝑙𝑙 ∶ 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 (
|| ̄𝑎𝑖 − ?̄?𝑖 ||
max𝑖 {|| ̄𝑎𝑖 − ?̄?𝑖 ||}
) = .3
𝑁𝑝 ∶ 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 (
|| ̄𝑎𝑖 − ?̄?𝑖 ||
max𝑖 {|| ̄𝑎𝑖 − ?̄?𝑖 ||}
) = .8
The finding is driven by the fact that victims tend to have less wealth than their opponents, and this
shifts the distribution of ̄𝑎 to the left of ?̄?. Moreover, the resource inequality becomes more pronounced
in the 𝑁𝑝 case where cars randomly match with pedestrians. Going back to the analysis of Section 3.2,
for the given distributions of 𝑤𝑉 and 𝑤𝐷 , the defendants always prefer to settle when they have enough
money to make the optimal offer 𝑆.
Given the estimation results for the 𝑁𝑎𝑙𝑙 sample, the relation of 𝑉 to 𝐷 indeed shapes 𝑉 ’s preferences.
In fact, strangers (pedestrians) tend to be 9.6 times more vindictive than close relatives of the defendants.
Excluding 𝑤𝑉 and 𝑤𝐷 from the specifications of ̄𝑎 and ?̄? due to their insignificance, we observe ( ̄𝑎 > ?̄?)
for the two datasets:
𝑁𝑎𝑙𝑙 ∶ min ( ̄𝑎) = 74.87 > 22.75 = ?̄?
𝑁𝑝 ∶ ̄𝑎 = 89.71 > 73.21
73 According to surveys conducted in Russia in 2012, a typical female driver was a top-manager or a young mother with average or
above average income. See https://www.dp.ru/a/2012/03/27/CHislo_zhenshhin_za_rulem_v_R.
74 In 2012, females constituted 24% of Russian drivers, which was 1.7 times more than in 2007. See
https://www.dp.ru/a/2012/03/27/CHislo_zhenshhin_za_rulem_v_R.
75 An alternative explanation of the observed defendants’ gender composition might be the difference in risk preferences for males
and females.
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With probability .92, victims have strong preferences for revenge, and settling with offenders becomes
inefficient. In this case, feasible but not desirable agreements can emerge (see Proposition 5). 76
For both samples, we do not find the evidence that law enforcers and government officials have better
bargaining positions.This can be explained as follows. First, since law enforcers and government officials
constitute a relatively small subgroup (around 1% of victims and 2% of defendants), one should increase
the sample size to capture any systematic patterns these individuals display. Actually, the reduced form
analysis (Subsection 3.3.2) uses all the information available and signals in favor of this argument. An-
other, and potentially more problematic, concern is non-randomness of the sample. The group of law
enforcers and government officials is heterogeneous enough: it includes high-rank individuals, as well
as regular employees who perform minor tasks. The former cohort can use their non-monetary assets
(namely, connections and influence) in order to avoid the investigation stage. As a result, these indi-
viduals do not enter the sample. The original dataset includes around 14’000 records where offenders
are missing. It might be that individuals who managed to close their cases before the investigation had
started enter the given subset. Hence, those law enforcers and government officials whom we observe
may not differ from other defendants much. 77 Similar arguments apply to top-managers who occupy
very high positions. Thus, one must find a way to account for this potential selection bias and adjust
the estimator
Finally, we comment on main determinants of the expected punishment. Not surprisingly, the proba-
bility to get a real sentence increases with the number of dead / seriously injured victims, and the former
contributes the most. The effect of killing or hurting a child on the expected punishment is positive and
significantly higher compared to the case where a female victim dies. At the same time, the probability
to end up in prison decreases if the accident causes only serious bodily injuries for a woman. Hitting a
pedestrian, being drunk, and having criminal or administrative records enlarge the harm and lead to a
stricter punishment.
For the 𝑁𝑎𝑙𝑙 sample, matching with a drunk victim increases the probability to get a real sentence
as well. Given that we consider all criminal traffic offenses, this result has the following interpretation.
If the victim who was driving a car happened to be drunk or intoxicated, the accident is likely to have
severe consequences. As a result, the expected punishment for the offender may rise. Also, here we allow
for non-randommatching between victims and defendants. Then, it becomes probable for drunk drivers
to have intoxicated passengers who get hurt if the accident happens. Hence, observing 𝑑𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑘𝑉 = 1
positively correlates with facing 𝑑𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑘𝐷 = 1, which increases the expected punishment. In case of the
76 Based on simulations, this scenario is not very frequent. For the 𝑁𝑝 sample, feasible but not desirable settlements appear with
probability 1.3e-4 (1e-4) in equilibrium 1 (3).
77 Actually, they can even be in a disadvantaged position and display the behavior similar to low-status individuals.
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𝑁𝑝 sample, 𝑑𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑘𝑉 = 1 reduced 𝐷’s probability to end up in prison. Here, being injured might refer to
𝑉 ’s own fault andmitigate𝐷’s guilt.Thus, focusing on randommatches, we isolate a positive correlation
between 𝑑𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑘𝑉 = 1 and 𝑑𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑘𝐷 = 1.
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Further, we run the goodness-of-fit tests and check whether the model replicates key observed pat-
terns well. Specifically, the following empirical frequencies are matched against their simulated coun-
terparts:
1. 𝐸(𝑃𝑆) – a probability to observe the settlement decision;
2. 𝐸(𝑃𝐶 | 𝑛𝑜 𝑆) – a probability that the case ends up in court given no settlement has happened;
3. 𝐸(𝑃(𝑥∗ = 1) | 𝐶) – a probability that the defendant gets a real sentence if the case has reached the
court stage.
Table 37 reports the statistics for all cases in the 𝑁𝑎𝑙𝑙 sample. The model replicates main stylized facts
well. Also, the Pearson’s 𝜒2 goodness-of-fit test cannot reject the null hypothesis that the simulated
distribution coincides with its empirical counterpart. Then, we divide the dataset into groups based
on victim- and defendant-specific characteristics. In particular, we compute empirical and simulated
moments for individuals from different age and socio-economic cohorts. On top of this, we trace the
defendants who have a criminal history.
Group-specific moments are summarized in Table 41. Generally, the model gets very close to the
empirical frequencies. Also, we do not detect any tendency towards systematic over- or underestimation
of the moments. The worst performance refers to the group of child victims. Here, the model predicts
significantly higher probabilities to settle and face a real sentence than observed in the data. 78 With
regard to defendant-specific characteristics, we underestimate (overestimate) 𝐸(𝑃𝑆) (𝐸(𝑃(𝑥 ∗ = 1) | 𝐶))
for female offenders and college graduates. With all other groups, the model performs quite well.
We repeat the same analysis for the “car vs. pedestrian” sample (Table 43). On average, the model
performs worse than in the 𝑁𝑎𝑙𝑙 case. It replicates the probability to face a real sentence quite well.
However, the model systematically overestimates (underestimates) 𝐸(𝑃𝐶 | 𝑛𝑜 𝑆) (𝐸(𝑃𝑆)), although the
bias is not very big. At the same time, for some groups, such as child victims or defendants with a
criminal record, the model performs better than its 𝑁𝑎𝑙𝑙 counterpart. Overall, increasing the sample size
and controlling for a possible selection bias discussed earlier must improve the predicting power of the
model.
Finally, we use the estimates to evaluate the cost of bargaining (for settled lawsuits) and fighting
(for non-settled cases) the defendants face. As it was mentioned before, the victims do not display high
vengeance benefits when 𝑤𝑉 and 𝑤𝐷 enter the specifications of ̄𝑎 and ?̄? (𝑎 < 𝑏 with probability 1). Then,
the offenders always prefer to settle if they have enough resources to pay the amount of 𝑆 (see Section
78 This pattern disappears once we concentrate on “car vs. pedestrian” matches.
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Table 37: Goodness-of-Fit: All Cases (𝑁𝑎𝑙𝑙 )
Moments 𝐸(𝑃𝑆) 𝐸(𝑃𝐶 | 𝑛𝑜 𝑆) 𝐸(𝑃(𝑥 ∗ = 1) | 𝐶)
Samples Data Sim. Data Sim. Data Sim.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All cases: .168 .160 .451 .435 .406 .444
(1.9e-4) (3.4e-4) (5.1e-4)
Pearson’s 𝜒 2 stat. 8.89
Critical 𝜒 23 (𝛼 = .99) 9.21
Note:
To simulate the model, 1’000 draws from the estimated distributions of 𝑤𝑉 , 𝑤𝐷 , 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑚𝑉 , 𝑚𝐷 , and 𝑥𝑝ℎ are taken. This procedure
is repeated 100 times.
𝐸(𝑃𝑆) denotes an expected probability to settle. 𝐸(𝑃𝐶 | 𝑛𝑜 𝑆) reflects an expected probability to end up in court given no settlement.
𝐸(𝑃(𝑥 = 1 | 𝐶)) defines an expected probability to get a real sentence once the case goes to court. For the data, 𝐸(𝑃𝑆), 𝐸(𝑃𝐶 | 𝑛𝑜 𝑆),
and 𝐸(𝑃(𝑥 = 1 | 𝐶)) correspond to a frequency of observing 𝑠 = 1, 𝑐 = 1, and 𝑥 ∗ = 1, respectively. In case of simulations, the values
are computed based on the estimated distributions. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
3.2). To make players’ payoffs more comparable, we weight the disutility 𝐷 encounters by his monetary
fighting ability, 𝑤𝐷 . Let 𝑝𝑠𝑤 and 𝑝𝑐𝑤 denote 𝐷’s relative payoff when he settles with the victim and ends
up in court, respectively:
𝑝𝑠𝑤 = − 𝑆𝑤𝐷
𝑝𝑐𝑤 = − 𝜋
∗𝐷
𝑤𝐷
where 𝜋 ∗𝐷 defines 𝐷’s equilibrium payoff. Table 38 compares the average values of 𝑝𝑠𝑤 and 𝑝𝑐𝑤 for the
two sample. If the conflicting parties settle, the defendant pays a much lower cost than in the alternative
scenario (–.007 against –810.78 for all cases in the 𝑁𝑝 sample). The effect does not vanish even when we
focus on different types of crime (1 dead pedestrian vs. 1 pedestrian with serious bodily injures). One
can also interpret 𝑝𝑠𝑤 and 𝑝𝑐𝑤 as a punishment the offender faces. Hence, those defendants who did not
manage to settle must suffer significantly more than their peers who committed similar crimes but had
better bargaining positions. On top of resource imbalances, this induces the inequality before the law,
which may constitute an important concern for the society. We discuss this aspect later.
Policy Experiments and the Discussion
Now, we run counterfactual experiments with the estimates obtained for the two samples.The first issue
to address is how the ban of settlements would affect the prison population. To answer this question,
3.3 the empirical analysis 113
Table 38: Expected Relative Payoffs for Defendants in Settled and Non-Settled Cases
Payoff 𝑁𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑁𝑝
Sample Sample
Expected relative payoff –.008 –.007
for settled cases (4.1e-5) (8.9e-5)
(−𝑆/𝑤𝐷 )
with 1 dead pedestrian –.007 –.003
(1.1e-4) (1e-4)
with 1 seriously –.009 –.008
injured pedestrian (5.2e-5) (8.8e-5)
Expected relative payoff –2903.89 –810.78
for non-settled cases (1.327) (.554)
(−𝜋 ∗𝐷 /𝑤𝐷 )
with 1 dead pedestrian –3107.27 –1’102.95
(3.569) (.956)
with 1 seriously –2610.12 –657.54
injured pedestrian (1.958) (.783)
Note:
To simulate the model, 1’000 draws from the estimated distributions of 𝑤𝑉 , 𝑤𝐷 , 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑚𝑉 , 𝑚𝐷 , and 𝑥𝑝ℎ are taken. This procedure
is repeated 100 times. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
we eliminate the settlement stage and assume the game starts from the contest. With probability 𝑃𝐶 ,
the case ends up in court, and the defendant faces the expected punishment 𝑥𝑝ℎ. According to our
assumptions, 𝑥𝑝ℎ turn to be a real sentence (𝑥∗ = 1) if and only if the realization of 𝑥𝑝ℎ exceeds the
threshold 𝑡 :
𝑥∗ = 1 ⇔ 𝑥𝑝ℎ ≥ 𝑡
To identify imprisoned defendants with the two sources of uncertainty (namely, 𝑃𝐶 and 𝑃 (𝑥∗ = 1 | 𝐶)),
we apply the following rule:
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑛 = 1 ⇔ 𝑃𝐶𝑃 (𝑥∗ = 1 | 𝐶) ≥ ̄𝜌
where ̄𝜌 ∈ (0, 1) is a threshold value that can be non-parametrically inferred from the data. In the begin-
ning, we simulate the model for the 𝑁𝑎𝑙𝑙 sample (all criminal traffic offenses). If pre-court agreements
were forbidden, on average, 30% of the previously settled lawsuits (106 observations) would close with
the defendants being imprisoned. 79 This can raise the cost of the society for two reasons. First, solving
all cases in court puts an additional pressure on prosecutors and judges who have limited resources.
Second, increasing the incarceration rate forces the society to redirect more money to the prison sys-
79 In the data, 353 cases (16.84% of all observations) settled.
114 explaining victim-defendant settlements under asymmetric bargaining positions
tem. For instance, Russia paid €2.2 per day for one incarcerated person in 2012. The total budget of the
country’s prison system reached €5.4 billion. 80 With these numbers, the monetary cost of keeping 106
additional individuals in prison for one year would amount to €85’118. 81 If we extrapolate this result
to the full dataset (56’000 cases), the ban of Victim-Defendant settlements could increase the prison
population by 2’856 inmates and cost Russia €2.3 million per year.
Next, consider the case of randomly matched victims and defendants (the 𝑁𝑝 sample). In the data,
172 disputes (16.3% of all observations) are solves out-of-court. The ban of settlements leads to 69 more
defendants going to prison. 82 If all 69 individuals get a 1-year incarceration sentence, the monetary cost
of increasing the prison population reaches €55’407. 83
Another question to investigate is how enlarging 𝐷’s resources (his monetary fighting abilities) influ-
ences the case outcome.The effect is two-fold. More resources available allow the defendant make better
offers and settle with stronger victims (“volume effect”). Also, higher values of𝑤𝐷 drive the amount of 𝑆
down (“price effect”). 84 Overall, a pre-court case resolution becomes easier when 𝐷’s monetary fighting
abilities improve.
Table 39 (44) provides simulation results for the 𝑁𝑎𝑙𝑙 (𝑁𝑝) sample. Here, all case-specific character-
istics, except 𝑤𝐷 , are kept the same. Particularly, a defendant with the given budget 𝑤𝐷 is matched
against the universe of victims from 𝑁𝑎𝑙𝑙 (𝑁𝑝). As one can see, relaxing 𝐷’s resource constraint indeed
allows the defendant to settle more often: 𝐸 (𝑃𝑆) steadily increases with 𝑤𝐷 . The average offer, how-
ever, tends to display an inverse 𝑈 -shape: in the beginning, it grows with 𝑤𝐷 , reaches the maximum
at 𝑤𝐷 = 8´443´750 (𝑤𝐷 = 41´653 in the 𝑁𝑝 case) and then starts decreasing. 85 This pattern has the
following explanation. When 𝐷 has limited resources and his budget constraint relaxes slightly, he can
afford much better offers and improve the settlement probability significantly. Here, the “volume effect”
dominates the “price effect”, and the average settlement offer rises. 86 If 𝐷 holds a sufficient amount of
resources, he is already able to reach an agreement with many victim types. For this reason, improving
𝐷’s monetary fighting ability does not result in a pronounced “volume effect”. However, it triggers the
“price effect” because now the defendant can push the optimal settlement offer down (see Proposition
4 and the discussion on page 129 for more details). Thus, the average amount of 𝑆 declines.
80 The corresponding expenditures for France amounted to €98 per day and €2.4 billion, respectively. See
http://www.rbc.ru/society/11/02/2015/54db24779a794752506f1ebf.
81 The cost is even higher if the sentence exceeds one year.
82 40% of the previously settled cases end up with a real prison term.
83 The calculation is based on €2.2 per day for one incarcerated person.
84 See Proposition 4 and the discussion on page 129 for more details.
85 The pattern is more pronounced in the 𝑁𝑝 case.
86 Settling with mighty victims requires higher offers.
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Table 39: The Effects of Increasing 𝐷’s Wealth: All Cases (𝑁𝑎𝑙𝑙 )
Moments 𝐸(𝑃𝑆) 𝑁𝑆 ̄𝑆
Wealth
𝑤1𝐷 = 13′099 5.8e-3 12 20.6
(2.3e-5) (.05) (.13)
𝑤2𝐷 = 261′991 .1 200 7’187.9
(5.7e-5) (.12) (10.45)
𝑤3𝐷 = 654′979 .15 313 21’883.7
(6.3e-5) (.13) (28.59)
𝑤4𝐷 = 2′043′305 .21 445 67’156.5
(5.3e-5) (.11) (74.08)
𝑤5𝐷 = 3′377′500 .23 485 91’844.8
(4.7e-5) (.1) (120.89)
𝑤6𝐷 = 5′066′250 .24 506 105’570.7
(2.3e-5) (.05) (115.54)
𝑤7𝐷 = 6′755′000 .247 515 107’443
(1.6e-5) (.03) (162.87)
𝑤8𝐷 = 8′443′750 .25 518 102’412.9
(9.2e-5) (.02) (156.02)
Note:
To simulate the model, 1’000 draws from the estimated distributions of 𝑤𝑉 , 𝑤𝐷 , 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑚𝑉 , 𝑚𝐷 , and 𝑥𝑝ℎ are taken. This procedure
is repeated 100 times. 𝑤 𝑖𝐷 , 𝑖 = {1, ..., 8} correspond to rescaled and sorted 0, .5, and 1 quantiles of ?̄? 𝑖𝐷 ’s estimated distribution. ?̄? 𝑖𝐷
is measured in rubles. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
In Section 3.2, we showed that𝑉 and𝐷 can fail to achieve a settlement agreement even if the defendant
has enough resources to make the optimal offer 𝑆. In other words, 𝐷 finds it more attractive to enter the
contest stage because the amount of 𝑆 is sufficiently high. Formally, this requires
⎧
⎨
⎩
𝜋 ∗𝐷 > −𝑆
𝑆 ≤ 𝑤𝐷
(49)
and 𝜋 ∗𝐷 denotes 𝐷’s equilibrium payoff. It was proven that (49) never holds if 𝐷’s resource constraint
binds or 𝑉 ’s winning benefit is not sufficiently high (𝑎 < 𝑏). Otherwise, one can observe the cases where
the settlement is feasible but not desirable. Suppose 𝑤𝑉 and 𝑤𝐷 affect ̄𝑎 and ?̄?, respectively. Given the
distributions of 𝑤𝑉 and 𝑤𝐷 , victims, who tend to have less resources than their opponents, do not
display strong preferences towards revenge, i.e. (𝑎 < 𝑏) with probability 1. 87 As a result, the (𝜋 ∗𝐷 > −𝑆)
condition is never satisfied (see Section 3.2). However, perturbing the distribution of 𝑉 ’s wealth can
reshape individual settlement decisions. 88
87 Here, we refer to the case when the coefficients in front of 𝑤𝑉 and 𝑤𝐷 in the specifications of ̄𝑎 and ?̄? differ from zeros.
88 Alternatively, we could vary the constant term of ̄𝑎 and get the same effect on the players’ behavior.
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In the next experiment, we check how players’ preferences and behavior change when the allocation
of ?̄?𝑉 varies. Table 45 (46) reports the results for the 𝑁𝑎𝑙𝑙 (𝑁𝑝) sample. We fix all case-specific char-
acteristics, except 𝑤𝑉 . Particularly, a victim who holds the given amount of 𝑤𝑉 plays against a set of
potential offenders. First, we compute the expected probability to observe a pre-court case resolution
for each level of 𝑤𝑉 . Then, we identify how often the (𝑎 > 𝑏) profile and feasible but not desirable
settlements appear.
As expected, the increase in 𝑉 ’s wealth drives vindictiveness (𝑎) up, and at some point, players’ pref-
erences start displaying the (𝑎 > 𝑏) pattern. However, to achieve this outcome, 𝑤𝑉 must grow quite a
lot. The probability to settle declines because higher values of 𝑎 improve 𝑉 ’s bargaining position and
drive the amount of 𝑆 up. At the same time, the frequency of feasible but not desirable agreements rises,
although they are difficult to support for the given structure of 𝑚𝑉 and 𝑚𝐷 . Since condition (49) re-
quires specific combinations of players’ preferences and fighting abilities, but only 𝑎 was perturbed, the
latter result is predictable. 89 Overall, one should expect the (𝑎 > 𝑏) pattern to appear more frequently
in disputes where the two parties do not display significant asymmetries in 𝑤𝑉 and 𝑤𝐷 or the distortion
goes in the victim’s favor. 90 This happens to be true for other types of crimes and lawsuits (for example,
civil litigations where opponents face comparable resource constraints).
With all the observations made, one can discuss Victim-Defendant settlements from the social welfare
prospective. Generally, the defendants who can make the offer and want to do so are both richer and
have better connections. This also means that their victims display relatively weak fighting abilities and
enjoy lower expected vengeance benefits. When we look at a particular Victim-Defendant match, the
presence of settlements makes no party worse off in the proposed theoretical setting. 91 However, if the
society has preferences that are more than just a sum of 𝑉 ’s and 𝐷’s utilities, the settlements may be
abandoned. 92
So far, we did not specify the objective the policymaker might aim to achieve. In principle, he can
have equality concerns andwant defendants to face the same relative punishment for a particular type of
crime. 93 Allowing for Victim-Defendant settlements, offenders with better fighting abilities encounter
milder sanctions (Table 38). On top of the income inequality, this generates unfairness in the legal field.
Mighty defendants manage to avoid a real punishment through the settlement channel. Also, their vic-
89 See Section 3.2 for more details.
90 As we explained earlier, in case of criminal traffic offenses the defendants tend to be reacher than their victims. This is especially
true when one focuses on “car vs. pedestrian” accidents.
91 Both 𝑉 and 𝐷 obtain their contest equilibrium payoffs at least.
92 One example comes from incapacitation concerns when the society wants to keep dangerous criminals in prison.
93 For example, see Fiss (1983).
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tims end upwith a lower compensation amount (see Proposition 4).Thus, the introduction of settlements
can undermine equality before the law, and the policymaker may be willing to declare this institute off.
In 2011–2012, Russian government was considering a possibility to forbid Victim-Defendant settle-
ments for criminal traffic offense with at least one death. The argument against the out-of-court case
resolution was exactly the inequality before the law this institute induces. However, the discussion did
not result in any changes of the Criminal code.
Further, we illustrate when Victim-Defendant settlements worsen social welfare in the presence of
fairness concerns. Suppose the policymaker assigns a value 𝜑 to the equality before the law, and his
preferences become:
𝑆𝑊 = 𝜒𝐷
𝑁
∑
𝑖=1
𝑢𝑖𝐷 + 𝜒𝑁
𝑁
∑
𝑖=1
𝑢𝑖𝑉 + 𝜑𝑓 (𝐺𝐷)
where
• 𝜒𝑖 ≥ 0, 𝑖 = {𝐷, 𝑉 } denotes how much player 𝑖’s utility contributes to social welfare;
• 𝐺𝐷 reflects the Gini coefficient computed for the distribution of 𝑢𝑖𝐷 ;
• 𝑁 represents a number of observed criminal traffic offenses.
We assume 𝑓 (𝐺𝐷) = 𝐺𝐷 and 𝜒𝐷 = 𝜒𝑁 = 1, i.e. the policymaker equally cares about both sides of the
conflict. Now, consider how the presence of Victim-Defendant settlements affects different elements
of 𝑆𝑊 . No private information about the victim’s characteristics allows the defendant extract all the
surplus when making a settlement offer. Hence, this player obtains more utility if the out-of-court case
resolution becomes possible, and the victim is never worse off. As Table 38 shows, those defendants
who manage to settle with the opponents face much milder punishment than their peers in non-settled
cases. Thus, the Gini coefficient rises with the introduction of Victim-Defendant agreements.
Let 𝑆𝑊𝑆 (𝑆𝑊𝑁𝑆 ) denote social welfare when the two conflicting parties can (not) settle among them-
selves. Also, define ̄𝜑 as follows: 94
̄𝜑 ∶ 𝑆𝑊𝑆 ( ̄𝜑) = 𝑆𝑊𝑁𝑆 ( ̄𝜑)
In words, 𝜑 reflects social preferences such that the policymaker is indifferent between banning Victim-
Defendant settlements and leaving this practice unchanged. Table 40 reports all elements of 𝑆𝑊 and
94 Since 𝑆𝑊 is linear in 𝜑, the value of 𝜑 must be unique.
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Table 40: Social Welfare with and without Victim-Defendant Settlements
Value All cases No deaths 1 death > 1 deaths
𝑆 𝑁𝑆 𝑆 𝑁𝑆 𝑆 𝑁𝑆 𝑆 𝑁𝑆
All cases (𝑁𝑎𝑙𝑙 )
∑𝑁𝑖=1 𝑢𝑖𝐷 –109.2 –129.4 –59.5 –73.4 –39.9 –45.9 –9.9 –10
∑𝑁𝑖=1 𝑢𝑖𝑉 .265 .139 .107 .019
𝐺𝐷 .472 .369 .483 .366 .441 .354 .361 .347
̄𝜑 –197.3 –136.6 –59.5 –1.1
Car vs. pedestrian (𝑁𝑝)
∑𝑁𝑖=1 𝑢𝑖𝐷 –.649 –.759 –.356 –.435 –.277 –.307 –.017 –.017
∑𝑁𝑖=1 𝑢𝑖𝑉 3.7E–3 2.1E–3 1.6E–3 9.4E–5
𝐺𝐷 .346 .218 .321 .164 .238 .145 .031 .031
̄𝜑 –.851 –.618 –.234 0
Note:
∑𝑁𝑖=1 𝑢𝑖𝐷 ,∑
𝑁
𝑖=1 𝑢𝑖𝑉 and ̄𝜑 are measured in E+10 units. The value of 𝜑 corresponds to 𝑆𝑊𝑆 ( ̄𝜑) = 𝑆𝑊𝑁𝑆 ( ̄𝜑). In the 𝑁𝑝 sample, we donot observe settlements for “More than one death” accidents.
̄𝜑 for two scenarios and various types of criminal traffic offenses. Overall, the introduction of Victim-
Defendant settlements allows the policymaker increase∑𝑁𝑖=1 𝑢𝑖𝐷 by 15.6% (14.5%) for the 𝑁𝑎𝑙𝑙 (𝑁𝑝) sam-
ple. At the same time, the Gini coefficient grows by 27.9% (58.7%) in the 𝑁𝑎𝑙𝑙 (𝑁𝑝) case. The strongest
inequality corresponds to “No deaths” accidents where the harm made is not so high and the conflicting
parties achieve an agreement more often. For any 𝜑 < 𝜑 < 0, the policymaker does not benefit from
Victim-Defendant settlements because the cost of inequality becomes significant. 95 Otherwise, the gain
in defendants’ utility (∑𝑁𝑖=1 𝑢𝑖𝐷) dominates.
In principle, the optimality of Victim-Defendant settlements also depends onweights the policymaker
assigns to∑𝑁𝑖=1 𝑢𝑖𝐷 and∑
𝑁
𝑖=1 𝑢𝑖𝑉 (namely, 𝜒𝐷 and 𝜒𝑁 ). Notice that for 𝜒𝑉 ≥ 𝜒𝐷 = 0 and 𝜑 < 0, the society
will never allow for out-of-court agreements (𝑆𝑊𝑆 < 𝑆𝑊𝑁𝑆 ). Thus, when 𝜒𝐷 is relatively low, Victim-
Defendant settlements will make the policymaker worse off even for ||𝜑|| small enough.
Another argument against Victim-Defendant settlements in the presence of asymmetric bargaining
positions relates to deterrence concerns. If advantaged individuals know that in case of a norm violation
their victims are likely to have worse fighting abilities, the settlement becomes cheaper. Consequently,
they get stronger incentives to break the law than their less advantaged peers. As a result, the settlements
make it more problematic to sustain uniform deterrence across different socio-economic groups.
95 The negative value of 𝜑 can reflect the cost of redistribution associated with growing inequality.
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The deterrence concerns may be less important in case of accidental crimes, such as traffic offenses.
However, they turn to be crucial when one focuses on intentional felonies. Now, offenders can decide
which victim to target. Since individuals with lower income or / and weaker connections are easier
to settle with, they are more likely to become victims. Roughly speaking, the presence of pre-court
agreements in the criminal law may create a “market” for potential victims. This argument can also
convince the policymaker against the given institution.
3.4 conclusion
Most states use Victim-Defendant settlements to solve civil and criminal conflicts. This paper explores
how bargaining positions of the parties involved (namely, their preferences, non-monetary fighting
abilities and resource constraints) define the case outcome. Also, we discuss the effect Victim-Defendant
settlements may have on social welfare. With this approach, the previous work devoted to out-of-court
case resolution connects to the literature that focuses on resource imbalances and the inequality before
the law.
We construct a stylized theoretical model where two individuals with conflicting interests, the victim
and the defendant, must exert effort in order to achieve / avert the court stage. The defendant has an
option to settle with the victim before the fight starts, and the optimal offer decreases in his bargaining
position. Reaching the agreement is always efficient when the defendant encounters sufficiently high
winning benefits. If the victim displays strong preferences for revenge, but the opponent has better
fighting abilities, the latter player is willing to enter the contest stage. Hence, even feasible settlements
can fail to happen.
To estimate themodel, we employ the data on criminal traffic offenses in Russia and restore bargaining
positions of the conflicting parties. Our theoretical framework successfully replicates the observed case
outcomes where the key states are “settled”, “in court”, and “in court & real sentence”. On average,
defendants have 10 times more resources to expend than victims. At the same time, winning benefits of
both parties increase in their wealth. Victims who happen to be close relatives of their offenders have
weaker preferences for revenge. Finally, to capture the difference in non-monetary fighting abilities, the
estimator needs to be adjusted for non-random selection of law enforcers and government officials into
the sample.
Settling with the opponent results in much lower disutility than going to court. Hence, on top of
resource imbalances, Victim-Defendant settlements increase the inequality before the law, which may
go against the interests of the society. Our counterfactual experiments show that forbidding Victim-
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Defendant settlements would add more than 2’850 prisoners and cost Russia €2.3 million per year. Also,
the frequency of feasible but not desirable agreements rises when we change the wealth distribution for
both conflicting parties and victims obtain a pronounced resource advantage.
Although we focused on criminal traffic offenses, the model and the estimation approach proposed in
the paper turn to be very general. To push the analysis further, one must specify the objective function
of the society and concentrate on the optimal design of the justice system. The criterion may include
deterrence and incapacitation concerns, as well as equality considerations. Without this step, it is im-
possible to give a precise answer when Victim-Defendant settlements must be abandoned, and we leave
it for the future.
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3.a proofs
Proposition 2.The equilibrium of the contest stage exists and is unique.
Proof. First, consider the unconstrained versions of players’ problems.96 First-order conditions look as
follows:
𝑉 ∶ 𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ 𝑒𝐷(𝑒𝐷+𝑒𝑉 )2 −𝑚𝑉 = 0
𝐷 ∶ 𝑏𝑥𝑝ℎ 𝑒𝑉(𝑒𝐷+𝑒𝑉 )2 −𝑚𝐷 = 0
Notice that second-order derivatives of 𝜋𝐷 (⋅) and 𝜋𝑉 (⋅) are always negative, and any 𝑒𝑉 and 𝑒𝐷 that
satisfy first-order conditions correspond to an interior maximum. Solving the system of FOCs delivers
𝑒∗𝑉 = 𝑥𝑝
ℎ𝑎2𝑚𝐷𝑏
(𝑎𝑚𝐷+𝑏𝑚𝑉 )2
, 𝑒∗𝐷 = 𝑥𝑝
ℎ𝑏2𝑚𝑉 𝑎
(𝑎𝑚𝐷+𝑏𝑚𝑉 )2
𝜋 ∗𝑉 = 𝑎𝑚𝐷 𝑎
2𝑚𝐷𝑥𝑝ℎ
(𝑎𝑚𝐷+𝑏𝑚𝑉 )2
𝜋 ∗𝐷 = − 𝑎𝑚𝐷𝑏𝑥𝑝
ℎ
(𝑎𝑚𝐷+𝑏𝑚𝑉 )2
(𝑎𝑚𝐷 + 2𝑏𝑚𝑉 )
where asterisks denote equilibrium effort levels and expected payoffs. By construction, this equilibrium
is unique and features pure strategies. Now, bring budget constraints back and write down complete
first-order conditions:
𝑉 ∶ 𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ 𝑒𝐷(𝑒𝐷+𝑒𝑉 )2 −𝑚𝑉 − 𝜆𝑉𝑚𝑉 + 𝜂𝑉 = 0
𝐷 ∶ 𝑏𝑥𝑝ℎ 𝑒𝑉(𝑒𝐷+𝑒𝑉 )2 −𝑚𝐷 − 𝜆𝐷𝑚𝐷 + 𝜂𝐷 = 0
Here, 𝜆𝑖 ≥ 0 and 𝜂𝑖 ≥ 0, 𝑖 = {𝑉 , 𝐷} are Lagrangemultipliers corresponding to {𝑤𝑖 −𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑖 ≥ 0} and {𝑒𝑖 ≥ 0},
respectively. The solution of the unconstrained problem, 𝑒∗𝑉 and 𝑒∗𝐷 , is feasible if and only if
⎧
⎨
⎩
𝑤𝑉 ≥ 𝑚𝑉 𝑥𝑝
ℎ𝑎2𝑚𝐷𝑏
(𝑎𝑚𝐷+𝑏𝑚𝑉 )2
𝑤𝐷 ≥ 𝑚𝐷 𝑥𝑝
ℎ𝑏2𝑚𝑉 𝑎
(𝑎𝑚𝐷+𝑏𝑚𝑉 )2
(50)
and this can be supported with 𝜆𝑖 = 𝜂𝑖 = 0, 𝑖 = {𝑉 , 𝐷}. Hence, as long as condition (50) holds, the
equilibrium of the contest stage coincides with the one of the unconstraint problem.
96 This case is well-studies in the contest literature. With the given specification of the Tullock contest success function, the solution
is interior and unique.
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Next, we analyze all the cases when at least one budget constraint becomes active.
1. 𝑒∗𝐷 is not feasible, and 𝐷’s budget constraint can bind:
⎧
⎨
⎩
𝑤𝑉 ≥ 𝑚𝑉 𝑥𝑝
ℎ𝑎2𝑚𝐷𝑏
(𝑎𝑚𝐷+𝑏𝑚𝑉 )2
𝑤𝐷 < 𝑚𝐷 𝑥𝑝
ℎ𝑏2𝑚𝑉 𝑎
(𝑎𝑚𝐷+𝑏𝑚𝑉 )2
(51)
Now, 𝐷’s optimization program has a corner solution, and his strategy space reduces to 𝑒𝐷 =
{0, 𝑤𝐷𝑚𝐷 }. Suppose in equilibrium 𝐷 plays 𝑒𝐷 =
𝑤𝐷
𝑚𝐷
, the highest effort available. Next, assume 𝑉 ’s
best reply to ̂𝑒𝐷 = 𝑤𝐷𝑚𝐷 solves her first-order condition. Then:
̂𝑒𝑉 = √
𝑤𝐷𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ
𝑚𝐷𝑚𝑉
− 𝑤𝐷𝑚𝐷 , ̂𝑒𝐷 =
𝑤𝐷
𝑚𝐷
𝜆𝐷 = 𝑏𝑥𝑝
ℎ
𝑚𝐷
̂𝑒𝑉
( ̂𝑒𝑉 + ̂𝑒𝐷)2
− 1, 𝜂𝐷 = 0
?̂?𝑉 = 𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ − 2√
𝑤𝐷𝑚𝑉 𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ
𝑚𝐷
+ 𝑚𝑉𝑤𝐷𝑚𝐷
?̂?𝐷 = −𝑏𝑥𝑝ℎ +√
𝑤𝐷𝑚𝑉 𝑥𝑝ℎ
𝑚𝐷𝑎
𝑏 − 𝑤𝐷
When condition (51) holds:
• 𝜆𝐷 > 0 and
• ̂𝑒𝑉 is positive and feasible (𝑚𝑉 ̂𝑒𝑉 ≤ 𝑤𝑉 ), i.e. 𝜆𝑉 = 𝜂𝑉 = 0.
Since 𝜋𝑉 (⋅) displays strict concavity, ̂𝑒𝑉 corresponds to an interior maximum of 𝑉 ’s program. If
𝐷 chooses 𝑒𝐷 = 0, his equilibrium payoff reaches 𝜋𝐷 (0, 0) = −𝑏𝑥𝑝ℎ, and ?̂?𝐷 > 𝜋𝐷 (0, 0) under
condition (51).97 Thus, 𝑒𝐷 = 𝑤𝐷𝑚𝐷 strictly dominates 𝑒𝐷 = 0, and ( ̂𝑒𝑉 , ̂𝑒𝐷) constitutes a unique pure
strategy equilibrium of the contest stage when 𝐷’s budget constraint binds.
2. 𝑒∗𝑉 is not feasible, and 𝑉 ’s budget constraint can bind:
⎧
⎨
⎩
𝑤𝑉 < 𝑚𝑉 𝑥𝑝
ℎ𝑎2𝑚𝐷𝑏
(𝑎𝑚𝐷+𝑏𝑚𝑉 )2
𝑤𝐷 ≥ 𝑚𝐷 𝑥𝑝
ℎ𝑏2𝑚𝑉 𝑎
(𝑎𝑚𝐷+𝑏𝑚𝑉 )2
(52)
The analysis employs all the arguments developed in point 1. 𝑉 has two options to choose: 𝑒𝑉 =
𝑤𝑉
𝑚𝑉
and 𝑒𝑉 = 0. Assume in equilibrium 𝑉 plays 𝑒𝑉 = 𝑤𝑉𝑚𝑉 , and 𝐷’s best reply comes from his
first-order condition:
97 Also, the case of 𝜆𝐷 = 0, 𝜂𝐷 > 0 does not deliver well-defined Lagrange multipliers and results in a contradiction.
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̂𝑒𝑉 = 𝑤𝑉𝑚𝑉 , ̂𝑒𝐷 = √
𝑤𝑉 𝑏𝑥𝑝ℎ
𝑚𝐷𝑚𝑉
− 𝑤𝑉𝑚𝑉
𝜆𝑉 = 𝑎𝑥𝑝
ℎ
𝑚𝑉
̂𝑒𝐷
( ̂𝑒𝑉 + ̂𝑒𝐷)2
− 1, 𝜂𝑉 = 0
?̂?𝑉 = √
𝑤𝑉𝑚𝐷𝑥𝑝ℎ
𝑚𝑉 𝑏
𝑎 − 𝑤𝑉
?̂?𝐷 = −2√
𝑤𝑉𝑚𝐷𝑏𝑥𝑝ℎ
𝑚𝑉
+ 𝑚𝐷𝑤𝑉𝑚𝑉
where 𝜆𝑉 > 0, ̂𝑒𝐷 maximizes 𝜋𝐷 (⋅) and satisfies 𝐷’s budget constraint under condition (52). It is
easy to show that 𝜋𝑉 (0, 𝑒𝐷) < ?̂?𝑉 and 𝑒𝑉 = 𝑤𝑉𝑚𝑉 strictly dominates 𝑒𝑉 = 0. Hence, ( ̂𝑒𝑉 , ̂𝑒𝐷) is a
unique pure strategy equilibrium of the contest game.
3. Neither 𝑒∗𝑉 nor 𝑒∗𝐷 are feasible, and budget constraints of both players can bind:
⎧
⎨
⎩
𝑤𝑉 < 𝑚𝑉 𝑥𝑝
ℎ𝑎2𝑚𝐷𝑏
(𝑎𝑚𝐷+𝑏𝑚𝑉 )2
𝑤𝐷 < 𝑚𝐷 𝑥𝑝
ℎ𝑏2𝑚𝑉 𝑎
(𝑎𝑚𝐷+𝑏𝑚𝑉 )2
(53)
In this case, the contestants can no longer afford the solution of the unconstrained program. Play-
ers can exert either zero effort or expend all resources available, i.e. 𝑒𝑖 = {0, 𝑤𝑖𝑚𝑖 }, 𝑖 = {𝑉 , 𝐷}. The
first-order conditions of contestants’ programs do not behave well if 𝑒𝑉 = 0 or / and 𝑒𝐷 = 0.98 For
this reason, we work with the payoff matrix directly:
𝐷
𝑉
𝑒𝑉 = 0 𝑒𝑉 = 𝑤𝑉𝑚𝑉
𝑒𝐷 = 0 (−𝑏𝑥𝑝ℎ, 𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ) (−𝑏𝑥𝑝ℎ, 𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ − 𝑤𝑉 )
𝑒𝐷 = 𝑤𝐷𝑚𝐷 (−𝑤𝐷 , 0) (−𝑏𝑥𝑝
ℎ𝑃𝐶 (𝑤𝑉𝑚𝑉 ,
𝑤𝐷
𝑚𝐷
) − 𝑤𝐷 , 𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ𝑃𝐶 (𝑤𝑉𝑚𝑉 ,
𝑤𝐷
𝑚𝐷
) − 𝑤𝑉 )
If 𝐷 chooses {𝑒𝐷 = 0}, 𝑉 responds with {𝑒𝑉 = 0} as well. When 𝑉 plays {𝑒𝑉 = 0}, 𝐷 is better off
exerting {𝑒𝐷 = 𝑤𝐷𝑚𝐷 }. Best replies to {𝑒𝐷 =
𝑤𝐷
𝑚𝐷
} and {𝑒𝑉 = 𝑤𝑉𝑚𝑉 } depend on 𝑤𝐷 and 𝑤𝑉 :
• 𝑤𝑉 < 𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ − 𝑚𝑉𝑚𝐷 𝑤𝐷 ⇒𝑉 prefers {𝑒𝑉 =
𝑤𝑉
𝑚𝑉
} to {𝑒𝑉 = 0} when 𝐷 plays {𝑒𝐷 = 𝑤𝐷𝑚𝐷 }
• 𝑤𝑉 < 𝑚𝑉𝑚𝐷 (𝑏𝑥𝑝
ℎ − 𝑤𝐷) ⇒ 𝐷 prefers {𝑒𝐷 = 𝑤𝐷𝑚𝐷 } to {𝑒𝐷 = 0} when 𝑉 plays {𝑒𝑉 =
𝑤𝑉
𝑚𝑉
}
Now, we show that (53) implies𝑤𝑉 < min {𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ, 𝑚𝑉𝑚𝐷 𝑏𝑥𝑝
ℎ} − 𝑚𝑉𝑚𝐷 𝑤𝐷 . Suppose𝑤𝑉 ≥ 𝑎𝑥𝑝
ℎ − 𝑚𝑉𝑚𝐷 𝑤𝐷
is compatible with (53). Then, the following set must be non-empty:
[𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ − 𝑚𝑉𝑚𝐷
𝑤𝐷 , 𝑚𝑉
𝑥𝑝ℎ𝑎2𝑚𝐷𝑏
(𝑎𝑚𝐷 + 𝑏𝑚𝑉 )
2) ≠ Ø ⇔ 𝑤𝐷 > 𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ
𝑚𝐷
𝑚𝑉
− 𝑥𝑝
ℎ𝑎2𝑚2𝐷𝑏
(𝑎𝑚𝐷 + 𝑏𝑚𝑉 )
2 (54)
98 When 𝑒𝑉 = 0 or / and 𝑒𝐷 = 0, there do not exist well-defined Lagrange multipliers that can support an interior solution.
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Also, condition (54) defines a non-empty intersection with (53) if and only if
𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ𝑚𝐷𝑚𝑉
− 𝑥𝑝
ℎ𝑎2𝑚2𝐷𝑏
(𝑎𝑚𝐷 + 𝑏𝑚𝑉 )
2 < 𝑚𝐷
𝑥𝑝ℎ𝑏2𝑚𝑉 𝑎
(𝑎𝑚𝐷 + 𝑏𝑚𝑉 )
2 ⇔ 𝑎𝑚𝐷 (𝑎𝑚𝐷 + 𝑏𝑚𝑉 ) < 0 (55)
where the latter results in a contradiction. Hence, 𝑤𝑉 ≥ 𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ − 𝑚𝑉𝑚𝐷 𝑤𝐷 never combines with (53),
and (53) must imply𝑤𝑉 < 𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ − 𝑚𝑉𝑚𝐷 𝑤𝐷 . Similarly, one can prove that𝑤𝑉 ≥
𝑚𝑉
𝑚𝐷
(𝑏𝑥𝑝ℎ − 𝑤𝐷) and
(53) are disjoint. Thus, under condition (53), 𝐷 must have a dominant strategy {𝑒𝐷 = 𝑤𝐷𝑚𝐷 }. Then,
the unique equilibrium is
̂𝑒𝑉 = 𝑤𝑉𝑚𝑉 , ̂𝑒𝐷 =
𝑤𝐷
𝑚𝐷
𝜆𝑉 = 𝑎𝑥𝑝
ℎ
𝑚𝑉
̂𝑒𝐷
( ̂𝑒𝑉 + ̂𝑒𝐷)2
− 1, 𝜆𝐷 = 𝑏𝑥𝑝
ℎ
𝑚𝐷
̂𝑒𝑉
( ̂𝑒𝑉 + ̂𝑒𝐷)2
− 1
𝜂𝑉 = 𝜂𝐷 = 0
?̂?𝑉 = 𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ𝑃𝐶 (𝑤𝑉𝑚𝑉 ,
𝑤𝐷
𝑚𝐷
) − 𝑤𝑉
?̂?𝐷 = −𝑏𝑥𝑝ℎ𝑃𝐶 (𝑤𝑉𝑚𝑉 ,
𝑤𝐷
𝑚𝐷
) − 𝑤𝐷
Under all conditions imposed on contestants’ resources, 𝜆𝑉 and 𝜆𝐷 are strictly positive and sup-
port an interior solution.
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Proposition 3. Contestants’ equilibrium effort, 𝑒∗𝑖 , 𝑖 = {𝑉 , 𝐷} always increases in his / her valuation of
punishment and 𝑤𝑖 , decreases in 𝑚𝑖 :
𝜕𝑒∗𝑉
𝜕𝑎 ≥ 0,
𝜕𝑒∗𝐷
𝜕𝑏 ≥ 0,
𝜕𝑒∗𝑖
𝜕𝑤𝑖
≥ 0, 𝜕𝑒
∗𝑖
𝜕𝑚𝑖
≤ 0, 𝑖 = {𝑉 , 𝐷}
For 𝑎𝑚𝑉 ≥
𝑏
𝑚𝐷
1. 𝑒∗𝑉 increases in 𝑏 and 𝑒∗𝐷 decreases in 𝑎
2. 𝑒∗𝑉 decreases in 𝑚𝐷 and increases in 𝑤𝐷
3. 𝑒∗𝐷 increases in 𝑚𝑉 and decreases in 𝑤𝑉 if and only if 𝑤𝑉 ≥ 𝑏𝑥𝑝
ℎ𝑚𝑉
4𝑚𝐷
> 0. Otherwise, 𝑒∗𝐷 strictly
decreases in 𝑚𝑉 and strictly increases in 𝑤𝑉
For 𝑎𝑚𝑉 <
𝑏
𝑚𝐷
1. 𝑒∗𝑉 strictly decreases in 𝑏 and 𝑒∗𝐷 strictly increases in 𝑎
2. 𝑒∗𝑉 increases in 𝑚𝐷 and decreases in 𝑤𝐷 if and only if 𝑤𝐷 ≥ 𝑎𝑥𝑝
ℎ𝑚𝐷
4𝑚𝑉
> 0. Otherwise, 𝑒∗𝑉 strictly
decreases in 𝑚𝐷 and strictly increases in 𝑤𝐷
3. 𝑒∗𝐷 strictly decreases in 𝑚𝑉 and strictly increases in 𝑤𝑉
Proof. To show how contestants’ effort choice depends on their fighting abilities and preferences, we
inspect all possible equilibrium outcomes. First, check how 𝑒∗𝐷 and 𝑒∗𝑉 change with 𝑏 and 𝑎, respectively:
𝑈𝐶 ∶ 𝜕𝑒
∗𝑉
𝜕𝑎 =
2𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ𝑏2𝑚𝐷𝑚𝑉
(𝑎𝑚𝐷+𝑏𝑚𝑉 )3
> 0, 𝜕𝑒
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑏 =
2𝑏𝑥𝑝ℎ𝑎2𝑚𝐷𝑚𝑉
(𝑎𝑚𝐷+𝑏𝑚𝑉 )3
> 0
𝐵𝐶𝐷 ∶ 𝜕𝑒
∗𝑉
𝜕𝑎 =
1
2√
𝑤𝐷𝑥𝑝ℎ
𝑎𝑚𝐷𝑚𝑉
> 0, 𝜕𝑒
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑏 = 0
𝐵𝐶𝑉 ∶ 𝜕𝑒
∗𝑉
𝜕𝑎 = 0,
𝜕𝑒∗𝐷
𝜕𝑏 =
1
2√
𝑤𝑉 𝑥𝑝ℎ
𝑏𝑚𝐷𝑚𝑉
> 0
𝐵𝐶𝑉𝐷 ∶ 𝜕𝑒
∗𝑉
𝜕𝑎 =
𝜕𝑒∗𝐷
𝜕𝑏 = 0
where 𝑈𝐶 denotes the unconstrained problem; 𝐵𝐶𝐷 (𝐵𝐶𝑉 ) defines the situation when 𝐷’s (𝑉 ’s) budget
constraint binds; in case of 𝐵𝐶𝑉𝐷 the solution of 𝑈𝐶 is no longer feasible for both contestants. Hence,
players’ equilibrium effort never decreases in their valuations punishment, i.e. 𝜕𝑒
∗𝑉
𝜕𝑎 ≥ 0,
𝜕𝑒∗𝐷
𝜕𝑏 ≥ 0.
Second, we investigate the effect of 𝑚𝑖 on 𝑒∗𝑖 and 𝑒∗𝑗 , 𝑖, 𝑗 = {𝑉 , 𝐷}, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗:
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𝑈𝐶 ∶ 𝜕𝑒
∗𝑉
𝜕𝑚𝑉
= − 2𝑎
2𝑥𝑝ℎ𝑏2𝑚𝐷
(𝑎𝑚𝐷+𝑏𝑚𝑉 )3
< 0, 𝜕𝑒
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑚𝐷
= − 2𝑏
2𝑥𝑝ℎ𝑎2𝑚𝑉
(𝑎𝑚𝐷+𝑏𝑚𝑉 )3
< 0
𝜕𝑒∗𝑉
𝜕𝑚𝐷
= − 𝑎
2𝑥𝑝ℎ𝑏(𝑎𝑚𝐷−𝑏𝑚𝑉 )
(𝑎𝑚𝐷+𝑏𝑚𝑉 )3
, 𝜕𝑒
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑚𝑉
= 𝑏
2𝑥𝑝ℎ𝑎(𝑎𝑚𝐷−𝑏𝑚𝑉 )
(𝑎𝑚𝐷+𝑏𝑚𝑉 )3
𝐵𝐶𝐷 ∶ 𝜕𝑒
∗𝑉
𝜕𝑚𝑉
= − 12𝑚𝑉 √
𝑤𝐷𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ
𝑚𝐷𝑚𝑉
< 0, 𝜕𝑒
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑚𝐷
= −𝑤𝐷𝑚2𝐷 < 0
𝜕𝑒∗𝑉
𝜕𝑚𝐷
= − 12𝑚𝐷√
𝑤𝐷𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ
𝑚𝐷𝑚𝑉
+ 𝑤𝐷𝑚2𝐷 ,
𝜕𝑒∗𝐷
𝜕𝑚𝐷
= 0
𝐵𝐶𝑉 ∶ 𝜕𝑒
∗𝑉
𝜕𝑚𝑉
= < 0, 𝜕𝑒
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑚𝐷
= − 12𝑚𝐷√
𝑤𝑉 𝑏𝑥𝑝ℎ
𝑚𝐷𝑚𝑉
< 0
𝜕𝑒∗𝑉
𝜕𝑚𝐷
= 0, 𝜕𝑒
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑚𝑉
= − 12𝑚𝑉 √
𝑤𝑉 𝑏𝑥𝑝ℎ
𝑚𝐷𝑚𝑉
+ 𝑤𝑉𝑚2𝐷
𝐵𝐶𝑉𝐷 ∶ 𝜕𝑒
∗𝑉
𝜕𝑚𝑉
= −𝑤𝑉𝑚2𝑉 ,
𝜕𝑒∗𝐷
𝜕𝑚𝐷
= −𝑤𝐷𝑚2𝐷
𝜕𝑒∗𝑉
𝜕𝑚𝐷
= 𝜕𝑒
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑚𝑉
= 0
Contestants’ equilibrium effort 𝑒∗𝑖 increases in 𝑚𝑖 for any preference profile. The effect of 𝑚𝑗 on 𝑒∗𝑖 ,
𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 is ambiguous. Take the 𝑈𝐶 case. If 𝑎𝑚𝑉 ≥
𝑏
𝑚𝐷
, it must be 𝜕𝑒
∗𝑉
𝜕𝑚𝐷
≤ 0, 𝜕𝑒
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑚𝑉
≥ 0, and the opposite holds
for 𝑎𝑚𝑉 <
𝑏
𝑚𝐷
. Next, consider the 𝐵𝐶𝐷 scenario, which also requires condition (51) from the proof of
Proposition 1. The derivative 𝜕𝑒
∗𝑉
𝜕𝑚𝐷
is non-negative if and only if
𝜕𝑒∗𝑉
𝜕𝑚𝐷
≥ 0 ⇔ 𝑤𝐷 ≥
𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ𝑚𝐷
4𝑚𝑉
(56)
Otherwise, 𝜕𝑒
∗𝑉
𝜕𝑚𝐷
< 0 holds. The inequality (56) defines a non-empty intersection with (51) if and only if
𝑎
𝑚𝑉
< 𝑏𝑚𝐷 . Otherwise, 𝑒
∗𝑉 decreases in 𝑚𝐷 . In the 𝐵𝐶𝑉 case, 𝑒∗𝐷 (weakly) increases in 𝑚𝑉 if and only if
𝜕𝑒∗𝐷
𝜕𝑚𝑉
≥ 0 ⇔ 𝑤𝑉 ≥
𝑏𝑥𝑝ℎ𝑚𝑉
4𝑚𝐷
(57)
Condition (52) supports the 𝐵𝐶𝑉 scenario. It has a non-empty intersection with (57) if and only if
𝑎
𝑚𝑉
≥ 𝑏𝑚𝐷 . Combining the results obtained for different equilibrium outcomes and “preferences–fighting
abilities” profiles, we get the effects of 𝑚𝑖 on 𝑒∗𝑖 and 𝑒∗𝑗 , 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 as stated in the proposition.
Finally, compute the derivatives of 𝑒∗𝑖 with respect to 𝑤𝑖 and 𝑤𝑗 , 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗:
𝑈𝐶 ∶ 𝜕𝑒
∗𝑖
𝜕𝑤𝑖
= 𝜕𝑒
∗𝑖
𝜕𝑤𝑗
= 0, 𝑖, 𝑗 = {𝑉 , 𝐷} , 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗
𝐵𝐶𝐷 ∶ 𝜕𝑒
∗𝑉
𝜕𝑤𝑉
= 0, 𝜕𝑒
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑤𝐷
= 1𝑚𝐷 > 0
𝜕𝑒∗𝑉
𝜕𝑤𝐷
= 12√
𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ
𝑚𝐷𝑚𝑉𝑤𝐷
− 1𝑚𝐷 ,
𝜕𝑒∗𝐷
𝜕𝑤𝑉
= 0
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𝐵𝐶𝑉 ∶ 𝜕𝑒
∗𝑉
𝜕𝑤𝑉
= 1𝑚𝑉 > 0,
𝜕𝑒∗𝐷
𝜕𝑤𝐷
= 0
𝜕𝑒∗𝑉
𝜕𝑤𝐷
= 0, 𝜕𝑒
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑤𝑉
= 12√
𝑏𝑥𝑝ℎ
𝑚𝐷𝑚𝑉𝑤𝑉
− 1𝑚𝑉
𝐵𝐶𝑉𝐷 ∶ 𝜕𝑒
∗𝑉
𝜕𝑤𝑉
= 1𝑤𝑉 ,
𝜕𝑒∗𝐷
𝜕𝑤𝐷
= 1𝑤𝐷
𝜕𝑒∗𝑉
𝜕𝑤𝐷
= 𝜕𝑒
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑤𝑉
= 0
The 𝑈𝐶 equilibrium effort levels display no response to 𝑤𝑉 and 𝑤𝐷 because the constraints do not bite.
Look at the 𝐵𝐶𝐷 case. 𝑉 ’s equilibrium effort strictly increases in 𝑤𝐷 if and only if
𝜕𝑒∗𝑉
𝜕𝑤𝐷
> 0 ⇔ 𝑤𝐷 <
𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ𝑚𝐷
4𝑚𝑉
(58)
When 𝑎𝑚𝑉 ≥
𝑏
𝑚𝐷
, condition (51) implies (58), and 𝑒∗𝑉 always increases in 𝑤𝐷 under the 𝐵𝐶𝐷 scenario.
Otherwise, 𝜕𝑒
∗𝑉
𝜕𝑤𝐷
≤ 0 holds for any 𝑤𝐷 ≥ 𝑎𝑥𝑝
ℎ𝑚𝐷
4𝑚𝑉
. Next, turn to the 𝐵𝐶𝑉 case. The effort 𝐷 exerts in
equilibrium strictly increases in 𝑤𝑉 if and only if
𝜕𝑒∗𝐷
𝜕𝑤𝑉
> 0 ⇔ 𝑤𝑉 <
𝑏𝑥𝑝ℎ𝑚𝑉
4𝑚𝐷
(59)
and this is always satisfied for 𝑎𝑚𝑉 <
𝑏
𝑚𝐷
in the 𝐵𝐶𝑉 scenario. If 𝑎𝑚𝑉 ≥
𝑏
𝑚𝐷
, we observe 𝜕𝑒
∗𝐷
𝜕𝑤𝑉
≤ 0 for any
𝑤𝑉 ≥ 𝑏𝑥𝑝
ℎ𝑚𝑉
4𝑚𝐷
. Putting things together, the effect of 𝑤𝑖 and 𝑤𝑗 on 𝑒∗𝑖 , 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 follows.
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Proposition 4.The optimal settlement offer 𝑆 always decreases (increases) in 𝐷’s (𝑉 ’s) willingness to win
𝑏 (𝑎) and his fighting abilities. 𝑆 always increases in 𝑉 ’s non-monetary fighting ability. 𝑆 increases in 𝑤𝑉
if and only if 𝑤𝑉 is sufficiently small (𝑤𝑉 ∈ [0, ?̃?𝑉 ], ?̃?𝑉 > 0).
Proof. To prove the claim, recall Lemma 1, which states that the optimal settlement offer 𝑆 equals to 𝑉 ’s
equilibrium payoff 𝜋 ∗𝑉 . Hence, 𝜋 ∗𝑉 ’s comparative statics coincide with those of 𝑆. Consider all possible
equilibrium outcomes. First, take the case when contestants’ budget constraints do not bind and 𝑉 ’s
equilibrium payoff reaches
𝜋 ∗𝑉 = 𝑎𝑚𝐷
𝑎2𝑚𝐷𝑥𝑝ℎ
(𝑎𝑚𝐷 + 𝑏𝑚𝑉 )
2
𝜋 ∗𝑉 ≡ 𝑆 responds to changes in players’ willingness to win and fighting abilities as follows:
𝜕𝜋 ∗𝑉
𝜕𝑎 =
𝑎2𝑚𝐷𝑥𝑝ℎ
(𝑎𝑚𝐷+𝑏𝑚𝑉 )3
(𝑎𝑚𝐷 + 3𝑏𝑚𝑉 ) > 0, 𝜕𝜋
∗𝑉
𝜕𝑏 = −
2𝑎3𝑚2𝐷𝑚𝑉 𝑥𝑝ℎ
(𝑎𝑚𝐷+𝑏𝑚𝑉 )3
< 0
𝜕𝜋 ∗𝑉
𝜕𝑚𝑉
= − 2𝑎
3𝑚2𝐷𝑏𝑥𝑝ℎ
(𝑎𝑚𝐷+𝑏𝑚𝑉 )3
< 0, 𝜕𝜋
∗𝑉
𝜕𝑚𝐷
= 2𝑎
3𝑚𝐷𝑚𝑉 𝑏𝑥𝑝ℎ
(𝑎𝑚𝐷+𝑏𝑚𝑉 )3
> 0
𝜕𝜋 ∗𝑉
𝜕𝑤𝑉
= 𝜕𝜋
∗𝑉
𝜕𝑤𝐷
= 0
where non-binding budget constraints imply no effect of 𝑤𝑖 , 𝑖 = {𝑉 , 𝐷} on 𝜋 ∗𝑉 .
Next, we investigate the equilibrium where 𝐷 plays 𝑒𝐷 = 𝑤𝐷𝑚𝐷 and 𝑉 ’s best reply comes from her
first-order condition:
𝜋 ∗𝑉 = 𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ − 2√
𝑤𝐷𝑚𝑉 𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ
𝑚𝐷
+ 𝑚𝑉𝑤𝐷𝑚𝐷
𝜕𝜋 ∗𝑉
𝜕𝑎 = 𝑥𝑝
ℎ −√
𝑤𝐷𝑚𝑉 𝑥𝑝ℎ
𝑎𝑚𝐷
, 𝜕𝜋
∗𝑉
𝜕𝑏 = 0
𝜕𝜋 ∗𝑉
𝜕𝑚𝑉
= 𝑤𝐷𝑚𝐷 −√
𝑤𝐷𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ
𝑚𝐷𝑚𝑉
, 𝜕𝜋
∗𝑉
𝜕𝑚𝐷
= −𝑚𝑉𝑤𝐷𝑚2𝐷 +
1
𝑚𝐷√
𝑤𝐷𝑚𝑉 𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ
𝑚𝐷
𝜕𝜋 ∗𝑉
𝜕𝑤𝑉
= 0, 𝜕𝜋
∗𝑉
𝜕𝑤𝐷
= 𝑚𝑉𝑚𝐷 −√
𝑚𝑉 𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ
𝑚𝐷𝑤𝐷
and the signs of these derivatives are defined by
𝑤𝐷 <
𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ𝑚𝐷
𝑚𝑉
(60)
The given equilibrium outcomes requires condition (51) from the proof of Proposition 2, and (51) implies
(60). Hence, the effects of 𝑎, 𝑚𝑉 , 𝑚𝐷 , and 𝑤𝐷 on 𝜋 ∗𝑉 become unambiguous:𝜕𝜋 ∗𝑉
𝜕𝑎 > 0,
𝜕𝜋 ∗𝑉
𝜕𝑚𝑉
< 0, 𝜕𝜋
∗𝑉
𝜕𝑚𝐷
> 0, 𝜕𝜋
∗𝑉
𝜕𝑤𝐷
< 0
When 𝑉 ’s budget constraint binds, but 𝐷 still has enough resources, the victim obtains
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𝜋 ∗𝑉 = √
𝑤𝑉𝑚𝐷𝑥𝑝ℎ
𝑚𝑉 𝑏
𝑎 − 𝑤𝑉
The effects of interest are
𝜕𝜋 ∗𝑉
𝜕𝑎 = √
𝑤𝑉𝑚𝐷𝑥𝑝ℎ
𝑚𝑉 𝑏
> 0, 𝜕𝜋
∗𝑉
𝜕𝑏 = −
𝑎
2𝑏√
𝑤𝑉𝑚𝐷𝑥𝑝ℎ
𝑚𝑉 𝑏
< 0
𝜕𝜋 ∗𝑉
𝜕𝑚𝑉
= − 𝑎2𝑚𝑉 √
𝑤𝑉𝑚𝐷𝑥𝑝ℎ
𝑚𝑉 𝑏
< 0, 𝜕𝜋
∗𝑉
𝜕𝑚𝐷
= − 𝑎2√
𝑤𝑉 𝑥𝑝ℎ
𝑚𝐷𝑚𝑉 𝑏
> 0
𝜕𝜋 ∗𝑉
𝜕𝑤𝑉
= 𝑎2√
𝑚𝐷𝑥𝑝ℎ
𝑤𝑉𝑚𝑉 𝑏
− 1 > 0 ⇔ 𝑤𝑉 < 𝑎
2𝑥𝑝ℎ𝑚𝐷
4𝑏𝑚𝑉
, 𝜕𝜋
∗𝑉
𝜕𝑤𝐷
= 0
To support this equilibrium configuration, condition (52) from the proof of Proposition 2 is necessary. If
𝑎
𝑚𝑉
≥ 𝑏𝑚𝐷 , (52) implies 𝑤𝑉 <
𝑎2𝑥𝑝ℎ𝑚𝐷
4𝑏𝑚𝑉
, and 𝜕𝜋
∗𝑉
𝜕𝑤𝑉
> 0 always holds. Otherwise, 𝜕𝜋
∗𝑉
𝜕𝑤𝑉
> 0 for 𝑤𝑉 < 𝑎
2𝑥𝑝ℎ𝑚𝐷
4𝑏𝑚𝑉
and 𝜕𝜋
∗𝑉
𝜕𝑤𝑉
≤ 0 for 𝑤𝑉 ∈ [ 𝑎
2𝑥𝑝ℎ𝑚𝐷
4𝑏𝑚𝑉
, 𝑚𝑉 𝑥𝑝
ℎ𝑎2𝑚𝐷𝑏
(𝑎𝑚𝐷+𝑏𝑚𝑉 )2
). Take
?̃?𝑉 = min {
𝑎2𝑥𝑝ℎ𝑚𝐷
4𝑏𝑚𝑉
, 𝑚𝑉
𝑥𝑝ℎ𝑎2𝑚𝐷𝑏
(𝑎𝑚𝐷 + 𝑏𝑚𝑉 )
2 }
and the claim of the proposition follows.
Finally, we study the case when both contestants face tight budget constraints (condition (53) from
the proof of Proposition 2):
𝜋 ∗𝑉 = 𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ𝑃𝐶 (𝑤𝑉𝑚𝑉 ,
𝑤𝐷
𝑚𝐷
) − 𝑤𝑉
𝜕𝜋 ∗𝑉
𝜕𝑎 = 𝑥𝑝
ℎ𝑃𝐶 (𝑤𝑉𝑚𝑉 ,
𝑤𝐷
𝑚𝐷
) > 0, 𝜕𝜋
∗𝑉
𝜕𝑏 = 0
𝜕𝜋 ∗𝑉
𝜕𝑚𝑉
= −𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ 𝑤𝑉𝑤𝐷𝑚𝐷(𝑤𝑉𝑚𝐷+𝑤𝐷𝑚𝑉 )2 < 0,
𝜕𝜋 ∗𝑉
𝜕𝑚𝐷
= 𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ 𝑤𝐷𝑤𝑉𝑚𝑉(𝑤𝑉𝑚𝐷+𝑤𝐷𝑚𝑉 )2 > 0
𝜕𝜋 ∗𝑉
𝜕𝑤𝑉
= 𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ 𝑤𝐷𝑚𝑉𝑚𝐷(𝑤𝑉𝑚𝐷+𝑤𝐷𝑚𝑉 )2 − 1 > 0 ⇔ ∑
2
𝑖=1
𝑤𝑖
𝑚𝑖
< √
𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ𝑤𝐷
𝑚𝑉𝑚𝐷
𝜕𝜋 ∗𝑉
𝜕𝑤𝐷
= −𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ 𝑤𝑉𝑚𝐷𝑚𝑉(𝑤𝑉𝑚𝐷+𝑤𝐷𝑚𝑉 )2 < 0
Define ?̃?𝑉 = min {√
𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ𝑤𝐷
𝑚𝑉𝑚𝐷
𝑚𝑉 − 𝑚𝑉𝑚𝐷 𝑤𝐷 , 𝑚𝑉
𝑥𝑝ℎ𝑎2𝑚𝐷𝑏
(𝑎𝑚𝐷+𝑏𝑚𝑉 )2
} and get the statement of the proposition.
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Proposition 5. There exist non-empty sets of “preference–abilities” profiles 𝑌 ̄𝑆 ⊂ 𝑌𝑎>𝑏 and 𝑌𝑆 ⊂ 𝑌𝑎>𝑏
such that
• For any 𝑦 ∈ 𝑌 ̄𝑆 the defendant has enough resources to settle but is not willing to do so:
⎧
⎨
⎩
−𝑥𝑝ℎ𝑃𝐶 (𝑒∗𝑉 , 𝑒∗𝐷) (𝑎 − 𝑏) + 𝑚𝑉 𝑒∗𝑉 +𝑚𝐷𝑒∗𝐷 < 0
𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ𝑃𝐶 (𝑒∗𝑉 , 𝑒𝐷) − 𝑚𝑉 𝑒∗𝑉 ≤ 𝑤𝐷
≠ Ø
• For any 𝑦 ∈ 𝑌𝑆 the defendant has enough resources to settle and is willing to do so:
⎧
⎨
⎩
−𝑥𝑝ℎ𝑃𝐶 (𝑒∗𝑉 , 𝑒∗𝐷) (𝑎 − 𝑏) + 𝑚𝑉 𝑒∗𝑉 +𝑚𝐷𝑒∗𝐷 ≥ 0
𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ𝑃𝐶 (𝑒∗𝑉 , 𝑒𝐷) − 𝑚𝑉 𝑒∗𝑉 ≤ 𝑤𝐷
≠ Ø
Proof. To prove the proposition, we analyze all equilibriumoutcomes separately. Define ?̃?𝐷 = 𝑚𝐷 𝑥𝑝
ℎ𝑏2𝑎𝑚𝑉
(𝑎𝑚𝐷+𝑏𝑚𝑉 )2
and ?̃?𝑉 = 𝑚 𝑥𝑝
ℎ𝑎2𝑒𝑏
(𝑎𝑒+𝑏𝑚)2 . First, take the case when contestants’ budget constraints do not bind. Condition
(50) from the proof of Proposition 2 supports this scenario. In equilibrium, players obtain
𝜋 ∗𝑉 = 𝑎𝑚𝐷 𝑎
2𝑚𝐷𝑥𝑝ℎ
(𝑎𝑚𝐷+𝑏𝑚𝑉 )2
𝜋 ∗𝐷 = − 𝑎𝑚𝐷𝑏𝑥𝑝
ℎ
(𝑎𝑚𝐷+𝑏𝑚𝑉 )2
(𝑎𝑚𝐷 + 2𝑏𝑚𝑉 )
The optimal settlement offer is 𝑆 = 𝜋 ∗𝑉 (Lemma 1). The game does not proceed to the contest stage if and
only if
⎧
⎨
⎩
𝜋 ∗𝐷 ≤ −𝑆
𝑆 ≤ 𝑤𝐷
⇔
⎧
⎨
⎩
𝑚𝑉 ≥ 𝑎𝑚𝐷(𝑎−𝑏)2𝑏2 = ?̂?𝑉
𝑤𝐷 ≥ 𝑎
3𝑚2𝐷𝑥𝑝ℎ
(𝑎𝑚𝐷+𝑏𝑚𝑉 )2
The latter inequality always defines a non-empty intersection with condition (50). Taking𝑚𝑉 ∈ [0, ?̂?𝑉 )
and𝑤𝐷 ≥ max {?̃?𝐷 , 𝑎
3𝑚2𝐷𝑥𝑝ℎ
(𝑎𝑚𝐷+𝑏𝑚𝑉 )2
}, one gets the case when the settlement is feasible, but𝐷 strictly prefers
to fight:
𝑌 1̄𝑆 = {𝑦 ∈ 𝑌𝑎>𝑏 ∶ 𝑚𝑉 ∈ [0, ?̂?𝑉 ) , 𝑤𝑉 ≥ ?̃?𝑉 , 𝑤𝐷 ≥ max {?̃?𝐷 ,
𝑎3𝑚2𝐷𝑥𝑝ℎ
(𝑎𝑚𝐷 + 𝑏𝑚𝑉 )
2 }}
where 𝑌 ̄𝑆 ⊂ 𝑌𝑎>𝑏 . A set of “preference–abilities” profiles such that the settlement indeed happens looks
as follows:
𝑌 1𝑆 = {𝑦 ∈ 𝑌𝑎>𝑏 ∶ 𝑚𝑉 ≥ ?̂?𝑉 , 𝑤𝑉 ≥ ?̃?𝑉 , 𝑤𝐷 ≥ max {?̃?𝐷 ,
𝑎3𝑚2𝐷𝑥𝑝ℎ
(𝑎𝑚𝐷 + 𝑏𝑚𝑉 )
2 }}
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Next, consider the equilibrium where 𝐷’s budget constraint binds (condition (51) from the proof of
Proposition 2 is needed):
𝜋 ∗𝑉 = 𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ − 2√
𝑤𝐷𝑚𝑉 𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ
𝑚𝐷
+ 𝑚𝑉𝑤𝐷𝑚𝐷
𝜋 ∗𝐷 = −𝑏𝑥𝑝ℎ +√
𝑤𝐷𝑚𝑉 𝑥𝑝ℎ
𝑚𝐷𝑎
𝑏 − 𝑤𝐷
𝐷 makes a settlement offer if and only if
⎧
⎨
⎩
𝜋 ∗𝐷 ≤ −𝑆
𝑆 ≤ 𝑤𝐷
⇔
⎧
⎨
⎩
𝜋 ∗𝑉 ≤ 𝑏𝑥𝑝ℎ −√
𝑤𝐷𝑚𝑉 𝑥𝑝ℎ
𝑚𝐷𝑎
𝑏 + 𝑤𝐷
𝜋 ∗𝑉 ≤ 𝑤𝐷
When condition (51) holds, it must be {𝑥𝑝ℎ −√
𝑤𝐷𝑚𝑉 𝑥𝑝ℎ
𝑚𝐷𝑎
> 0}. Then, {𝑆 ≤ 𝑤𝐷} implies {𝜋 ∗𝐷 ≤ −𝑆}, i.e. a
feasible settlement is always desirable by 𝐷. The {𝑆 ≤ 𝑤𝐷} condition holds if and only if
𝑤𝐷 (
𝑚𝐷 −𝑚𝑉
𝑚𝐷
) + 2√𝑤𝐷√
𝑚𝑉 𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ
𝑚𝐷
− 𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ ≥ 0
Solving the underlying equation for √𝑤𝐷 delivers two real roots, 𝑟1 and 𝑟2:
𝑟1, 2 =
𝑚𝐷 (±√𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ −√
𝑚𝑉 𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ
𝑚𝐷
)
𝑚𝐷 −𝑚𝑉
Depending on 𝑚𝐷 and 𝑚𝑉 , different cases emerge:
• 𝑚𝐷 > 𝑚𝑉 ⇒𝑟1 > 0, 𝑟2 < 0, and the settlement offer requires𝑤𝐷 ≥ 𝑟21 , and this defines a non-empty
intersection with condition (51) if and only if
⎧
⎨
⎩
𝑤𝐷 ≥ 𝑟21
𝑤𝐷 < 𝑚𝐷 𝑥𝑝
ℎ𝑏2𝑎𝑚𝑉
(𝑎𝑚𝐷+𝑏𝑚𝑉 )2
≠ Ø ⇔ 𝑟21 < 𝑚𝐷
𝑥𝑝ℎ𝑏2𝑎𝑚𝑉
(𝑎𝑚𝐷 + 𝑏𝑚𝑉 )
2 ⇔ 𝑚𝑉 >
𝑎2𝑚𝐷
𝑏2
With 𝑎 > 𝑏, the last inequality contradicts 𝑚𝐷 > 𝑚𝑉 , and no settlement offer is made.
• 𝑚𝐷 < 𝑚𝑉 ⇒ 𝑟1 < 0, 𝑟2 > 0, and the offer appears under 𝑤𝐷 ≤ 𝑟22 . Hence, 𝑉 and 𝐷 settle if and
only if 𝑤𝐷 < min {𝑟22 , ?̃?𝐷}:
𝑌 2𝑆 = {𝑦 ∈ 𝑌𝑎>𝑏 ∶ 𝑚𝑉 > 𝑚𝐷 , 𝑤𝑉 ≥ ?̃?𝑉 , 𝑤𝐷 < min {𝑟22 , ?̃?𝐷}}
Further, we analyze the case when only 𝑉 ’s budget constraint binds (condition (52) from the proof of
Proposition 2):
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𝜋 ∗𝑉 = √
𝑤𝑉𝑚𝐷𝑥𝑝ℎ
𝑚𝑉 𝑏
𝑎 − 𝑤𝑉
𝜋 ∗𝐷 = −2√
𝑤𝑉𝑚𝐷𝑏𝑥𝑝ℎ
𝑚𝑉
+ 𝑚𝐷𝑤𝑉𝑚𝑉
It is optimal to settle if and only if
⎧
⎨
⎩
𝜋 ∗𝐷 ≤ −𝑆
𝑆 ≤ 𝑤𝐷
⇔
⎧
⎨
⎩
√𝑤𝑉 (𝑚𝐷−𝑚𝑉 )𝑚𝑉 ≤ √
𝑚𝐷𝑥𝑝ℎ
𝑚𝑉 𝑏
(2𝑏 − 𝑎)
√
𝑤𝑉𝑚𝐷𝑥𝑝ℎ
𝑚𝑉 𝑏
𝑎 − 𝑤𝑉 ≤ 𝑤𝐷
If 𝐷 has enough wealth (𝑤𝐷 ≥ ?̂?𝐷 = max {?̃?𝐷 , √
𝑤𝑉𝑚𝑉 𝑥𝑝ℎ
𝑚𝐷𝑏
𝑎 − 𝑤𝑉 }), the second inequality always holds,
i.e. the settlement is feasible. However, the willingness to settle (𝜋 ∗𝐷 ≤ −𝑆) strongly depends on players’
preferences and fighting abilities:
• 𝑚𝐷 > 𝑚𝑉 (𝑉 has an advantage in non-monetary fighting abilities)⇒ two cases emerge:
– 𝑎 ≥ 2𝑏 (𝑉 is vindictive enough)⇒𝐷 never wants to settle:
√𝑤𝑉 ≤ √
𝑚𝐷𝑥𝑝ℎ
𝑚𝑉 𝑏
(2𝑏 − 𝑎)𝑚𝑉
(𝑚𝐷 −𝑚𝑉 )
< 0, 𝑎 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑌 2̄𝑆 = {𝑦 ∈ 𝑌𝑎>𝑏 ∶ 𝑚𝐷 > 𝑚𝑉 , 𝑎 ≥ 2𝑏, 𝑤𝑉 < ?̃?𝑉 , 𝑤𝐷 ≥ ?̂?𝐷}
– 𝑎 ∈ (𝑏, 2𝑏) ⇒ 𝐷 is willing to settle if and only if
𝑤𝑉 < ?̂?𝑉 = min {𝑚𝐷
𝑚𝑉 𝑥𝑝ℎ (2𝑏 − 𝑎)2
𝑏 (𝑚𝐷 −𝑚𝑉 )
2 , ?̃?𝑉 }
When 𝑚𝑉 < ?̂?𝑉 , it must be
min {𝑚𝑉
𝑚𝐷𝑥𝑝ℎ (2𝑏 − 𝑎)2
𝑏 (𝑚𝐷 −𝑚𝑉 )
2 , ?̃?𝑉 } = 𝑚𝑉
𝑚𝐷𝑥𝑝ℎ (2𝑏 − 𝑎)2
𝑏 (𝑚𝐷 −𝑚𝑉 )
2 ≡ ?̄?𝑉
Then, one can specify non-empty subsets of 𝑌 ̄𝑆 and 𝑌𝑆 :
𝑌 3̄𝑆 = {𝑦 ∈ 𝑌𝑎>𝑏 ∶ 𝑚𝐷 > 𝑚𝑉 , 𝑚𝑉 < ?̂?𝑉 , 𝑎 ∈ (𝑏, 2𝑏) , 𝑤𝑉 ∈ [?̂?𝑉 , ?̃?𝑉 ) , 𝑤𝐷 ≥ ?̂?𝐷}
𝑌 3𝑆 = {𝑦 ∈ 𝑌𝑎>𝑏 ∶ 𝑚𝐷 > 𝑚𝑉 , 𝑚𝑉 < ?̂?𝑉 , 𝑎 ∈ (𝑏, 2𝑏) , 𝑤𝑉 < ?̂?𝑉 , 𝑤𝐷 ≥ ?̂?𝐷}
𝑌 4𝑆 = {𝑦 ∈ 𝑌𝑎>𝑏 ∶ 𝑚𝐷 > 𝑚𝑉 , 𝑚𝑉 ≥ ?̂?𝑉 , 𝑎 ∈ (𝑏, 2𝑏) , 𝑤𝑉 < ?̂?𝑉 , 𝑤𝐷 ≥ ?̂?𝐷}
• 𝑚𝐷 < 𝑚𝑉 (𝐷 has an advantage in non-monetary fighting abilities) :
– 𝑎 ≥ 2𝑏 (𝑉 is vindictive enough)⇒𝐷 makes an offer if and only if
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𝑤𝑉 ∈ (?̄?𝑉 , ?̃?𝑉 )
and this set is non-empty if and only if𝑚𝑉 > ?̂?𝑉 . With this result, non-empty subsets of 𝑌 ̄𝑆
and 𝑌𝑆 are
𝑌 4̄𝑆 = {𝑦 ∈ 𝑌𝑎>𝑏 ∶ 𝑚𝐷 < 𝑚𝑉 , 𝑚𝑉 ≤ ?̂?𝑉 , 𝑎 ≥ 2𝑏, 𝑤𝑉 < ?̃?𝑉 , 𝑤𝐷 ≥ ?̂?𝐷}
𝑌 5̄𝑆 = {𝑦 ∈ 𝑌𝑎>𝑏 ∶ 𝑚𝐷 < 𝑚𝑉 , 𝑚𝑉 > ?̂?𝑉 , 𝑎 ≥ 2𝑏, 𝑤𝑉 ≤ ?̄?𝑉 , 𝑤𝐷 ≥ ?̂?𝐷}
𝑌 5𝑆 = {𝑦 ∈ 𝑌𝑎>𝑏 ∶ 𝑚𝐷 < 𝑚𝑉 , 𝑚𝑉 > ?̂?𝑉 , 𝑎 ≥ 2𝑏, 𝑤𝑉 ∈ (?̄?𝑉 , ?̃?𝑉 ) , 𝑤𝐷 ≥ ?̂?𝐷}
– If 𝑉 does not get sufficient benefits from 𝐷 being punished (𝑎 ∈ (𝑏, 2𝑏)), the defendant
always prefers to settle:
𝑌 6𝑆 = {𝑦 ∈ 𝑌𝑎>𝑏 ∶ 𝑚𝐷 < 𝑚𝑉 , 𝑎 ∈ (𝑏, 2𝑏) , 𝑤𝑉 < ?̃?𝑉 , 𝑤𝐷 ≥ ?̂?𝐷}
Finally, check the equilibrium where both contestants face binding budget constraints (condition (53)
from the proof of Proposition 2):
𝜋 ∗𝑉 = 𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ𝑃𝐶 (𝑤𝑉𝑚𝑉 ,
𝑤𝐷
𝑚𝐷
) − 𝑤𝑉
𝜋 ∗𝐷 = −𝑏𝑥𝑝ℎ𝑃𝐶 (𝑤𝑉𝑚𝑉 ,
𝑤𝐷
𝑚𝐷
) − 𝑤𝐷
The settlement requires
⎧
⎨
⎩
𝜋 ∗𝐷 ≤ −𝑆
𝑆 ≤ 𝑤𝐷
⇔
⎧
⎨
⎩
𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ𝑃𝐶 (𝑤𝑉𝑚𝑉 ,
𝑤𝐷
𝑚𝐷
) − 𝑤𝑉 ≤ 𝑏𝑥𝑝ℎ𝑃𝐶 (𝑤𝑉𝑚 ,
𝑤𝐷
𝑒 ) + 𝑤𝐷
𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ𝑃𝐶 (𝑤𝑉𝑚𝑉 ,
𝑤𝐷
𝑚𝐷
) − 𝑤𝑉 ≤ 𝑤𝐷
where the latter inequality implies the former one. Thus, if the settlement is feasible, 𝐷 does not want
to move to the contest stage. One can reduce the second condition to
𝑤2𝑉𝑚𝐷 + (𝑤𝐷 (𝑚𝐷 +𝑚𝑉 ) − 𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ𝑚𝐷) 𝑤𝑉 + 𝑤2𝐷𝑚𝑉 ≥ 0 (61)
If (53) holds, it must be {𝑤𝐷 (𝑚𝐷 +𝑚𝑉 ) − 𝑎𝑥𝑝ℎ < 0}, and (61) may be violated. When we solve (61) with
respect to 𝑤𝑉 , two possibilities appear:
• The discriminant of the underlying square equation is non-negative ⇒ there are two real roots,
̃𝑟1 and ̃𝑟2, 0 < ̃𝑟1 ≤ ̃𝑟2. Then, (61) is satisfied for any 𝑤𝑉 ∈ [0, ̃𝑟1] ∪ [ ̃𝑟2, ∞), and we can define a
non-empty subset of 𝑌𝑆 :
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𝑌 6𝑆 = {𝑦 ∈ 𝑌𝑎>𝑏 ∶ 𝑤𝑉 < min { ̃𝑟1, ?̃?𝑉 } , 𝑤𝐷 < ?̃?𝐷}
• The discriminant of the underlying square equation is negative⇒ (61) always holds:
𝑌 7𝑆 = {𝑦 ∈ 𝑌𝑎>𝑏 ∶ 𝑤𝑉 < ?̃?𝑉 , 𝑤𝐷 < ?̃?𝐷}
Finally, define 𝑌 ̄𝑆 and 𝑌𝑆 as follows:
𝑌 ̄𝑆 = ∪5𝑖=1𝑌 𝑖 ̄𝑆 , 𝑌𝑆 = ∪7𝑖=1𝑌 𝑖𝑆
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Figure 10: The Distribution of 𝑉 ’s Expected Wealth (?̄? 𝑖𝑉 ): All Cases (𝑁𝑎𝑙𝑙 )
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Table 41: Goodness-of-Fit: All Cases and Different Group (𝑁𝑎𝑙𝑙 )
Moments 𝐸(𝑃𝑆) 𝐸(𝑃𝐶 | 𝑛𝑜 𝑆) 𝐸(𝑃(𝑥 ∗ = 1) | 𝐶)
Samples Data Sim. Data Sim. Data Sim.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Groups by victim-specific characteristics
Female victim .196 .15 .444 .444 .382 .432
(2.9e-4) (6.1e-4) (6.8e-4)
Child victim .161 .385 .398 0.32 .413 0.54
(5.9e-4) (1.6e-3) (1.7e-3)
Unemployed victim .148 .166 .454 .424 .457 .447
(2.8e-4) (5.7e-4) (8.3e-4)
Victim of age 30–49 .168 .102 .463 .442 .415 .436
(3.4e-4) (6.8e-4) (8.9e-4)
Groups by defendant-specific characteristics
Female defendant .214 .164 .437 .436 .187 .393
(5.3e-4) (1.2e-3) (1.9e-3)
Defendant of age 25–29 .21 .128 .485 .462 .418 .438
(3.2e-4) (7.4e-4) (1.2e-3)
Defendant of age 30–39 .156 .156 .508 .434 .4 .452
(3.8e-4) (6.9e-4) (9.9e-4)
Defendant is a law enforcer or .143 .172 .5 .448 .5 .424
a government official
(2.1e-3) (4.1e-3) (6.8e-3)
Defendant holds a college degree .245 .175 .432 .418 .316 .424
(4.8e-4) (1.04e-3) (1.4e-3)
Defendant holds a high school .104 .156 .535 .439 .487 .442
degree
(3.1e-4) (5.9e-4) (9.4e-4)
Defendant has a criminal record .132 .139 .454 .442 .444 .513
(3.7e-4) (5.7e-4) (9.6e-4)
Note:
To simulate the model, 1’000 draws from the estimated distributions of 𝑤𝑉 , 𝑤𝐷 , 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑚𝑉 , 𝑚𝐷 , and 𝑥𝑝ℎ are taken. This procedure
is repeated 100 times.
𝐸(𝑃𝑆) denotes an expected probability to settle. 𝐸(𝑃𝐶 | 𝑛𝑜 𝑆) reflects an expected probability to end up in court given no settlement.
𝐸(𝑃(𝑥 = 1 | 𝐶)) defines an expected probability to get a real sentence once the case goes to court. For the data, 𝐸(𝑃𝑆), 𝐸(𝑃𝐶 | 𝑛𝑜 𝑆),
and 𝐸(𝑃(𝑥 = 1 | 𝐶)) correspond to a frequency of observing 𝑠 = 1, 𝑐 = 1, and 𝑥 ∗ = 1, respectively. In case of simulations, the values
are computed based on the estimated distributions. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
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Table 42: Estimation Results: “Car vs. Pedestrian” Cases (𝑁𝑝)
Victim’s Wealth
Variable Coefficient St. Error
Intercept 88.62 87.484
𝑆𝐸𝑆𝑉 :
worker 21.31∗∗∗ 2.348
office worker 88.14∗∗∗ 1.157
top-manager 44.49∗∗∗ 2.849
entrepreneur −12.02∗∗∗ .074
budget office worker 92.03∗∗∗ 8.033
student 82.34∗∗ 32.502
welfare recipient −3.21 4.265
retired 88.52∗∗∗ 0.534
other 90.67∗∗∗ 26.314
𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑉 27.72∗∗∗ 1.573
𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑉 137.05∗∗ 2.058
𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑉 45.71∗∗∗ 1.629
𝑎𝑔𝑒2𝑉 −0.53∗∗ .267
Defendant’s Wealth
Intercept 22.72 25.329
𝑆𝐸𝑆𝐷 :
worker 66.19∗∗ 25.753
office worker 87.37∗∗∗ .163
top-manager 36.3∗ 21.161
entrepreneur 88.59∗∗∗ 1.474
budget office worker 96.7∗∗∗ 3.779
student 105.1∗∗∗ 1.396
welfare recipient 25.8∗∗∗ .408
retired 66.5∗∗∗ .9
other 25.66 23.324
𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝐷 21.34∗∗∗ 1.279
𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐷 57.36∗∗∗ .326
𝑎𝑔𝑒2𝐷 −0.81∗∗∗ .113
𝑒𝑑𝑢𝐷 104.18∗∗∗ 15.686
𝑝𝑐𝑎𝑟𝐷 1 None
Vindictiveness (𝑎)
Intercept 89.71∗∗∗ 24.232
𝑤𝑉 0.19 30.175
Defendant’s Disutility of Punishment (𝑏)
Intercept 73.21∗∗∗ 0.185
𝑤𝐷 18.72 18.612
𝑁 1055
Non-Monetary Fighting Abilities
Variable Coefficient St.Error
Victim:
Intercept 56.87∗∗∗ 2.119
𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑒𝑛𝑓𝑉 56.55∗∗ 23.13
Defendant:
Intercept 8.81∗∗∗ 2.02
𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑒𝑛𝑓𝐷 12.57 19.829
Accident and Harm
Number of
dead victims 154.81∗∗∗ 26.143
victims with 11.18 15.245
serious injuries
dead minor victims 82.52∗∗∗ 1.604
minor victims with 166.56∗∗∗ 16.826
serious injuries
dead female victims 90.19∗∗∗ 1.903
female victims with −1.25∗∗∗ 4.739
serious injuries
dead minor 28.28∗∗∗ 3.352
female victims
minor female victims 12.69 27.234
with serious injuries
𝑑𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑘𝐷 173.7∗∗∗ .332
𝑑𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑘𝑉 −34.22∗∗∗ .378
𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐷 89.06∗∗∗ .631
𝑎𝑑𝑚ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐷 37.89∗∗∗ .832
𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝐷 81.42∗∗∗ 27.426
Region-specific Yes
controls
𝑡 291.18∗∗∗ .436
Underlying Distributions
𝜎𝑤𝑉 12.91∗∗∗ .246
𝜎𝑤𝐷 10.61∗∗∗ 1.977
𝜎𝑎 11.07∗∗∗ .528
𝜎𝑏 4.1∗∗∗ .189
𝜎𝑚𝑉 7.75∗∗∗ .239
𝜎𝑚𝐷 67.83∗∗∗ .331
𝜎𝑥 158.87∗∗∗ 12.441
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐿) –1501.21
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Table 43: Goodness-of-Fit: “Car vs. Pedestrian” Cases (𝑁𝑝)
Moments 𝐸(𝑃𝑆) 𝐸(𝑃𝐶 | 𝑛𝑜 𝑆) 𝐸(𝑃(𝑥 ∗ = 1) | 𝐶)
Samples Data Sim. Data Sim. Data Sim.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All cases: .163 .123 .399 .495 .406 .453
(2.7e-4) (1.3e-3) (6.7e-4)
Pearson’s 𝜒 2 stat. 38.78
Critical 𝜒 23 (𝛼 = .99) 9.21
Groups by victim-specific characteristics
Female victim .173 .12 .392 .5 .41 .462
(4.3e-4) (1.7e-3) (9.8e-4)
Child victim .187 .17 .356 .418 .46 .598
(8.8e-4) (2.9e-3) (2.2e-3)
Unemployed victim .16 .12 .384 .507 .435 .476
(4.1e-4) (1.7e-3) (1.1e-3)
Victim of age 30–49 .13 .112 .38 .515 .39 .423
(6e-4) (2.3e-3) (1.3e-3)
Groups by defendant-specific characteristics
Female defendant .179 .156 .344 .446 .12 .329
(1.01e-3) (4.3e-3) (2.5e-3)
Defendant of age 25–29 .206 .126 .398 .491 .391 .459
(6.3e-4) (2.6e-3) (1.5e-3)
Defendant of age 30–39 .151 .123 .4 .495 .51 .499
(5.3e-4) (1.9e-3) (1.5e-3)
Defendant is a law enforcer or .167 .1 .5 .571 .6 .551
a government official
(2.7e-3) (6e-3) (6.8e-3)
Defendant holds a college degree .195 .15 .28 .461 .283 .4
(6.8e-4) (2.8e-3) (1.8e-3)
Defendant holds a high school .07 .1 .463 .514 .513 .455
degree
(4.6e-4) (2e-3) (1.1e-3)
Defendant has a criminal record .162 .08 .446 .548 .419 .577
(6.1e-4) (2.1e-3) (1.5e-3)
Note:
To simulate the model, 1’000 draws from the estimated distributions of 𝑤𝑉 , 𝑤𝐷 , 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑚𝑉 , 𝑚𝐷 , and 𝑥𝑝ℎ are taken. This procedure
is repeated 100 times.
𝐸(𝑃𝑆) denotes an expected probability to settle. 𝐸(𝑃𝐶 | 𝑛𝑜 𝑆) reflects an expected probability to end up in court given no settlement.
𝐸(𝑃(𝑥 = 1 | 𝐶)) defines an expected probability to get a real sentence once the case goes to court. For the data, 𝐸(𝑃𝑆), 𝐸(𝑃𝐶 | 𝑛𝑜 𝑆),
and 𝐸(𝑃(𝑥 = 1 | 𝐶)) correspond to a frequency of observing 𝑠 = 1, 𝑐 = 1, and 𝑥 ∗ = 1, respectively. In case of simulations, the values
are computed based on the estimated distributions. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
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Table 44: The Effects of Increasing 𝐷’s Wealth: “Car vs. Pedestrian” Cases (𝑁𝑝)
Moments 𝐸(𝑃𝑆) 𝑁𝑆 ̄𝑆
Wealth
𝑤1𝐷 = 728 .01 10 1.28
(5.2e-5) (.055) (.012)
𝑤2𝐷 = 2′082 .026 28 11
(6.8e-5) (.072) (.063)
𝑤3𝐷 = 2′250 .028 30 12.87
(8.2e-5) (.087) (.055)
𝑤4𝐷 = 2′444 .03 32 15.3
(8.3e-5) (.088) (.079)
𝑤5𝐷 = 2′816 .035 37 20.49
(5.1e-5) (.053) (.075)
𝑤6𝐷 = 7′283 .084 89 138.73
(1.3e-4) (.139) (.348)
𝑤7𝐷 = 19′405 .178 187 702.79
(9.5e-5) (.1) (.788)
𝑤8𝐷 = 20′826 .185 195 765.45
(1e-4) (.114) (1.425)
𝑤9𝐷 = 22′506 .192 203 834.1
(9.7e-5) (.103) (1.639)
𝑤10𝐷 = 27′145 .21 221 993.45
(9.2e-5) (.097) (1.569)
𝑤11𝐷 = 28′166 .213 224 1’020.51
(7.6e-5) (.08) (1.543)
𝑤12𝐷 = 41′653 .237 250 1’190.61
(5e-5) (.053) (1.864)
𝑤13𝐷 = 45′013 .241 253 1’183.92
(4.8e-5) (.05) (1.839)
𝑤14𝐷 = 48′891 .243 256 1’162.33
(3.7e-5) (.039) (2.149)
𝑤15𝐷 = 56′333 .246 260 1’084.4
(2.3e-5) (.024) (2.065)
Note:
To simulate the model, 1’000 draws from the estimated distributions of 𝑤𝑉 , 𝑤𝐷 , 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑚𝑉 , 𝑚𝐷 , and 𝑥𝑝ℎ are taken. This procedure
is repeated 100 times. 𝑤1𝐷–𝑤5𝐷 correspond to 0, .25, .5, .75, and 1 quantiles of ?̄? 𝑖𝐷 ’s estimated distribution; 𝑤6𝐷–𝑤10𝐷 and 𝑤11𝐷 –𝑤15𝐷
reflect 𝑤1𝐷–𝑤5𝐷 multiplied by 10 and 20, respectively. 𝑤𝐷 is measured in rubles. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 45: The Effects of Increasing 𝑉 ’s Wealth: All Cases (𝑁𝑎𝑙𝑙 )
Moments 𝐸(𝑃𝑆) 𝑃(𝑎 > 𝑏) 𝑃(𝑆 ∈ ( −𝜋 ∗𝐷 , 𝑤𝐷] )
Wealth
𝑤1𝑉 = 13′099 4.2e-3 0 0
(2e-5) (–) (–)
𝑤2𝑉 = 51′082 1.1e-3 0 0
(1.3e-5) (–) (–)
𝑤3𝑉 = 130′995 4.6e-4 0 0
(6.5e-6) (–) (–)
𝑤4𝑉 = 168′875 3.6e-4 0 0
(7.2e-6) (–) (–)
𝑤5𝑉 = 261′991 2.3e-4 0 0
(5.1e-6) (–) (–)
𝑤6𝑉 = 392′987 1.6e-4 0 0
(4.4e-6) (–) (–)
𝑤7𝑉 = 510′826 1.2e-4 0 0
(3.8e-6) (–) (–)
𝑤8𝑉 = 523′983 1.2e-4 0 0
(3.9e-6) (–) (–)
𝑤9𝑉 = 1′021′652 6.2e-5 .23 4.8e-8
(2.5e-6) (–) (6.9e-8)
𝑤10𝑉 = 1′532′479 4.1e-5 .23 5.3e-7
(2e-6) (–) (2.3e-7)
𝑤11𝑉 = 1′688′750 3.7e-5 .39 5.3e-7
(2.2e-6) (5.1e-5) (2.4e-7)
𝑤12𝑉 = 2′043′305 3e-5 .46 7.2e-7
(2.1e-6) (–) (2.7e-7)
𝑤13𝑉 = 3′377′500 1.7e-5 .72 1.2e-6
(1.1e-6) (–) (3.7e-7)
𝑤14𝑉 = 5′066′250 1e-5 .86 1.3e-6
(9.5e-7) (–) (3.2e-7)
𝑤15𝑉 = 6′755′000 6.9e-6 .95 1.4e-6
(9.4e-7) (–) (4.1e-7)
Note:
To simulate the model, 1’000 draws from the estimated distributions of 𝑤𝑉 , 𝑤𝐷 , 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑚𝑉 , 𝑚𝐷 , and 𝑥𝑝ℎ are taken. This procedure
is repeated 100 times. 𝑤 𝑖𝑉 , 𝑖 = {1, ..., 15} correspond to rescaled and sorted 0, .5, and 1 quantiles of ?̄? 𝑖𝑉 ’s estimated distribution
(scaling factors are located between 1 and 40). ?̄? 𝑖𝑉 is measured in rubles. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 46: The Effects of Increasing 𝑉 ’s Wealth: “Car vs. Pedestrian” Cases (𝑁𝑝)
Moments 𝐸(𝑃𝑆) 𝑃(𝑎 > 𝑏) 𝑃(𝑆 ∈ ( −𝜋 ∗𝐷 , 𝑤𝐷] )
Wealth
𝑤1𝑉 = 14′567 1e-3 0 0
(1.9e-5) (–) (–)
𝑤2𝑉 = 21′850 6.9e-4 0 0
(1.5e-5) (–) (–)
𝑤3𝑉 = 29′134 5.2e-4 0 0
(7.4e-6) (–) (–)
𝑤4𝑉 = 36′417 4.3e-4 0 0
(1e-5) (–) (–)
𝑤5𝐷 = 45′013 3.6e-4 0 0
(6.4e-6) (–) (–)
𝑤6𝐷 = 56′333 2.9e-4 0 0
(8.4e-6) (–) (–)
𝑤7𝐷 = 67′520 2.4e-4 3.1e-5 0
(5.9e-6) (6.4e-6) (–)
𝑤8𝐷 = 84′500 1.9e-4 1 0
(8.7e-6) (–) (–)
𝑤9𝐷 = 90′026 1.8e-4 1 0
(7.5e-6) (–) (–)
𝑤10𝐷 = 112′533 1.4e-4 1 1.4e-6
(3.4e-6) (–) (4.9e-7)
𝑤11𝐷 = 112′667 1.3e-4 1 1.5e-6
(6e-6) (–) (5.3e-7)
𝑤12𝐷 = 140′834 1e-4 1 8.3e-6
(3.5e-6) (–) (1.2e-6)
Note:
To simulate the model, 1’000 draws from the estimated distributions of 𝑤𝑉 , 𝑤𝐷 , 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑚𝑉 , 𝑚𝐷 , and 𝑥𝑝ℎ are taken. This procedure
is repeated 100 times. 𝐷’s wealth is fixed at 𝑤 𝑖𝐷 = min𝑖 {?̄? 𝑖𝐷}. 𝑤 𝑖𝑉 , 𝑖 = {1, ..., 14} correspond to rescaled and sorted 0, .5, and 1
quantiles of ?̄? 𝑖𝑉 ’s estimated distribution (scaling factors are located between 1 and 50). ?̄? 𝑖𝑉 is measured in rubles. Standard errors
are reported in parentheses.
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Figure 11: The Distribution of 𝐷’s Expected Wealth (?̄? 𝑖𝐷 ): All Cases (𝑁𝑎𝑙𝑙 )
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Figure 12: The Distribution of 𝑉 ’s Expected Wealth (?̄? 𝑖𝑉 ): “Car vs. Pedestrian” Cases (𝑁𝑝)
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Figure 13: The Distribution of 𝐷’s Expected Wealth (?̄? 𝑖𝐷 ): “Car vs. Pedestrian” Cases (𝑁𝑝)
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